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Iraqi Women’s Narratives of Identity and Security: Challenging 
Dominant Knowledge 
 
This thesis examines narratives of Iraqi women in relation to US 
representations of them and in relation to their experiences of US foreign 
policy since 2003. Specifically, it asks: How do Iraqi women’s narratives 
disrupt existing knowledge about Muslim women since 9/11? Scholars of 
Feminist International Relations (IR) have argued that US narratives since 
9/11 have represented Muslim women as in need of saving in order to 
justify the US ‘War on Terror’, in particular with regards to the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Whilst these scholars have sought to deconstruct and 
oppose this discourse as disempowering to Muslim women, they have often 
not considered Muslim women’s own narratives and how these relate to 
dominant discourses about them. This serves to reproduce binaries of 
dominant/subordinate, powerful/powerless that underpin dominant relations 
of power and hegemonic epistemologies. 
 
This thesis is based on original data in the form of semi-structured 
interviews with 19 Iraqi women of different religious and class 
backgrounds, who are predominantly refugees from the conflict in Iraq and 
based in Jordan. Drawing on postcolonial feminist approaches and Feminist 
Security Studies, this thesis analyses these interviews as narratives of 
identity and security. The first substantive chapter considers the degree to 
which Iraqi women’s own narratives relate to US discourses about them. 
Towards this end, the chapter deploys Stuart Hall’s decoding theory and an 
intersectional approach to reveal that Iraqi women articulate a pluralistic 
positionality towards the US, premised on a complex relationship that 
endorses as well as contests elements of their representation. Individual 
women negotiate multiple positions towards different issues as expressions 
of their self-identity. Their narratives indicate both resistance and 
(re)negotiation within a hegemonic framework. This ambivalence disrupts 
dominant knowledge about Iraqi women yet is unacknowledged in the vast 
majority of the literature.  
 
The second substantive chapter considers Iraqi women’s narratives of their 
experiences of war, conflict, violence and displacement since 2003. 
Drawing on Feminist Security Studies and intersectionality, the chapter 
reveals the central concern of security and how it is constituted by as well as 
constitutive of self-identity. The chapter emphasizes that self-identity is 
constructed not only in relation to gender but also class and religious and 
ethnic background. Therefore, the chapter highlights that there is no unified 
conceptualization of security, and this differs between women according to 
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their different self-identities. In this way, the chapter contributes to de-
essentializing Muslim women’s experiences and disrupting hegemonic 
knowledge as well as further extending feminist understandings of the links 
between security and identity. 
 
Overall, this thesis argues for the significance of women’s narratives as 
sources of alternative knowledge production, challenging the binary 
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Note on Terminology 
 
There are number of terms adopted within this thesis which are potentially 
contentious but to which there is, at present, no better alternative choice that 
is widely used and readily understood. 
 
Iraqi women 
My use of ‘Iraqi women’ refers to women with Iraqi citizenship, those who 
are born in Iraq or to Iraqi parents. In using this term therefore, I wish only 
to denote women who have experienced life in Iraq and or who at some 
stage have identified as ‘Iraqi’. I shall highlight how each woman relates to 
Iraq differently and the ways in which she chooses to express her Iraqiness 
or the absence of it. 
 
Broader Middle East 
This is a relatively recent phrase that Özalp (2011) has shown emerged—
with synonyms such as Greater Middle East—in the US political lexis 
following the 9/11 terror attacks. It is problematic because, despite the 
obvious conflation it imposes on diverse countries and cultures, it has 
become commonplace. I reluctantly make use of it at points, as it is a 
recurring term in the representation of Iraqi women. 
 
Daesh 
The US State Department has repeatedly amended the term by which they 
nominate the terror group that formed in Syria and Iraq in recent years: it is 
variously referred to as the Islamic State (IS), the so-called Islamic State, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), and Daesh, the Arabic acronym for Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyah 
Al-Iraq Al-Sham. I use the latter designation, as it is the term most 
commonly used by the women I interviewed and also accords with the most 
recent usage of the US State Department. 
 
Muslim women 
This term is hugely problematic, as it has been used by US officials to 
denote women from the Middle East and beyond. It not only conflates 
women who are from different countries with distinct cultures, but it has 
also been used to denote all women from the Middle East, which is grossly 
inaccurate. I have reluctantly deployed this term in the spirit of tackling the 
issue of the representation of Muslim women, which is to say, in order to 
challenge this essentializing category.   
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Introduction: where are the Iraqi Women? 
 
The academic feminist must learn to learn from them [marginalized 
women], to speak to them, to suspect that their access to the political 
and sexual scene is not merely to be corrected by our superior 
theory and enlightened compassion (Spivak, 1988, p. 135, my 
emphasis) 
 
The exhortation of prominent postcolonial thinker Gayatri Spivak to ‘speak 
to [women]’ has been overlooked in feminist scholars’ recent approaches to 
the representation of Muslim women in US foreign policy narratives since 
the watershed, epoch-defining events of 9/11. While intense academic 
scrutiny has been placed on Western perspective of these events and the 
subsequent geo-political landscape, in which predominantly Muslim 
countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan have figured so centrally, there has 
been a noticeable tendency to exclude, or least consciously elide, the views 
and experiences of those who are often the object of such narratives, 
especially Muslim women.  
 
In examining how hegemonic authorities have implicitly discussed Muslim 
women’s security needs in their narratives, the majority of scholars also 
have made assumptions on their needs and have not considered how these 
women may themselves perceive US foreign policy, respond to their 
portrayal, or self-narrate. Once this observation is made, it naturally 
provokes several questions: why is it necessary to take seriously the 
narratives of Muslim women? Why should scholars recognise an obligation 
to ‘speak to’ women not merely ‘speak for’ them? Can the narratives 
produced by Muslim women themselves challenge dominant knowledge 
about them? What will these epistemological interventions mean for the 
field of International Relations (IR) in general and Feminist IR in particular? 
This study addresses these points and contributes to a shift in the way 
feminist IR scholars approach the representation of marginalized women. 
 
To begin addressing these critical questions, it is first helpful to establish 
briefly why the representations of Muslim women in US foreign policy 
narratives following 9/11 are of importance to feminist scholarship. One of 
the main motivating factors for academic consideration of this matter is tied 
to the linguistic focus in Feminist IRs work, which emphasizes the role of 
language in understanding power relations.  
 
Scholars have observed that since 9/11 women’s rights have occupied a 
central position in the rhetoric of US foreign policy. Monica Dux and Zora 
Simic (2008, p. 158) argue the Bush administration ‘attempted to justify the 
War on Terror as a crusade to spread women’s rights’ with the First Lady 
Laura Bush declaring that ‘the fight against terrorism is also the fight for the 
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rights and dignity of women’. The rhetoric of women’s rights became 
inextricable from the slogan of the ‘War on Terror’. This produced powerful 
social effects, as these texts formed what Michael Foucault (1980, p. 131) 
described as a ‘regime of truth’, whereby sets of ideas become accepted as 
objective truth, so that gradually it is perceived as no more than common 
sense to believe in the language espoused by those perpetuating and 
authorizing such ideas. In this instance, the Bush administration gained 
traction for public support by presenting the ‘War on Terror’ as a campaign 
not merely with military objectives but also, at least partially, for women’s 
rights.  Scholars in response to this rhetoric have been particularly attentive 
to studying the discursive language of the ‘War on Terror’: 
 
Although the events of 9/11 are actual happenings in the world, 
those events do not intrinsically contain their own interpretation. 
Only through language are such events turned into a full account of 
that experience. Through language, we name protagonists, ascribe 
motivations and provide explanation. Through language, we 
construct a narrative (Hodges, 2011, pp. 3–4). 
 
Scholars—such as Jasmine Zine (2006), Lila Abu Lughod (2002, 2013), 
Nadia Al-Sajji (2009), and Smeeta Mishra (2007) among others—have 
focused on the discourse of hegemonic narratives about Muslim women to 
pin down how the narratives of the Bush administration often represented 
Muslim women according to gendered or racializing logics that 
homogenized, victimized or otherwise diminished them. This has revealed a 
concerted effort to construct a ‘saving’ narrative behind the US presence in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (Khalid, 2014, p. 9). As such, scholars argue that this 
has produced binary oppositions that are gendered, emphasising in particular 
binaries of a masculinist hero versus feminised victim (see for example 
Shepherd 2006) and race-ed binaries such as civilized versus uncivilized 
(see for example Nayak 2006). These binaries have meant the identities of, 
for example, Afghani and Iraqi women have been collapsed into the singular 
category of Muslim women, to fit into the ‘War on Terror’s’ narrative of 
saving women from terrorists and terrorist-sponsoring states.  
 
Scholars argue that these representations are reminiscent of, and in many 
ways constitute a regressive revival of, historical oriental discourse, as 
Edward Said (1978) initially identified it in his seminal Orientalism. Said 
argued that the West essentialized the values and cultures of a diverse set of 
people into a general, primitive category, effectively constructing them in 
abstract and negative terms in order to bolster the West’s position as 
superior and to maintain power through dominant knowledge about others. 
Scholars, particularly postcolonial feminist scholars, have drawn on 
parallels with Said’s thesis to argue that since 9/11 US administrations have 
persistently deployed the tactic of essentialization in their representation of 
Muslim women and wider foreign policy narratives. They have 
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demonstrated how this dehumanises Muslim women, rendering them 
discursive symbols for Western political ambitions, and can in fact be 
regarded as an act of epistemological violence (Spivak, 1988). 
 
While scholarship that identifies and critiques essentialization and the 
construction of simplistic, symbolic figureheads within hegemonic 
narratives is a vital step towards understanding the workings of power 
relations, it is insufficient on its own. Simply identifying a binary as 
reductive and false does not in itself dismantle these assumptions or help to 
humanise those who are its objects.   
 
In identifying binaries, scholars have implicitly made assumptions about 
Muslim women’s agency a solely residing in opposing US foreign policy 
narratives. I argue, the omission of Muslim women’s own narratives and 
their perspective on their objectification in US narratives serves to recycle 
hegemonic knowledge, leaving scholars confined to operate within this 
epistemological framework. In effect, such an approach discounts Muslim 
women’s agency and erases their plurality of experience and identity.  
 
The prioritization of studying dominant knowledge has led feminist IR 
scholars to produce partial knowledge about US discourse on Muslim 
women, as we are only left with the scholars’ position on the subject.   
 
 
Standpoint Feminist Theory Approach: Contributions to the field of 
Feminist IR and Feminist Security Studies  
 
 
The work in this thesis is situated within the field of Feminist IR and in 
particular will build on the contributions from those scholars who have 
engaged with standpoint feminist theory to challenge the common 
assumptions in IR. Feminist IR scholars have attempted to respond to 
masculinist and realist approaches in the field of IR which have otherwise 
ignored women’s perspectives and experiences. Jill Steans explains that 
standpoint theory serves as a more general challenge mainstream IR’s 
positivist approach to knowledge, as traditional IR scholars regard ‘fact’ as 
objective truth. This leads to the marginalization of other ways of 
interpreting the world: ‘understanding’ and ‘explaining’ International 
Relations have been constructed in ways that delimit the scope of 
‘legitimate’ study in the field (Steans, 2006, p. 20). According to Susan 
Hekman: 
 
Standpoint theory constituted a challenge to the masculinist 
definition of truth and method embodied in modern Western science 
and epistemology. It established an alternative version of truth and, 
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with it, hope for a less repressive society (Susan Hekman, 1997, p. 
356). 
 
Hekman’s point about the significance of feminist standpoint theory in 
challenging dominant masculinist definition of truth can be seen in J. Ann 
Tickner’s work, who has adopted a feminist standpoint theory approach. 
Tickner tackles IR’s lack of engagement with feminist perspectives by 
encouraging IR scholars to take gender as a category of analysis seriously 
and to acknowledge the feminist standpoint in IR (Tickner, 1992, pp.17-19). 
Although it is important to include gender analysis and a feminist standpoint 
in IR, my thesis will also be mindful of other social categories, such as race 
and class, by engaging with the concept of intersectionality developed by 
Patricia Hill-Collins and Kimberle Crenshaw. The thesis will also include 
postcolonial thinkers’ discussions about the inclusion of non-Western 
knowledge to guard against Western-centric perspectives.  
 
Feminist scholars such as Cynthia Enloe and J. Ann Tickner have previously 
attempted to rectify the marginalization of different ways of interpreting IR 
by encouraging students and scholars to ‘make feminist sense of 
international politics’ (Enloe, 1989 and Tickner, 1992).This was in order to 
advocate the inclusion of women’s experiences  as valid perspectives of 
international politics. Enloe usefully developed the conceptual tool of 
‘feminist curiosity’ to help scholars ask questions which leads us to uncover 
women’s experiences and uncommon knowledge:  
 
What is distinctive about developing a feminist curiosity? One of the 
starting points of feminism is taking women’s lives seriously. 
“Seriously” implies listening carefully, digging deep, developing a 
long attention span, being ready to be surprised. Taking women—all 
sorts of women, in disparate times and places—seriously is not the 
same thing as valorizing women. Many women, of course, deserve 
praise, even awe; but many women we need to take seriously may 
appear too complicit in violence or in the oppression of others, or 
too cozily wrapped up in their relative privilege to inspire praise or 
compassion (Enloe, 2004, pp. 3–4). 
 
By adopting a ‘feminist curiosity’ approach, she has crucially pointed to the 
ways in which women are omnipresent in International Relations and how 
considering women’s experiences can offer a rich insight into what happens 
‘behind the curtains’ in international politics. This includes, for example, the 
experiences of diplomat’s wives and sex workers outside military bases. 
Thus, my study will be inspired by ‘feminist curiosity’ in order to explore 
and learn from the experiences of ordinary women regarding the workings 
of international politics in considerable depth.  
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Standpoint feminist scholars, such as Sandra Harding, Donna Haraway, and 
Dorothy Smith, amongst others, argue that knowledge needs to be socially 
situated in order to move away from abstraction towards humanizing 
experiences of women (Harding, 1987, Haraway 1988, Smith, 1990). Thus, 
a standpoint feminist approach teaches us to learn from the women who 
have been the object of hegemonic narratives in order to circumscribe, and 
indeed anchor, the claims that scholars may make to better highlight 
marginalized women’s pluralistic experiences and to add complexity to the 
ways in which we understand hegemonic representations.  
 
It is important to note that standpoint feminist theory is more than just an 
exercise in highlighting women’s experiences; it also treats women’s 
situated knowledge as a form of agency and has the mechanisms to help us 
better understand power relations as, according to Hill-Collins, standpoint 
feminist theory is an “interpretive framework dedicated to explicating how 
knowledge remains central to maintaining and changing unjust systems of 
power […] such theory exists primarily to explicate these power relations. 
Thus, attempts to take the knowledge while leaving the power behind 
inadvertently operate within the terrain of privileged knowledge.” (Collins, 
1997, pp. 375-381). The project will treat situated knowledge as alternative 
knowledge.  The term ‘alternative’ in this context means differing from 
dominant knowledge, and is used in this thesis as a way to compare, contrast 
and challenge the singularity and authority of hegemonic knowledge. I 
further use the terms hegemonic knowledge and dominant knowledge 
interchangeably to mean knowledge which comes to be considered as 
common sense and serves the interest of the powerful (Gramsci, 1971).  
 
I will draw upon feminist standpoint theory and build upon the work of 
feminist IR scholars such as Cynthia Enloe, J. Ann Tickner and Cynthia 
Cockburn, amongst others, who treat women’s lives as a form of situated 
knowledge. Standpoint theory is important to my thesis as it will enable me 
to privilege Iraqi women’s experiences as a form of situated knowledge with 
regards to US foreign policy, thereby challenging US-centric knowledge 
through IR. My project will access women’s experiences through their 
narratives of war, violence, security and identity in the post-2003 period. I 
argue that Iraqi women’s narratives constitute a form of alternative 
knowledge about international politics that disrupts hegemonic/dominant 
knowledge. 
 
I focus on discussing the value of situated knowledge in order to better 
understand power relations from the perspectives of the subjugated in 
Chapter Four. In particular, I will deploy “decoding theory” to help in 
theorizing women’s multiple positionalities in relation to US foreign policy 
narratives. Decoding theory captures the nuances within women’s narratives 
and experiences that allow us to understand the relationship between Iraqi 
women and US foreign policy narrative in a detailed manner. Alongside 
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decoding theory, I deploy the concept of Occidentalism to help us 
understand how women’s decoding positionalities can challenge and 
complicate the reductive Orientalist ‘us versus them’ approach. In this way, 
the chapter demonstrates how women’s narratives produce knowledge that 
challenges the powerful versus powerless dichotomy, thus complicating 
power dynamics. This points to the value of situated knowledge in 
complicating our understanding of power dynamics.  
 
In Chapter Five, I problematize how mainstream Feminist IR and Feminist 
Security Studies have often privileged the assumption that gender is the 
most significant aspect of women’s experiences of war and violence. To this 
end, I deploy feminist standpoint theory in combination with 
intersectionality theory to enable us to explore how women’s experiences 
are constituted by other social inequalities and differences, such as class, 
nationality, and religion, as have been produced over time as a result of the 
Iraqi’s regime policies and post-invasion political dynamics. Thus, this 
chapter demonstrates that the categorization of ‘gender’ or ‘woman’ is not 
monolithic in this context (Carby, 1982; Butler, 1999) and should not be 
regarded as a single entity forming the shared experiences and meanings of 
security amongst women. Specifically, the chapter highlights the multiple 
meanings of security for Iraqi women and these meanings are mutually 
constituted in relation to their respective identities, which, in turn, are 
constructed in relation to multiple axes of identity. I therefore confirm and 
extend Maria Stern’s (2005) work on the relationship between identity and 
security to the Iraq case, highlighting the utility of intersectionality in this 
regard.  
 
More generally, this thesis highlights the fact that Iraqi women’s alternative 
knowledge is a form of agency and that feminist IR scholars, or indeed 
feminist security studies scholars, should not capture stories of women’s 
victimhood but understand that their situated knowledge (alternative 
knowledge) is empowering. As Dorothy Smith (1987) explains, women who 
vocalise their struggles and victories can “raise consciousness”.  
 
 
Iraqi women’s security narratives: why does it matter? 
 
The importance of understanding Iraqi women security narratives and 
situations can be clarified as follows: although the meta-narrative of the 
‘War on Terror’ affected all Muslims regardless of geography, the US at the 
same time targeted particular countries for intervention. One of these was 
Iraq, and US narratives have specifically instrumentalized Iraqi women to 
justify the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. After Bush launched the ‘War on 
Terror’ he categorised Iraq as part of what he termed ‘the axis of evil’ 
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(Dimitrova et al., p. 23) denoting countries allegedly engaged in acts of 
terrorism and/or in possession of weapons of mass destruction. Women’s 
rights were co-opted as one of the core pillars of Bush’s flagship policy, the 
Freedom Agenda, which was aimed at bringing democracy to the Middle 
East and combatting terrorism. The Bush administration made this 
particularly apparent in their remarks on and representation of Iraqi women, 
whom they sought to render symbolic of these values of freedom and 
civilization. The Bush administration enacted an explicit binding of the 
Freedom Agenda with women’s rights by funding various organisations and 
initiatives for women in the Middle East, most prominently in Iraq (Hassan, 
2014, p. 128). These included the Iraqi Women’s Democracy Initiative and 
the US-Iraq Women’s Network (Office of the senior coordinator for 
international women’s issues, 2005). Such prominent multi-million-dollar 
initiatives were widely regarded as indicative of how important women’s 
rights were to Bush’s foreign policy and his freedom agenda (Hassan, 2014, 
p. 126).   
 
In addition, on the one hand, US foreign policy narratives have effectively 
made the claim that Iraqi women needed saving from Saddam Hussein as he 
was their source of insecurity; on the other, the research that deals with 
these narratives has to date focussed on demonstrating how Muslim women 
did not need saving from the US, as postcolonial scholars take the view that 
the idea of Western intervention is patronizing and can in itself result in 
considerable violence. Both scholars and US officials made these claims 
without researching Iraqi women’s historical context in any real detail or 
from the position of having a deep understanding of what security actually 
means to women in Iraq. My project is concerned with exploring the 
question of security with those who have been left out of discussions 
concerning their ‘saving’.  
 
It is important to note that the concept of ‘security’ is contested in IR. 
Traditionally, discussions of security in IR tend to revolve around issues of 
peace and war or sovereign power, which assumes that the state protects its 
subjects from foreign threats. Feminist IR scholars have questioned this 
definition and argued that the state is rather a source of insecurity for 
women. For example, V. Spike Peterson problematized the state and its role 
as protector of its citizens, arguing that the state is responsible for allowing 
women to become: “the objects of masculinist social control not only 
through direct violence (murder, rape, battering, incest), but also through 
ideological constructs, such as ‘women’s work’ and the cult of motherhood, 
that justify structural violence—inadequate health care, sexual harassment, 
and sex-segregated wages, rights and resources” (Peterson, 1992c, 46). 
Similarly, Tickner argues for a widening of the concept of security beyond 
“the direct violence of war” to also include the “insecurity of individuals 
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whose life expectancy was reduced [] by domestic and international 
structures of political and economic oppression” (Tickner 1992, 69). 
A particular concept of security that offers a different approach to traditional 
notions of security is that of human security, as being: “Contrary to the state 
centric security framework, which both endangers people and ignores the 
real threats to individuals” (McCormack, 2008, p. 113).  However, Feminist 
scholars, such as Wenona Gile, Jennifer Hyndman and Heidi Hudson, have 
also been critical of human security for being gender blind. (Wenona Giles 
& Jennifer Hyndman, 2004, Hudson, 2005). In addition, Hudson raised the 
issue that human security’s universalizing tendencies means that it also 
neglects cultural differences:  
The security needs of Western women and women in the developing 
world are different to the extent that no global sisterhood can be 
assumed. In response to such universalizing tendencies, African 
women have begun to reassert their own brands of feminism and/or 
womanism (Heidi Hudson, 2005, p.157). 
This project will respond to this concern by developing the concept of 
security and will highlight the need for a contextualized security that 
incorporates an intersectional approach and emphasizes the importance of 
standpoint theory in foregrounding Iraqi women’s own definitions of 
security. 
I observed that each Iraqi woman I interviewed expressed ideas of what it 
means to feel secure, and often in ways that were based on their particular 
experiences and social backgrounds. The aim of my fieldwork is to uncover 
the multiple ways in which Iraqi women narrate their experiences and may 
relate to hegemonic representations of themselves in order to avoid 
essentializing women’s experiences and generating generic understandings 
of their identities. I have found the works of Annick Wibben (2011) and 
Maria Stern (2005), regarding the links between women’s identities, 
securities, and insecurities, to be particularly useful to my understanding of 
the narratives of the women whom I interviewed. 
 
It is important to note that there are studies which have specifically studied 
the lives of Iraqi women under the 2003 US occupation of Iraq (Al-Ali & 
Pratt, 2009, Enloe, 2010). There are also a number of studies which have 
examined the role of Iraqi women’s activism in Iraq’s past and present, 
including post the 2003 invasion (Efrati, 2012; Al Ali, 2007). Examples of 
authors who focus on Iraqi women’s security situation include Yasmin Al 
Jawaheri (2012), who has carried out empirical work on Iraqi women from 
different socio-economic backgrounds in order to study the impact of 
international economic sanctions on their lives. More recent studies include 
those carried out by Lisa Davis (2016a, 2016b), who has conducted a 
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contextual analysis on gender-based violence with the emergence of ISIL 
(Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). These important works have 
contributed to our understanding of the complexities of Iraqi women’s 
experiences of conflict, hardship and empowerment. 
 
However, none of these studies actually offer a systematic analysis of Iraqi 
women’s responses to their portrayal in US narratives since 9/11; also 
missing from this corpus is the theorisation of women’s experiences and 
tackling of epistemological questions, such as: how do we build an 
alternative common sense to what has been said about Iraqi women in US 
narratives? How should we approach the question of their agency? The 
importance of thinking about these theories and approaches does not merely 
serve to benefit the present study exclusively but could also be of broader 
enduring value for research areas interested in developing a deeper 
understanding of women’s agency. Such theories are generally transferable 
and serve as fundamentally important conceptual tools for scholars who 
adopt a feminist methodology.  
 
Overview of women’s situation in Iraq 
The interviewees have not only referenced the 2003 US invasion in their 
own narratives but also have pointed to the significance of longer-term 
national and historical processes. Thus, in order to fully appreciate their 
narratives about their post-conflict security situation and attitude towards 
US foreign policy narratives, it is necessary to contextualize their narratives 
in relation to wider national and historical processes as well as US foreign 
policies. Towards this end, I will provide an historical overview of Iraqi 
women’s relationship with the state as well as to the relevant policies of the 
Bush and Obama administrations.  
 
In developing this overview, I first cover the period of the Ba’ath party 
which came to power in 1968. I then discuss the period of the Bush 
administration’s (2003–2008) involvement with women’s rights in Iraq and 
also the Obama administration’s (2008–2016) policies in this regard. 
Importantly, I also cover the rise of Daesh (also known as the Islamic State, 
see Note on Terminology). I have focused on Ba’ath’s rule as a starting 
point, because it forms the earliest reference point in Iraq’s history for the 
participants interviewed in this work. 
 
Iraqi women under the Ba’ath Party from 1968–2003 
The Ba’ath Party, which ruled Iraq from 1968–2003, is generally considered 
a secular Arab socialist political party. It was first led by Ahmed Hassan Al-
Bakr and subsequently by Saddam Hussein from 1979 until his toppling in 
2003. From the early 1970s until the early 1980s, Iraq experienced an 
economic boom resulting from the rise of oil prices. As a result, the Ba’ath 
 23 
Party worked on developing the country and took the decision to introduce 
policies which benefited women: 
 
While the other oil-producing Gulf countries started to look for 
workers outside their national boundaries, the Iraqi government 
mainly tried to tap into the country’s own human resources: women. 
Less motivated by egalitarian principles than by pragmatic 
economic calculations, the Iraqi government encouraged women to 
get an education and become part of the labor force (Al-Ali and 
Pratt, 2009, p. 31).  
 
Thus, the Ba’ath party was invested in the idea of ‘state feminism’ for 
pragmatic reasons. Regardless of motivation, these policies still worked to 
empower some women. The Ba’ath party’s ideas of empowerment did not 
just operate on the level of rhetoric, but rather they passed legislation to 
ensure that women improved their rates of literacy and were furthermore, in 
practice, encouraged to enter the workforce: ‘in 1974 a government decree 
stipulated that all university graduates—men or women—would be 
employed automatically. Subsequently, working outside the home became 
for women not only acceptable but prestigious and normative’ (Al-Ali and 
Pratt, 2009, p. 31). 
 
The Ba’ath party also implemented progressive civil laws that not only 
focused on improving education and work opportunities for women but also 
on improving other aspects of their lives: ‘The Iraqi Provisional 
Constitution (drafted in 1970) formally guaranteed equal rights to women 
and other laws specifically ensured their right to vote, attend school, run for 
political office, and own property’ (Human Rights Watch Report, 2003). 
Thus, because of this progressive civil law, in the 1960s and 1970s Iraqi 
women were regarded as among the most educated in the region, and 
accordingly often held high professional status.  
 
While there were progressive state policies in place, the Ba’ath party also 
implemented regressive policies which targeted minority groups. Before 
delving into an example of how these regressive laws led to violence, for 
example as perpetrated by the Ba’ath party against people from minority 
backgrounds including women, it is essential to highlight the heterogeneity 
of Iraq’s ethno-religious makeup and the different relationships formed 
between current and past governments of Iraq and distinct ethno-religious 
groups, and vice versa. The estimated religious and ethnic breakdown of 
Iraq is as follows: 
 
The three largest demographic groups are Shi’a Arabs, Sunni Arabs 
and Kurds, most of whom adhere to Sunni Islam. [….] 99 per cent of 
Iraqis are Muslim, of which 60-65 per cent are Shi’a and 32-37 per 
cent are Sunni. […] In terms of ethnicity […] Ethnic minorities 
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include Turkmen, Shabak, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenians, black 
Iraqis and Roma. Some Yezidis consider themselves a distinct ethnic 
group, while others identify as being Kurds (Minority Rights Group 
International, 2017). 
 
Despite Iraq’s diverse religious-ethnic population, the Ba’ath party sought to 
impose a predominantly Sunni vision of the ‘Iraqi past’ (Davis, 2005). This 
ignored other sectarian histories such as, notably, those of the Shias or the 
Kurds. These ideas, again, did not exclusively operate on the level of 
rhetoric. In fact, the Ba’ath party carried out Arabization campaigns which 
devastated minority populations in Iraq on many levels. A notable example 
of this is Saddam Hussein’s brutal ethnic cleansing programme which 
sought to target Kurds: ‘Between 1986 and 1989, in the midst of the Iran-
Iraq War, Hussein carried out the genocidal Anfal campaign against Iraq’s 
Kurds, culminating in a chemical attack on the civilian population of 
Halabja in 1988’ (Minority Rights Group International, 2017). This 
demonstrates that although the Ba’ath party’s official line on women’s 
rights was oriented to improve their living conditions, the state failed to 
protect women from particular minority backgrounds such as Kurds. These 
Arabization campaigns begun in the 1960s (Ihsan, 2017, p. 26), around the 
same time as the Ba’ath party implemented progressive laws which sought 
to empower women. This fact strongly suggests that a study which only 
focuses on gender analysis will lack the necessary tools to understand the 
situation of women from different social and ethnic/religious backgrounds, 
which could lead to a reductive narrative with respect to the history and 
experiences of Iraqi women. 
 
It was not just the state that caused a degradation of women and minority 
group’s living conditions. International organizations also contributed to the 
declining social and economic situation in Iraq by imposing international 
economic sanctions. These were introduced by the United Nations Security 
Council in 1990 following the first Gulf war, and the measures affected 
women differently to their male counterparts:  
 
Levels of unemployment and food insecurity rose. As time wore on, 
women bore the brunt of sustained decreasing education spending in 
terms of their literacy, education, and employment. Currently, the 
illiteracy rate of Iraqi women is twice as high as that of men 
(UNDP, 2011, p. 9).  
 
Yet, the Bush administration famously blamed the deteriorating conditions 
of Iraqi women solely on Saddam Hussein. Scholars such as Yasmin Al 
Jawaheri, who conducted a study of Iraqi women’s experiences under 
international sanctions, has argued that the assertion that the US was 
‘‘saving women’ from Saddam Hussein, […] operates to erase the impact of 
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many years of international sanctions, which impoverished Iraqis’ (Al 
Jawaheri, 2008, p. 77).  
 
Iraqi women under the Bush administration from 2003–2008 
The Bush administration responded to the attacks on the twin towers on 
September 11th, 2001 by invading Iraq in 2003. Part of the justification the 
Bush administration claimed for going to war with Iraq was to save Iraqi 
women from the brutal dictator Saddam Hussein and to introduce 
democracy. As Hester Eisenstein (2010, p. 424) notes, ‘the liberation of 
women was self-evidently part of the project of modernisation and 
democratisation claimed by the Bush administration as it brutally reshaped 
the landscape of Afghanistan and Iraq’. The Bush administration’s interest 
in women’s rights and their foreign policy’s emphasis on ‘saving’ women in 
the Broader Middle East has perplexed some scholars such as Christina Ho, 
who comments that ‘the sudden concern for women has come from neo-
conservatives like George W. Bush, who are not known for their support for 
feminism. Yet feminism is ‘essential’ to the War on Terror […] enabling 
Islamic societies to be condemned as ‘uniquely oppressive to women’ (Ho, 
2010, p. 1). Ho argues that the US adopted feminist principles to justify 
military intervention as a rescue mission for victimized women: ‘protecting 
the rights of women became the most politically powerful rationale for 
invading Afghanistan’ (Ho, 2010, p. 2). Andrea G. Bottner, Director of the 
Office of International Women’s Issues, encapsulated just such a narrative 
at the end of the Bush administration’s tenure, in late 2008: 
 
We have learned the type of society envisioned by extremists, and 
know that when women’s voices are silenced, the consequences are 
tragic. After September 11th, the United States was faced with a 
whole new sort of war – a war against extremists who battle on 
many fronts (Bottner, US State Department, 2008). 
 
Bottner presents the marginalization or oppression of women as inextricable 
from the extremist enemies the US faces in a post-9/11 world. She thereby 
establishes that for the US to emerge triumphant in its foreign policy, it 
must champion women’s freedoms. 
 
Indeed, the Bush administration established that ‘introducing’ democracy to 
Iraq would make women feel more secure. Their democracy initiatives were 
almost uniformly American in ethos and style: ‘grants were given to NGOs 
to carry out democracy education, leadership training, political training, 
NGO coalition building, organisational management, media training, and, 
that all important pillar of US-style democracy, ‘teaching entrepreneurship’’ 
(Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009, p. 63).  
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While the Bush administration was fixated on their democratic aims, they 
failed to acknowledge that the living conditions and security of Iraqi women 
did not improve. In fact, women’s conditions in Iraq sharply declined after 
the Bush administration invaded Iraq in 2003: ‘undeniably, the biggest 
challenge facing Iraqi women in 2013 [was] the lack of security coupled 
with the lack of rule of law, both contributing to increasing and wide-
ranging forms of gender-based violence’ (Al-Ali, 2013, p. 1). For example, 
‘honour’ killings rose following the 2003 invasion of Iraq: ‘the southern city 
of Basra experienced a seventy percent increase in ‘honour’ killings 
between 2004 and 2008’ (Davis, 2016a, pp. 116-117). Shockingly, these 
figures may in fact underestimate aspects of the reality: ‘Tellingly, more 
than 97% of women in one survey stated that they would not be willing to 
report gender-based violence to the police because of ‘fear of damaging 
their reputation’ or the belief that Iraq’s law enforcement agencies would be 
unable to solve the problem’ (Davis, 2016a, p. 111).  
 
The US launched democracy initiatives in Iraq which produced mixed 
results, with respect to voting and political participation. Certain outcomes 
contradicted the US’s goal of liberating all women and bringing progress to 
Iraq. The US desired democracy for Iraq, but, in reality, the progressive civil 
laws that were once protected under the Ba’ath rule became under attack: 
 
In 2004, as the CPA-backed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was 
drafting a Transitional Administrative Law for the country, women’s 
rights advocates demanded a female quota of 40 percent in the Iraqi 
parliament and the abolition of the proposed Resolution 137, which 
would rely exclusively on Shari’a for personal status issues. The 
CPA ultimately granted women a 25 percent parliamentary quota 
that year, which was considered a good start. However, many of the 
women who have gained seats in the parliament are conservative 
and have not attempted to push for change. Instead, they follow 
instructions from their party leaders and tend to vote against the 
expansion of women’s rights (Ahmed, 2010, p. 160). 
 
This also highlights the division and tensions between secular and Islamist 
women as these outcomes have empowered Islamist women who support 
Islamic conservatism. This has put secular women at a loss (Al-Ali & Pratt 
2009, p. 79). 
 
Meanwhile, the outcomes of parliamentary quota have had a positive impact 
on the Kurds as they were able to gain more independence and exercise 
autonomy: ‘The two Kurdish parties, which for decades had been rivals for 
political influence in northern Iraq, joined together in early 2005 in a 
parliamentary coalition, the Kurdistan Alliance’ (Enloe, 2010. p. 93).  
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Adding to the complexity of the US intervention, Sunnis who were favoured 
by the old regime were displaced by the US-favoured Shia-led government. 
As Sunni dominance withered, sectarian tensions became aggravated 
(Hagen et al.,2015, p. 158). This dynamic thus complicates the way in 
which scholars should interpret sectarian tensions as not necessarily 
resulting from the emergence of Daesh.  
 
Iraqi women under the Obama administration from 2008–2016 
There are very few studies which have examined the Obama 
administration’s rhetoric and policies towards women. The systematic, 
sustained instrumentalization of Iraqi women underpinned much of US 
foreign policy in this period, across two separate administrations; exploring 
how Iraqi women themselves conceived of this is a necessary. It is an 
overdue step in developing a better sense of the degree to which women 
diverge or converge with these US narratives and military action.  
 
The centrality of women’s rights in US foreign policy was maintained by 
Bush’s successor Obama, who pronounced that ‘promoting gender equality 
and advancing the status of women and girls around the world is vital to 
achieving our overall foreign policy objectives’ (Obama, 2013). Yet, this 
policy fell short when it came to Iraq—the Obama administration sought to 
distance itself from the Bush administration’s legacy and opted to discard 
democracy-building in Iraq. The Obama administration has distanced itself 
for most of its tenure from anything synonymous with Iraq, including Iraqi 
women. The absence of the ‘saving’ narrative is striking; from his 
investiture onwards, Obama presided over a resolute silence on Iraqi 
women, in complete contrast with the previous administration (see Al-Ali & 
Pratt, 2011). The marked difference from the narrative of the Bush 
administration is evident in Obama’s 2010 official address to end the 
combat mission in Iraq. There was not a single mention of Iraqi women or a 
hint of any possible policy extension regarding women’s rights: ‘so tonight, 
I am announcing that the American combat mission in Iraq has ended. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people now have lead 
responsibility for the security of their country’ (Obama, The White House, 
2010). 
 
Obama thus presided over a foreign policy narrative that was in flux. His 
administration strove to disassociate itself from the Iraqi war. Central to this 
was the discarding of Iraqi women from the narrative. The emergence of 
Daesh irrevocably changed this, however. Thus, due to the rise of Daesh, the 
Obama administration sought to rationalize the return of military 
intervention. They did so by providing ‘protection’ for women from Daesh, 
through military air strikes, choosing not to have on the ground military 
presence in Iraq. The Obama administration then restored Iraqi women to 
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their foreign policy narrative as victims in need of saving, this time from 
Daesh. 
 
The Obama administration focused on linking sexual violence with the rise 
of Daesh. Malinowski spoke of Daesh’s impact on the women of Iraq in 
charged, sexualized language: ‘it has kidnapped thousands of women 
belonging to other religious sects, taking them not simply as hostages, but as 
commodities, spoils of war to be raped or sold as slaves’ (Malinowski, US 
State Department, 2014a). Malinowski elsewhere reiterated the idea that 
Iraqi women were victims of brutal sexual violence: ‘women and girls as 
young as 12 or 13 have been taken captive, to be sold as sex slaves or put 
into forced marriages with ISIL fighters’ (Malinowski, US State 
Department, 2014b). 
 
This narrative ignored the important issue of how gender-based violence had 
existed pre-Daesh and even pre-invasion. As Nadje Al-Ali has argued: 
 
sexual violence, as we are witnessing now, did not emerge in a 
vacuum but Iraqi women and men have been confronted with sexual 
and broader gender-based violence pre-invasion Iraq and, as well as 
in the post-invasion period. Without wanting to belittle the carnage 
and cruelties committed by ISIS, I have felt uneasy about the limited 
interest displayed by the media, policy makers and the general 
public with respect to the broad continuum of sexual and gender-
based violence in present day Iraq, but also prior to the appearance 
of ISIS in Iraq (Al-Ali, 2016, p. 2). 
 
However, sexual violence and sectarian violence have escalated with the 
emergence of Daesh:  
 
In 2014, as Iraq was undergoing a steady rise in sectarian violence, 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) took control of 
several major cities […] they immediately imposed their extremist 
agenda directly on the bodies of women, ordering them to fully cover 
themselves and stay at home. Within days, credible reports began 
emerging of ISIL fighters abducting and raping women (Davis, 
2016a, p. 102).  
 
It was not just direct sexual violence that women experienced under Daesh 
but other forms of violence and control too. For example, Daesh attempted 
to install an Islamic system which sought to control women’s bodies by 
imposing very strict dress codes—any women who opposed such laws were 
then met with physical violence: 
 
Under the militia’s enforcement of a strict and misguided 
interpretation of sharia law, ISIL has subjected women to stoning, 
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lashings, and beatings with sticks for having their hair or faces 
uncovered, or for not otherwise adhering to a strict interpretation of 
Islamic dress code (Davis, 2016b, p. 1175). 
 
Forced migration 
The conflict has displaced millions of Iraqis. Even before the rise of Daesh, 
it was reported in 2007 that one in six Iraqis were displaced:  
 
There are now two million internally displaced Iraqis and 2.2 
million refugees, mostly in neighbouring states. (Forced Migration 
Review, 2007, p. 3). 
 
The emergence of Daesh worsened the refugee situation and the numbers of 
displaced people in Iraq. Some Iraqi women and men managed to escape the 
conflict and conditions of Daesh by seeking refuge in neighbouring 
countries. Recent estimates suggest that: ‘as of 2016, there were more than 3 
million Iraqis displaced within Iraq and another 264,000 registered as 
refugees in the region’ (Kvittingen et al., 2018, p. 2). Of those Iraqis who 
fled to Jordan as of 2010, ‘estimates of the Iraqi refugee population in 
Jordan range from 500,000 to 750,000, representing approximately 8–10 
percent of Iraq’s population’ (Al-Qdah & Lacroix, 2010, p. 523). Many 
Iraqi refugees have resided in Jordan. For this reason, I have chosen Jordan 
as the main fieldwork site for undertaking my research.  
 
It is widely acknowledged in human rights policy circles that the conditions 
of Iraqi refugees in Jordan are not necessarily pleasant. This is largely due to 
the fact that Jordan does not recognize Iraqis as having refugee status, which 
hinders them from having a stable life: 
 
persons registered with UNHCR [United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees], including Iraqis, would be designated 
as asylum seekers rather than given prima facie refugee status 
[….]As such, Iraqis are considered guests or visitors in Jordan, and 
there are no specific policies to deal with their needs, nor are there 
plans to put policies in place to integrate them in the long term (Al-
Qdah & Lacroix, 2010, p. 528). 
 
Even after escaping war and hardship, Iraqi women often continue to 
encounter severe issues. In this case, these issues stem almost exclusively 
from not being allowed to integrate into Jordanian society. This situation 
demonstrates that Iraqi women’s experience of violence and conflict should 
be considered in relation to a continuum: ‘By understanding conflict as a 
continuum, instead of as an expression of a particular form of mass violence 
in the context of war, we can recognize that human rights violations persist 
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outside of, and are magnified by, conflict, instead of being created by it’ 
(Davis, 2016a, p. 106). 
 
This summary of women’s situation in Iraq and as refugees demonstrates 
the multiple and varying influences on Iraqi women’s experiences. This 
begs the question of the meaning of security for Iraqi women and the degree 
to which this may be different from the meaning of security articulated in 
US foreign policy. There is a need to avoid generalizing the experiences of 
Iraqi women and instead highlight difference in social identities, such as 
religion and ethnicity in women’s experiences of (post-) conflict and 
security need 
Outline of chapters 
Chapter One: Making feminist sense of the ‘War on Terror’ 
Chapter One begins by providing an overview of the literature on the US 
representation of Muslim women since 9/11. It argues that most postcolonial 
feminists have demonstrated how the raced and gendered dimensions of the 
‘War on Terror’ served to justify the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
This consensus points to the importance of the study of representation to the 
field of IR in terms of understanding how discourses produce, for example, 
gendered and racial inequalities. Despite this, IR scholars have paid little 
attention to these dimensions due to their reliance on positivist 
methodologies that do not allow them to recognise the importance of 
language and representation in identifying power imbalances in knowledge 
production. I then elucidate more detailed examples of tropes and themes 
assigned to Muslim women via US foreign policy and demonstrate that 
while scholars have identified that US discourses about Muslim women 
were raced and gendered, they have excluded Muslim women’s responses to 
their representation. I argue that this is also due to the limitations inherent to 
these scholars’ methodologies. I demonstrate that postcolonial feminists’ 
over-reliance on the framework of Edward Said’s (1979) key text, 
Orientalism, has led them to largely neglect the lived experiences of the 
women in question. This methodological oversight has led me to formulate 
my research questions around the need to include Muslim women’s 
narratives as a source of alternative knowledge in order to disrupt dominant 
knowledge and highlight their agency. My study focusses on the case of 
Iraqi women but makes the claim that the underlying research has 
implications for the ways in which we approach the representation of 
marginalized women in general. 
 
I offer an overview of the relevant Feminist Security Studies literature and 
discuss the issue of security, as the latter is a unifying concern amongst the 
interviewees. In particular, I discuss how Feminist IR and Security Studies 
are important to enriching empirical research. I do this by examining the 
importance of women’s experiences to the understanding of global politics, 
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highlighting how feminist scholarship has shifted the ontology of 
IR/security studies to include women’s security, including bodily integrity, 
the injustice of gendered hierarchies at the interpersonal, national and 
international levels, and the particular gendered ways in which women are 
impacted by conflict, through referencing work by Cynthia Enloe and Ann 
Tickner, among other prominent feminist scholars. I highlight how my 
project emphasizes that the concept of human security should not only 
include the category of gender but also considers the inclusion of 
intersectionality as a way to better contextualize security. I will also argue 
that standpoint theory will help us highlight marginalized knowledge as 
matter of international security. 
 
Chapter Two:  Theoretical Framework: Feminist Standpoint Theory 
approach  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the study’s theoretical framework. The 
thesis draws on standpoint feminist theory as a means of understanding 
women’s narratives as a form of situated knowledge about International 
Relations. It discusses how central feminist standpoint theory enables me to 
address the project’s aim of producing alternative knowledge in order to 
highlight the interviewees’ agency and disruptions of US hegemonic 
knowledge about Muslim women. It also discusses how standpoint theory 
relates to other concepts in this project, such as ‘disruption’ and ‘agency’, in 
order to conceptualise the significance of women’s narratives in relation to 
dominant knowledge. It will also discuss how the project will overcome any 
risk of essentialism from a sole reliance on feminist standpoint theory by 
further drawing on the postcolonial and intersectional approaches.  
 
Chapter Three: Data Collection and Methods 
This chapter discusses the collection of primary data for the thesis, which 
consists of 19 interviews that I carried out with some of the most 
marginalized Iraqi female refugees in Jordan. I add an interview to this 
corpus which I conducted with an Iraqi woman who still resides in Iraq. The 
collation of these interviews is central to exploring my thesis’s research 
questions with regards to the ways in which Iraqi women’s narratives 
disrupt dominant knowledge. I detail my experiences in the field and what 
that entailed; namely, how I was able to gain access to some of the most 
marginalized Iraqi refugees living in Jordan. I also discuss how I aimed to 
capture a diverse sample, which has allowed me to achieve the project’s 
goal of offering a pluralistic account of Iraqi women’s experiences.  
 
I argue that Iraqi women’s experiences are best understood through a 
narrative approach. I therefore describe the kind of narrative analysis that 
was used and how this approach enables me to examine Iraqi women’s 
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positionalities in relation to US hegemonic narratives, as well to understand 
the interviewees’ identities and security.  
 
I lastly reflect on the challenges of researching marginalized women, of 
‘giving voice to women’ and the problems of understanding this voice. I 
elaborate on how I sought to overcome the limitations of translation and of 
carrying out empirical research by acknowledging the power dynamic 
between the researcher and researched, and adopting a feminist ethic of self-
reflexivity (considering, for example, Sandra Harding’s work on 
objectivity). I also address how my project sought to assume an 
interpretivist ontological direction to adhere to Harding’s objectivity, which 
further supports the project’s stance of adopting a sceptical view of ‘facts’. 
 
Chapter Four: Iraqi women’s attitudes towards US foreign policy 
narratives 
My main research question asks: How do Iraqi women’s narratives disrupt 
existing hegemonic knowledge about representations and experiences of 
Muslim women? Therefore, Chapter Four provides an analysis of Iraqi 
women’s own narratives in response to US, and indeed other, foreign policy 
narratives. The primary purpose is to capture Iraqi women’s diverse 
positionalities, and in doing so demonstrate how their narratives constitute 
an alternative knowledge. This chapter also demonstrates how feminist 
standpoint theory, as the project underpinning, has helped me to study 
power relations from the perspective of Iraqi women in a complex manner, 
and that I was able to reveal the extent to which the interviewees have 
confirmed, negotiated, or opposed US hegemonic knowledge about them in 
order to demonstrate the degree to which their narratives disrupt US 
hegemonic knowledge about Muslim women generally. In doing so, I make 
a case for the importance of adopting a standpoint feminist approach. 
 
In order to contextualise the interviewees’ narratives, I have provided an 
overview of US hegemonic narratives of the Bush and Obama 
administrations.  
 
I then detail how Stuart Hall’s decoding theory—which includes the concept 
of the hegemonic, negotiated and oppositional positions—enabled the study 
of women’s positionality in relation to US foreign policy narratives with 
considerable degrees of complexity and nuance. This facilitated my goal of 
offering a pluralistic account of women’s voices. I discuss the concept of 
Occidentalism as a supplement to decoding theory in order to demonstrate, 
for example, that even a hegemonic position is an agential position which by 
definition challenges binary oppositions such as ‘us versus them’, ‘powerful 
versus powerless’, etc. This finding will provoke feminist IR scholars to re-
evaluate their approach of prioritising hegemonic knowledge in order to 
understand power relations. This also allowed me to address the subsidiary 
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research question: How do Iraqi women relate to US foreign policy 
narratives and representations of Iraqi women? 
 
The key finding of this chapter is that Iraqi women’s narratives disrupt 
hegemonic US narratives, and indeed postcolonial feminist critiques of US 
narratives, because of the different ways in which Iraqi women position 
themselves in relation to US narratives. Moreover, the relationship between 
different positionalities and agency is more complex than the terms 
hegemonic, oppositional, or negotiated otherwise suggest. There is thus the 
need to recognize personal circumstances and to resist categorization of 
women.  This need has not always been met in the literature dealing with 
US representations of Muslim women since 9/11.  
 
Chapter Five: Iraqi women’s narratives of the violence and conflict in 
Iraq since 2003 
The previous chapter pointed to the importance of insecurity in shaping the 
narratives of the women that I interviewed. In Chapter Four, I build upon 
arguments made by Feminist Security Studies scholars for the need to 
reconceptualize security. However, instead of working on encompassing 
more gendered dimensions to security, I argue that we must instead pay 
attention to context and other social axes as well as recognize more agency 
in their narratives.  The chapter highlights the importance of feminist 
standpoint theory in facilitating this goal by enabling us to be more attentive 
to the life-grounded experiences of Iraqi women. I also discuss the 
importance of complicating the concept of agency in relation to security by 
adopting a standpoint epistemology. 
 
In doing so, I address the secondary research question: How do narratives of 
Iraqi women reveal the relationship between security and identity? 
 
Inspired by the works of Maria Stern (2005) and Annick Wibben (2011) on 
the relationship between identity and security, I examine women’s 
perceptions of security. In doing so, I illuminate the mutually constitutive 
and complex relationship between identities and different types of 
insecurities, namely in relation to personal security, economic security and 
community security. My work builds specifically on the work of Wibben 
and Stern, who argued that there is a mutually constitutive relationship 
between identity and security. My thesis extends their argument by 
complicating the idea of agency in relation to security. For example, Iraqi 
women’s narratives complicate the meaning of agency and security in 
relation to women’s freedoms, as many view communal security as 




Conclusion: Reflection and Implications 
In the conclusion, I discuss how the previous chapters support the 
overarching argument that highlighting the significance of women’s 
narratives as sources of alternative knowledge production is vital to 
challenging the binary epistemology and essentialization of dominant 
knowledge about Muslim women. In particular, my project identifies a 
number of methodological and epistemological gaps in how scholars study 
the representation of Muslim women and their agency. I detail how a 
methodological approach of narrative analysis, and standpoint theory as my 
epistemological approach, in addition to micro-level theories of decoding 
theory, Occidentalism, as well as the concepts of security and 
intersectionality, can redress these gaps. This chapter concludes by 
connecting the findings of the research to areas of contribution in the field 
of IR, specifically those of Feminist IR and Feminist Security Studies, and 
































Chapter One: Making feminist sense of the ‘War on 
Terror’ 
 
This chapter review of the literature to which this thesis aims to contribute, 
namely, scholarship on the representations of Muslim women post 9/11. It 
will examine the literature tackling the gendered dimensions of the ‘War on 
Terror’, specifically US representations of Muslim women since 9/11 and 
discusses why the issue of representation is important to the practice of 
International Relations. In particular, it explores how the representations of 
Muslim women since 9/11 share many similarities, as well as certain 
ruptures, with the representations of colonized women in colonial discourse. 
I argue that despite a considerable body of literature illustrating the role of 
gender and race in underpinning the ‘War on Terror’ and the epistemic 
violence (Gayatri Spivak, 1988) of US representations of Muslim women, 
the question of how these women respond to such representations and how 
they narrate their own identities and lives has received much less attention. 
The literature review emphasizes the importance of including Muslim 
women’s own responses towards US foreign policy and to US 
representations if we are to guard against essentialism and think beyond 
binary oppositions. It also argues for the importance of Feminist Security 
Studies in valuing empirical research and the reconceptualization of 
security. Towards this end, the thesis proposes to explore the specific case 
of Iraqi women who have been the subject of US foreign policy narratives 
since 9/11 as well as targeted by foreign policies as part of US efforts for 
regime change in Iraq and the establishment of a pro-US, stable government 
thereafter. I will argue that presenting Iraqi women’s experiences as 
alternative knowledge offers an effective way to disrupt hegemonic 
knowledge about them and to highlight their agency in order to combat 
essentializing them. Further, examining the specific case study of Iraqi 
women, I argue, has ramifications on the ways in which we approach the 
subject of the representation of marginalized women as a whole. 
 
In order to analyse women’s narratives of their experiences since 2003 and 
their attitudes towards US foreign policy narratives, the thesis adopts the 
narrative approach of Maria Stern and Annick Wibben, which 
conceptualizes security and identity as mutually constitutive. Through this 
framework, the thesis seeks to highlight and to understand the ways in 




This section offers a broad overview of how Feminist IR scholars sought to 
demonstrate the ‘War on Terror’ has gendered and race-ed dimensions. I 
also discuss in more detail the nature of representations of Muslim women 
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within US media and foreign policy narratives since 9/11. I demonstrate 
both the similarities and differences between media and foreign policy 
narratives, which, in turn, suggest their embeddedness in longer, historical 
orientalist discourses about Middle East/oriental women as well as the ways 
in which the ‘War on Terror’ has transformed these representations. The 
focus is on Muslim, rather than specifically Afghan, Iraqi, or other 
nationalities of women, because US narratives often conflate women of 
multiple nationalities (and religious traditions) within this overarching 
category. The terrorist attack of 9/11 is a watershed moment in such 
representations, as it triggered the ‘War on Terror’ and its corresponding 
foreign policy narratives. A closer look at the scholarly literature examining 
media and foreign policy narratives, as represented within the US media and 
other political and public sources, will demonstrate the need for capturing 
alternative forms of knowledge of international politics by the women who 
have been the objects of US foreign policy narratives on the ‘War on 
Terror.’ 
 
Gender and Race in the ‘War on Terror’ 
Following the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, the US, 
under the presidency of George W. Bush, launched the so-called ‘War on 
Terror’ to justify the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Non-feminist 
scholars such as Stephen Reese and Seth Lewis (2009, p. 85) argue that this 
slogan represents ‘a powerful ideological frame’ which was effective in 
garnering support for US military action, as the slogan was tactfully labelled 
by Bush (2001) as an us vs them conflict, famously declaring: ‘either you 
are with us or with the terrorists’. The phrase denotes that those who support 
the US stand for advancing American liberal values such as freedom and 
democracy and those who oppose the US are perceived as supporting terror 
and oppression. Frames such as these are more than persuasive foreign 
policy tools; they operate as ‘organizing principles that are socially shared 
and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure 
the social world’ (Reese, 2001, p. 11). As such, scholars believed that the 
‘War on Terror’ narrative created a powerful social effect. 
 
However, these scholars have failed to take into account the gendered and 
race-ed dimensions of the ‘War on Terror’ narrative (amongst others, Hunt 
& Rygiel, 2016; Steans, 2013; Zine, 2002; Tickner, 2002; Al-Ali & Pratt, 
2009). Laura Shepherd highlights the significance of Laura Bush’s speech to 
the nation after 9/11 which represented women and children in Afghanistan 
as victims in order to justify the need for the US to bomb Afghanistan:  
 
Civilized people throughout the world are speaking out in horror 
[…] because our hearts break for the women and children in 
Afghanistan [...] because in Afghanistan we see the world the 
terrorists would like to impose on the rest of us [...] Fighting 
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brutality against women and children […] is the acceptance of our 
common humanity (Shepherd, 2006, p. 20). 
 
Shepherd (2006, p. 34) argues that the power of Laura Bush’s speech 
depends upon the way in which particular constructions of Afghani women 
as passive victims are ‘presented as natural and therefore unproblematic’. In 
this way, particular constructions of Afghan women underpin the pursuit of 
the ‘War on Terror’ by the Bush administration. Similarly, Jill Steans (2013, 
p. 147) argues that, after 9/11, US foreign policy discourse:  
 
constructed and represented women as one of the key markers of 
civilization. On the other hand, Afghani women were constructed as 
‘innocents’ oppressed by the forces of barbarism represented by 
Afghan men… [This] narrative made sense within the overarching 
meta-narrative of the War on terror as a fight to protect and 
advance freedom and civilization in the face of the feared onslaught 
on oppressive and barbaric forces.  
 
In other words, the ‘War on Terror’ discourse was underpinned by particular 
representations of Afghan women and men, as well as producing notions of 
US superiority. 
 
The literature tackling the gendered and race-ed dimensions of the ‘War on 
Terror’ has identified three recurring themes, explored in more depth below: 
 
1. The necessity of the US ‘rescuing’ or ‘saving’ Muslim women;  
2. The deployment of the veil, particularly since 9/11, as a marker of 
the oppression of Muslim women; 
3. The collapse of a diversity of Middle Eastern identities into the 
discursive, homogenizing figure of ‘the Muslim woman’ constructed 
by US discourse. 
 
Theme 1: ‘saving’ 
This section argues that the ‘saving’ narrative is primarily about justifying 
and validating US intervention which operates to deny Muslim women’s 
agency as they are treated as ‘victims’ and ‘objects’ of US liberation. Some 
scholars, such as Katherine Allison (2011), argue that the US has invested 
Muslim women with some degree of agency, albeit restricted. In both cases, 
I shall demonstrate that these narratives of saving have appropriated Muslim 
women’s agency to justify US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
The agency of Muslim women was denied as they were infantilised and 
equated with passive children. As Laura Shepherd (2006, p. 20) notes, US 
foreign policy remarks deny ‘them both adulthood and agency, affording 
them only pity’. Nayak (2006, p. 50) builds on this argument by discussing 
 38 
how infantilising Muslim women has helped the US build its  identity as 
masculine, thereby invoking protective qualities: ‘If one counters 
infantilization, one effectively doubts the US ability to save others and thus 
threatens the very strength the USA proclaims it (still) has’. Nayak (2006, p. 
50) goes on to explain the US’s rationale for projecting paternalistic care: 
 
The paternalist mission, wherein only a real man can save suffering 
women under the shadow of the gun, is crucial for alleviating the 
anxiety that the USA has experienced since 9/11. Because states 
feminize boundaries, the invasion of such translates into imagery of 
an impotent, emasculated man unable to protect his possessions 
from being violated and destroyed. 
 
Thus, the US proved it is capable of offering ‘protection’. In representing 
Muslim women as inferior, the superior strength of the US—even its 
‘Hypermasculinity’ (Nandy, 1983), that is, a reactionary masculine assertion 
of power in the face of a threat—is palpable. The US was able to express its 
own agency to justify US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
The US did not just bolster military might; it also promoted itself as having 
morally superior values. Al-Saji (2009) argues that the appeal for the 
liberation of Muslim women forms a central part of the rhetoric that US 
politicians used to justify the war, and that this takes two related forms: the 
explicit depiction of oppressed Muslim women, and the implicit claim that, 
given such oppression, Western cultures are morally superior to Muslim 
cultures. Intervention by external US forces is thus justified by the argument 
that Muslim cultures lack a concept of freedom, which must therefore be 
introduced by an external power. This is another instance where Muslim 
women cannot speak for themselves, as the US believes it is in a better 
position to determine their agency for them. 
 
Razack (2008, p. 4) demonstrates that the saving narrative not only 
underpins Western superiority and justifies Western intervention but also 
serves to demonise Muslim men to justify the violence that is perpetrated 
against them in the ‘War on Terror’: ‘globally, while Muslim men have 
been the target of an intense policing, Muslim women have been singled out 
as needing protection from their violent and hyper-patriarchal men’. The 
agency of Muslim men is erased here in order to make the case for rescuing 
Muslim women. Riley (2013, p. 3) extends this argument: 
 
Western women have freedoms—sexual, occupational, cultural; that 
Muslim women do not. Consequently, as the story from the Western 
perspective goes, women from those regions, those religions, over 
there, are under the control of primitive, brutal, fundamentalist men 
who would imprison women and brainwash them in order to have 
them under their sway. In this scenario, Western men are posited as 
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liberal and free-thinking, and appreciative of every aspect of female 
liberation. They therefore pose no threat to the women of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. On the contrary, Western men are the 
potential saviors [sic] of these women. In the West women continue 
to be used to promote or justify war. 
 
Riley’s argument is that Western narratives about women in Afghanistan 
and Iraq present Western men and their values as superior to Muslim men, 
and therefore in the best position to save Muslim women from victimization. 
This echoes Spivak’s (1988, p. 297) description of colonialism as ‘White 
men saving brown women from brown men’.  
 
Some Western feminists have also supported and helped elaborate this 
narrative, as evidenced in Phyllis Chesler’s writing. She argues that the 
United States and Israel together face a deadly enemy, Muslims, and the 
‘terrorist’ politics they espouse. Discussing women in Afghanistan, Chesler 
(2005, p. 198) writes, ‘as a feminist, I have long dreamed of rescuing 
women who are trapped in domestic and sexual slavery against their will 
with no chance of escape’. This is another instance where Afghani women 
are denied agency. Instead, Chelser speaks for Afghani women by 
supporting the ‘saving’ narrative, which rests on an understanding of 
Muslim women as victimized, only to be saved through American 
exceptionalism (Lispet, 1998) that includes both American men and 
American women.  
 
Some authors have detected that the US have represented Muslim women 
with some degree of agency. As Al-Ali and Pratt argue (2009, p. 59), the US 
simultaneously constructed Iraqi women as victims and as heroines: ‘The 
US military invasion of Iraq not only purported to ‘save’ Iraqi women, who 
had been long-suffering victims of the Saddam Hussein regime, but 
transformed them from victims to heroines’. Yet despite recognising a 
degree of agency, it is still regarded problematic as the US has set the terms 
upon which Muslim women are recognised as agential. 
 
Similarly, Katherine Allison (2013) goes beyond binary representations in 
her analysis of US government representations of Muslim women to argue 
that they have not been depicted merely as victims but as having some 
degree of agency. For example, early in the invasion of Afghanistan, US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell (Allison, 2013, p. 674) stated:  
 
During these years of great suffering, the women of Afghanistan 
have been the backbone of the Afghan society. It is in large measure 
a thanks to their endurance, their ingenuity, their courage, that their 
country has survived.  
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Allison (2013, p. 681) argues that the Muslim woman is ascribed a 
particular kind of agency by the US, one that centres around her religious 
identity: 
 
The agential Muslim woman appears to represent a familiarisation 
of the self, a reflection both idealised and domesticated. She 
reconciles the conflicts of a fractured US society being devout in her 
religious beliefs and practices but equally at home in the modern, 
liberal, and pluralist society. 
 
Allison (2013, p. 666) adds that the ‘agential Muslim woman’ has subverted 
this ‘polarization of Occident and Orient by embodying both a recognisably 
Islamic practice and Western standards of emancipated modernity’. Yet, the 
‘agential Muslim woman’ may create another binary: that of ‘good’ versus 
‘bad’ Muslim women. Shakira Hussein (2016, p. 74) argues:  
 
According to this dichotomy, religiously pious women stubbornly 
adhere to their false consciousness on behalf of an aggressive 
patriarchal ideology. In contrast, ‘good’ Muslim women are those 
who confine their religious practice to private space, who accept 
that their ethno-religious identity must take second place to their 
identity as national citizens, who not only successfully embody 
Enlightenment values in their own lives, but who help to promote 
internal reform within their own societies and communities. 
 
Sunaina Maira (2009, pp. 635–636) also writes about the binary of good and 
bad Muslim women and recognizes the specific race-ed gendered dimension 
of such a binary: 
 
By definition, “good” Muslims are public Muslims who can offer 
first-person testimonials, in the mode of the native informant, about 
the oppression of women in Islam[…] In contrast, “bad” Muslims 
are made into public exemplars of anti- Western enemies by state 
allegations of threats to national security and US democracy; 
hysterical media coverage; virtually no opportunities to present, let 
alone publish, their own views and stories; and often distorted 
accounts of their activities and politics.  
 
I recognize it is important to understand the degree to which these more 
ambivalent representations destabilize the Other. For example, the 
transformation of Iraqi women from victims to ‘heroines’ has been 
dependent upon the degree to which they complied with US ambitions in 
Iraq, thereby instrumentalizing Iraqi women as agents of US foreign policy 
(see Al-Ali & Pratt 2009). Moreover, the representation of the agential 
Muslim woman is dependent upon her practising her religion in a way that 
is compatible with a modern, liberal and pluralist society. In this respect, it 
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is interesting to consider Zillah Eisenstein’s (2007) argument, which 
introduces the notion of ‘re-racing’ to characterize a process whereby a 
racialized group may be re-coded ‘white’ through their adoption of ‘white’ 
values. Eisenstein argues that the act of re-racing race produces the illusion 
of racial equality, when in fact it only serves as an act of appropriation. 
While I recognize that the act of appropriation does exist in order to 
maintain the exercise of power, this mask the agency of women. These 
women desire to adopt such values and have developed a different 
understanding of how they are perceived by others when embracing them. 
This is an area that I will explore later in this study, particularly with regard 
to Iraqi women who hold conforming or mixed-conforming attitudes 
towards the ways in which the US represented them.  
 
Theme 2: the veil 
The trope of the veil in the representation of Muslim women is a key 
dimension of the construction of Muslim women as ‘oppressed’ and in need 
of saving as several scholars have noted (Lazerg 2009; Al-Sajji, 2009; and 
others). Marnia Lazreg (2009, p. 10) notes that ‘the veil has traditionally 
been discussed as the most tangible sign of women’s ‘oppression’’. It 
shows:  
 
that Islam is a backward and misogynous religion, and 
underscore[es] the callousness or cruelty of the men who use Islam 
for political aims. Such a view made it acceptable to hail the war 
launched against Afghanistan in 2001 as a war of ‘liberation’ of 
women (Lazreg, 2009, p. 10). 
 
The fact that the veil was commonly associated with Muslim women meant 
it became a convenient symbol to depict their victimization and set up a 
narrative that they required saving through the US’s ‘War on Terror’.  
 
Nancy Jabra (2006, p. 240) traces the US media’s portrayal of Middle 
Eastern women’s ‘oppression’ through their clothing—‘some sort of hijab 
or veil: the chador, the abaya, the burqa’—and contrasts these images with 
those of ‘liberated’ American women to mark the race-ed and gendered 
disparities between American and Muslim women, interpreting their 
representation in a binary manner. 
 
Thus, building a narrative of veiled Muslim women as oppressed helped US 
media and politicians associate messages and images of unveiling Muslim 
women with American ‘liberation’. As Maryam Khalid (2011, p. 21) notes:  
 
An article in USA Today explicitly conflated the act of removing 
burqas and American-led ‘liberation’, as women ‘threw them 
[burqas] on the fire and lit the way for their rescuers’. President 
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George W. Bush claimed in 2002 that the victory over the Taliban 
had ‘liberated the women of Afghanistan’. State Department 
Spokesman Richard Boucher linked liberation to the removal of the 
burqa, as these liberated Afghan women could now be seen 
‘sometimes even without wearing a burqa.’ 
 
The spoken remarks of US politicians were supported by US media images 
that reproduced the idea that veiled Muslim women equated to oppression. 
This in turn conflated American-led liberation with the removal of the 
burqas, which served to reinforce the victim/saviour binary. 
 
Similarly, Dana Cloud also argues that US media presented women without 
the veil in order to demonstrate the successes of US intervention. Cloud 
offers the example of the US website time.com featuring a photograph of a 
TV announcer without her burqa. The photograph implies US intervention 
has brought modernity to Afghani women: 
 
This single photograph actually represents the woman three times, 
once in a medium shot of her profile as she reads from news reports, 
and twice (in waist shots of her still seated as she reads) on 
television monitors in the foreground. These layers of simulacra 
offer a sharp modern contrast to the image of the burqa-clad woman 
making her way through the ruins of a pre-modern world (Cloud, 
2004, pp. 295—296). 
 
Shahira Fahmy offers a slightly different argument to the way in which 
Afghani women were portrayed in US media. She argues that the US media 
were subtler in portraying Afghani women’s liberation; the US media 
photographed Afghani women donning the veil even after their liberation 
from the old regime:  
 
the burqas were not removed however, in an attempt to rescue the 
discourse of women’s liberation, photographers may have used 
subtle visual cues to communicate a relatively better environment for 
Afghan women following the fall of the Taliban regime (Fahmy, 
2004, p. 108). 
 
Most scholars writing on the veil in the context of 9/11, however, have 
interpreted them in negative and binary terms: Muslim women victims vs 
US saviour. 
 
Western attention to Muslim women’s veiling can be traced at least as far 
back to European colonialism. Frantz Fanon (1965, p. 42) argued that during 
the French colonial era, the French tried to encourage the unveiling of 
Algerian women as part of their civilising mission: ‘here and there it thus 
happened that a woman was ‘saved’ and symbolically ‘unveiled’’. Lila Abu-
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Lughod (2002, p. 783) for instance, has drawn parallel with such colonial 
argument of the veil: ‘[There are] resonances of contemporary discourses on 
equality, freedom, and rights with earlier colonial and missionary rhetoric 
on Muslim women’. Abu Lughod further argues that US politicians tend to 
make generalizations about the veil and fail to grasp the diverse range of 
opinions operant in Islamic societies. Abu-Lughod (2002, p. 786) 
emphasizes the need to work against the ‘reductive interpretation of veiling 
as the quintessential sign of women’s unfreedom’ and opposes the reduction 
of ‘diverse situations and attitudes of millions of Muslim women to a single 
item of clothing’.  
 
The majority of the literature has exposed the inequalities and iniquities of 
hegemonic knowledge of the veil, and further demonstrates how the agency 
of Muslim women has been discounted by US media and officials. Many 
scholars writing about the veil in the context of 9/11 have prioritized anti-
colonial or anti-imperialist positions and have not left room for other 
positions to be highlighted, for instance those who side with a colonial 
stance on the veil. However, it is important to note that there are examples 
of Muslim feminist scholars who oppose the veil and are also anti-
imperialist, such as Haideh Moghissi (2005). There are also examples of 
Muslim or former Muslim feminists whose writings could be regarded as 
endorsing a colonial paradigm towards Islam and veiling, such as Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali (2015).  
 
Theme 3: the homogenization of Muslim women  
The homogenization of Muslim women is another theme that the US used to 
help construct their saving narrative. This theme was central to the 
construction of Western superiority and binary opposites such as West vs 
East. 
 
The literature demonstrates that US narratives since 9/11 have conflated the 
multivalent ‘Arab woman’ into the singular figure of the ‘Muslim woman’, 
who functions as the Other to the universalised Western subject (Abu-
Lughod, 2001; Khalid & Nayak, 2006; Al-Saji, 2009; among others). The 
majority of the literature has sought to tackle the issue of homogenization 
‘by contesting the ‘truths’ of gendered and orientalist knowledge and 
uncovering the power relations underlying these representations’ (Khalid, 
2011, p. 29).  
 
Abu-Lughod proposes that the eradication of the plurality of Muslim 
women’s experiences demonstrates how the US is happy to accommodate 
difference in itself, but it depicts the Arab world, the Muslim world and the 
Middle East as homogeneous blocks. In US narratives therefore, the 
assumption remains that all women in the Middle Eastern region can be 
represented under the figure of the ‘Muslim woman’. Alia Al-Saji (2009) 
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has supported this argument by providing an anecdote to illustrate the 
homogeneity of Muslim women. Al-Saji (Al-Saji, 2009, pp. 66–67) 
describes herself as ‘a Muslim-Canadian Woman of Iraqi Origin who has 
lived most of my life in the West’. However, she is perceived as an 
‘authentic insider’ because of her origins, which has meant that she finds 
herself ‘called on to respond to some questions, confirm hypotheses, and 
give an ‘insider’s’ perspective on Muslim women and their practices’ (Al-
Saji, 2009, pp. 66–67). This demonstrates how the homogenization of 
Muslim women seeped into the public sphere and how it has become 
socially acceptable to disregard differences amongst them.  
 
Nadine Naber (2008, p. 3) discusses the ‘conflation of the categories ‘Arab’ 
and ‘Muslim’’, providing the example of a Roman Catholic Arab American 
family who renamed their son from Osama to Sam after being called a 
‘Muslim terrorist’. While Naber does not exclusively focus on gendered 
constructions of Muslims, her study demonstrates how a post-9/11 narrative 
has racialized Muslims and depicted them as an Other. Her study is 
illuminating in that she uses empirical research to measure the impact of the 
race-ed dimensions of US foreign policy on Arab Americans. This relates to 
my study, as I am not only concerned with understanding the extent to 
which gendered issues affect women but am also concerned with questions 
relating to race and how it intersects with gender and other social axes. 
Specifically, I will explore the extent to which these conflations of Arabs 
and terrorists, and Arabs and Muslims, amongst others, have impacted (if at 
all) Iraqi women’s lives. 
 
The logic behind homogenizing Muslims, some scholars such as Evelyn 
Alsultany (2012, p. 9) argue, was to help the US set up the narrative of 
saving Muslim women:  
 
Arab/Muslim conflation is strategically useful to the US government 
during the War on Terror because it comes with baggage. It draws 
on centuries old Orientalist narratives of patriarchal societies and 
oppressed women of Muslim fundamentalism. 
 
Several scholars support this argument that such assumptions are steeped in 
colonial-orientalist stereotypes (see Al-Sajji, 2009 or Khalid, 2011). For 
example, Lord Cromer, who was the British consul-general in Egypt during 
British rule, invoked the status of women to indicate how Islam oppressed 
women as a moral justification of colonial rule (see Ahmed, 1992; Lughod, 
2002; and Al-Sajji, 2009).  
 
By homogenizing Muslim women as victims and regressive, the US was 
able to emphasize its “exceptional” capabilities of bringing Western 
modernity and US values to these women, who are portrayed as otherwise 
uncivilized. According to Sunaina Maira (2009, p. 631): 
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US discourse [is] about bringing “democracy” and “human rights,” 
particularly “women’s rights,” to regions that presumably need to 
catch up with Western modernity. In this social Darwinist model, 
human subjects trapped in antidemocratic, patriarchal, and 
tribalistic cultures need to be liberated in order to achieve the 
“freedom” of individual autonomy promised to the fittest by 
neoliberal capitalism. 
 
Maira demonstrates that underpinning US narratives is the idea that 
American values must prevail and that it is incumbent upon the US to 
introduce these values to ‘uncivilized’ societies; as part of this narrative, 
rhetoric of women’s rights is frequently used.  
 
The idea of progress is a central component for enabling the US to exercise 
exceptionalism. Zine (2002, p. 3) writes: ‘The narrative of ‘progress’ 
therefore creates a rationale for the occupation of Iraq as a benevolent 
gesture of humanitarianism’. This further reinforces the 
progressive/backwards binary as invoking the narrative of progress, which 
signals that societies, such as Iraqi societies, are perceived as ‘eternal, 
uniform, and incapable of defining itself or of change and progress by virtue 
of being the Orient’ (Said, 1979, p. 301). 
 
It is important to note that scholars are often dependent upon binaries, which 
present Muslim women as victims, in their critique of the homogenization of 
Muslim women. While I acknowledge that these binaries are reproduced in 
US narratives of the ‘War on Terror’ and that these binaries are problematic, 
nonetheless, the identification of these binaries does not dismantle them. 
 
While I recognize that it is vital to critique hegemonic knowledge about 
Muslim women in order to identify uneven power relations at play, there is a 
danger that this body of literature favours a change ‘for women’ rather than 
a change ‘by women’ and that ‘in speaking ‘for women’ [these authors] 
largely objectify and depict women as passive victims’ (Youngs, 2006, p. 
15). Further, such critiques of US discourses leave little room for 
understanding women’s agency beyond resistance to these narratives. What 
about women who may endorse such narratives? Are these women merely 
dupes of hegemonic discourse without any agency? This thesis explores 
these questions by offering a pluralistic account of women’s experiences. In 
doing so, I build further on Gillian Youngs’ observations by centring on 
women’s own narratives, including their responses to hegemonic narratives 
of which they are the object. I argue that capturing a pluralistic account of 
their experiences will challenge binary oppositions as it highlights 




The importance of studying representations and gender in 
international politics  
This section will discuss key theories that have influenced scholars’ work on 
the subject of the representation of Muslim women since 9/11. I will also 
discuss how their contribution is important for advancing the field of IR’s 
understanding of gender and representation in international politics as well 
as highlight key reasons that we need more studies that pay attention to 
questions of gender and representation. 
 
Postcolonial scholars, in particular, have long highlighted the concrete 
implications of the West’s racialized and gendered discourses about the 
Other. This is most famously elaborated in Edward Said’s (1978, p. 3) study 
of Orientalism:  
 
Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate 
institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making 
statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching 
it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style 
for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient 
[…] Such language is all the more effective because of its 
naturalness, authority, professionalism, assertiveness, and anti-
theoretical directness.  
 
The relevance of Said’s text goes beyond the colonial modes of 
representation employed in the ‘War on Terror’ discourse. Said’s work is 
important for understanding how the development of Western knowledge 
about the Other is integral to the exercise of power. Postcolonial feminist 
scholars believed that the underpinning idea of Orientalism, that the West 
holds dominant power over the representation of the East, is visible in US 
representations of Muslim women since 9/11. The representation of Muslim 
women as victims set out by US foreign policy has become common 
currency. The reiteration of their representation takes hold through the 
process of hegemony, described by Said (1978, p. 7) as the:  
 
influence of ideas, of institution, and of other persons [which] works 
not through domination but by what Gramsci calls consent. […] 
certain cultural forms predominate over others […] It is hegemony, 
or rather the cultural hegemony at work, that gives orientalism [its] 
durability and strength.  
  
To understand the power of representation, it is vital to recognise the link 
between Western representations of non-Western societies and power-
knowledge. Said (1978, p. 3) adopted Foucault’s concept of power-
knowledge to argue that Western knowledge production and the West’s 
imperial domination were interweaved. This point is central to 
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understanding why postcolonial feminists are concerned with Western 
representations of Other women. Yet despite the fact that Said neglected to 
study the importance of gender in the construction of East-West binaries, 
feminist scholars have built on his key insights about the relationship 
between Western knowledge and power.  
 
In doing so, some postcolonial feminist scholars were able to offer a more 
nuanced gendered orientalist reading of the veil. For example, Meyda 
Yegenoglu offers the example of how the veil might threaten the West, 
particularly in terms of surveillance. She writes, ‘the veil can be seen as the 
resisting data or tropology of this modern power whose program aims to 
construct the world in terms of transparency provided by knowledge as 
power’ (Yegenoglu, 1998, p. 41). She adds: 
 
 ‘Bentham’s model prison, the panopticon, embodies the concept of 
an eye which can see without being seen […] the veil is, thus, the 
‘inverse of Bentham’s omnipotent gaze. The loss of control does not 
imply a mere loss of sight, but a complete reversal of positions: her 
body completely invisible to the European observer except for her 
eyes, the veiled woman can see without being seen’ (Yegenoglu, 
1998, p. 41-43).  
 
That the veil should represent, for the West, a subject who needs to be 
disciplined reflects the multi-layered reading of it.  
Postcolonial feminists have also demonstrated how European women 
criticized Muslims as a means of criticising European domesticity. Lamia 
Zayzafoon (2005, pp. 32–33) writes that Isabelle Eberhardt, a young 
European woman who travelled through North Africa in the late nineteenth 
century, reproduced ‘the male Orientalist stereotypes about the ‘Muslim 
woman’, [but] transform[ed] them to criticize the ideal of domesticity in fin 
de siècle European society’. These readings show that a gender analysis is 
central to understanding of the historical complexities on the representation 
of the Other.  
 
Feminist scholars have argued for the importance of gender as a category of 
analysis for understanding the complexities of the representation of the 
Other.  Moreover, feminist and postcolonial scholars have argued that the 
power of representation can produce inequalities and silence certain groups 
from expressing agency.  However, there is still an abundantly clear lack of 
attention given to the study of representation in the field of IR. As Nair and 
Chowdhry (2004, p. 16) have argued, ‘[IR] has not only ignored the 
question of representation, but also assumed that mainstream IR’s language 
[Realism] is universal, giving it the authority to speak for and about others’.  
 
The study of narrative and representation is indeed underused within 
mainstream IR today, due largely to the positivist approach of most scholars 
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within this field (Smith, 1996, p. 11). This approach is often antithetical to a 
methodological approach premised on narrative and perception. Within 
mainstream IR, language is ‘merely the means by which propositions about 
cause and effect relationships and explanations are conveyed to an audience 
in a way that makes sense’ (Steans, 2013, p. 141). That is, positivist 
researchers view language as a vehicle by which to describe the world, 
rather than subscribing to the idea that language functions to construct the 
world. Therefore, positivists view facts as producing true knowledge. This 
view limits the ways in which one can challenge what are considered to be 
‘facts’. By contrast, the present work adopts the view that ‘facts’ can be 
contested because there are inevitably various ways of interpreting 
knowledge. Moreover, the dominance of positivism and realism in the field 
of IR is problematic, because it reinforces the assumptions underpinning the 
exercise of power by the West over the other. Mainstream IR assumes that 
‘language is universal and unproblematic, [which gives mainstream IR] […] 
the authority of speaking for and about others’ (Chowdhry & Nair, 2004, p. 
16). 
 
The field of IR continues to marginalize alternative forms of knowledge that 
could challenge dominant power relations. Using the metaphor of a house to 
describe IR’s resemblance to a colonial household, Agathangelou and Ling 
(2004, p. 11) argue that IR’s lack of attention to alternative knowledge is 
depriving the field of rich and varied knowledge:  
 
The Native Other refers to non-Western, non-white source of 
knowledge, traditions, or worlds. These may be smuggled in 
“wards” of the house but otherwise are not recognized as identities 
in their own right. Such alienation does not allow the house to 
formalize connections between and different producers of 
knowledge, although informal cross-internalisations flourish and 
from the most unexpected sources.  
 
The current literature on the gendered and racialized dimensions of the ‘War 
on Terror’ and, within this, the representations of Muslim women, has also 
to some extent side-lined alternative forms of knowledge. It has tended to 
focus on hegemonic discourses and narratives. This is important in terms of 
drawing attention to the ways in which the fixing of gendered and racialized 
representations through particular narratives underpins certain US foreign 
policies. However, such an approach also risks reproducing the binaries that 
are implicated in hegemonic discourses and narratives, thus marginalizing 
the subjective experiences of those who are the objects of such discourses 
and narratives.  
  
In much of the literature, Muslim women are only considered as passive 
victims of US media and foreign policy discourses. For example, various 
feminist postcolonial critics as well as Feminist IR scholars have pointed to 
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orientalist tropes of ‘veiling’ and ‘saving’ which risk reproducing ‘an 
Orientalized dichotomy of America vs Islam self vs other in a ‘clash of 
civilisations’ manner’ (Allison, 2013, p. 666). Zine (2002, p. 2) 
problematizes such discourses ‘of abject victimhood’ as essentializing the 
representation of Muslim women and limiting their agency. Gillian Youngs 
also problematizes feminist scholars’ heavy focus on studying hegemonic 
discourses; she urges scholars instead to include women’s experiences and 
perspectives on the ‘War on Terror’. She writes: 
 
We need studies that explain how women have been and continue to 
be marginalized, othered and silenced, as well as those that counter 
that marginalization, othering and silencing by making women 
present in diverse ways (Youngs, 2006, p. 15). 
 
Therefore, in order to challenge the binaries of hegemonic discourses and 
narratives, this thesis shifts the focus on women’s subjective experiences of 
the ‘War on Terror’ and US foreign policy discourses. This thesis aims to 
contribute to creating an alternative, non-hegemonic knowledge. In this 
way, it builds on the very few studies of women’s lived experiences of the 
‘War on Terror’ (Al-Ali, 2007; Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009; Enloe, 2010). These 
studies demonstrate the gendered impacts of the Iraq War on women’s lives, 
in terms of violence and insecurity, increased burdens of social 
reproduction, and marginalization within the public sphere, as well as 
highlight women’s agency in terms of resisting these processes and 
addressing their negative effects.  
 
My thesis extends this work in two ways. First, it considers Iraqi women’s 
own responses to US foreign policy discourses and narratives. Second, it 
attempts to capture the diversity of Iraqi women’s experiences not only in 
relation to the 2003 invasion and its immediate aftermath but also in relation 
to the US troop withdrawal in 2010 and the US bombing of the Islamic State 
from 2014 onwards. This thesis seeks to move away from binaries of victim 
vs heroine, anti-US vs pro-US, as they preclude the wide range of 
experiences and attitudes that may be held by women experiencing complex 
situations. As Nadje Al-Ali (2007) demonstrates through her collection of 
oral histories of Iraqi women, experiences and attitudes may (although not 
necessarily) flow from the differences among Iraqi women, based on their 
class, religion/sect, place of residency and/or memories of the former regime 
of Saddam Hussein, among other social differences. 
 
Feminist Security Studies 
One sub-field of Feminist IR that has prioritized women’s experiences is 
that of Feminist Security Studies. My project treats Feminist Security 
Studies as a form of embodied knowledge that will help this thesis situate 
Iraqi women’s own concepts of security in wider gendered security 
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contexts. This thesis responds to the fact that US politicians have previously 
discussed Iraqi women’s security without accounting for Iraqi women’s own 
conceptions of security. I will first discuss the possible alternative 
conceptions of security rooted in Feminist Security Studies, and then go on 
to discuss how standpoint theory has helped me to interpret the 
interviewees’ security narratives in a more agential and contextualized 
manner. 
 
To begin, Feminist Security Studies provides a platform for the life-
grounded experiences of women otherwise elided by the mainstream 
literature on International Relations and Security Studies. It encourages IR 
to take the study of gender more seriously, arguing that the definition of 
security must be widened, if not reconceptualized, beyond concepts of state 
sovereignty and national security in order to encompass the issues that affect 
women, such as sexual violence, patriarchy, the economy, and the 
environment (Blanchard, 2003, p. 1292). Moreover, feminists question the 
state as the guarantor of women’s security, arguing that in fact the state may 
be a source of insecurity for them. Feminist approaches to security and IR 
draw on notions of gendered and structural violence to problematize 
dominant understandings of security and to prompt researchers to consider 
‘who is being secured by security policies’ (Blanchard, 2003, 1290).  
Similarly, scholars who work on human security recognize different types of 
security that are reflective of feminist concerns to move away from state-
centric notions of security and recognise the insecurity caused by structural 
violence. Despite this, feminist security scholars have contested the concept 
of ‘human security’. 
What is human security and why is the term contested by feminist security 
scholars?  There are various perspectives on the concept of human security, 
but its proponents all agree that the referent object of security is the 
individual. Where scholars tend to diverge in this matter usually involves 
questions related to purpose and scope (Liotta & Owen, 2006).  
Thus, one of the most salient debates regarding human security involves 
agreeing upon whether there needs to be a broadening or narrowing of the 
understanding of this term. Scholars who sought to narrow the definition 
tended to focus on ‘freedom from fear’, which refers to physical and 
personal safety. Examples of this include examining state repressions of 
peoples and failed governments (see, for example, Mack, 2004; MacFarlane 
& Khong, 2006).  
 
By contrast, the camp which favours broadening the term encompasses both 
issues of ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’, where the latter 
refers to basic needs such as food and shelter. Both these examples of 
narrowing and broadening definitions of human security have been 
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challenged by critical theorists and feminists in terms of their normative 
approach to security lacking analytical rigour: 
 
human security arguments are generally ‘problem-solving’. They do 
not generally engage in epistemological, ontological or 
methodological debates. Human security is therefore considered – 
and as a result generally dismissed – as ‘uncritical’ and 
unsophisticated by critical security scholars. For its part, because 
human security scholars wish to remain policy relevant – and 
accessible to policy circles – they have been reluctant to explore 
overtly ‘critical’ security studies themes, either because they feel 
these are unnecessary or because they fear that such theoretical 
pursuits will alienate them from the policy world. (Newman, 2010, p. 
77).  
Feminist scholars proved how normative definitions of human security are 
problematic by taking issue with the idea of the state being conceived in 
gender-neutral terms (see, for example, Peterson, 1992). Heidi Hudson 
(2005, p. 156) argues that feminist perspectives are critical to understanding 
security issues of women:  
There is a real danger that collapsing femininity or masculinity into 
the term ‘human’ could conceal the gendered underpinnings of 
security practices. The term ‘human’ is presented as though it were 
gender-neutral, but very often it is an expression of the masculine. 
Feminist scholars thus tasked themselves with rectifying this issue by 
critically dismantling gendered assumptions, such as the idea that women 
are linked unreflectively with peace (Blanchard, 2003, p. 1290); such 
assumptions hinder any meaningful understanding of human insecurities. In 
addition, it is important to study gender itself, as Jill Steans (1998, p.5) puts 
it: “to look at the world through gendered lenses is to focus on gender as a 
particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is 
central to understanding international processes.”   
My project acknowledges that human security lacks any serious 
consideration of gender and women’s experiences. However, my project 
does find certain elements of human security to be useful to some extent. It 
will primarily adopt themes borrowed from the UNDP (1994, p. 24) which, 
under the rubrics of human security, introduced seven subset themes of 
security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and 
political security. I observed that the themes of economic, personal and 
community security were recurrent concerns in the interviewees’ narratives. 
It is also important to understand how my project diverges from these more 
common perceptions of security.  
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More broadly, the present project seeks to extend the work on human 
security by considering the role of individual agency, rather than viewing 
women as merely victims of insecurity. In relation to my project, Western 
politicians, commentators and even some scholars have tended to conceive 
of Iraqi women’s security in relation to ‘negative security’, that is, the 
absence of any threat to well-being (Gjorv, 2012) such as dictatorship or 
patriarchy. Meanwhile, ‘positive security’, that is, the ability to determine 
ways to stop or mitigate these threats, either individually or collectively 
(Gjorv, 2012), has seen far less discussion in relation to Iraqi women’s 
security. Whilst the interviewees discussed the wish to live without threat to 
their well-being, they also emphasized their opinions, as well as their 
agency, towards mitigating threats.  
 
I have thus reviewed how Feminist scholars have attempted to redefine the 
concept of security to include gender as a category of analysis. This enables 
us to think about gender and women’s experiences as matters of security in 
international relations. Within Feminist Security Studies there are many 
different ways of approaching the study of security, with each approach 
yielding different outcomes, which in itself demonstrates that a feminist 
approach to security is not monolithic. Theoretical approaches to Feminist 
Security include a postcolonial theory and a poststructuralist theory, whilst 
methodological approaches include discourse analysis, narrative analysis 
and empirical research, amongst others. 
 
For example, Laura shepherd (2008) takes a post-structural approach to 
security.  She uses a discursive approach to deconstruct NGOs and the UN 
documents that affect gender issues in the context of international 
policy. Shepherd’s analysis, however, lacks a certain focus on human 
agency because she prioritizes discursive analysis. 
More generally, post-structural feminists’ approaches consider gender to be 
an important category of analysis - as, indeed, does this project – but such 
an approach to security tend to lack a critical consideration of Western-
centric gendered assumptions. 
The postcolonial theory of security acts as a remedy to this issue, as it 
critiques traditional accounts of security that otherwise uncritically draw on 
their “core categories and assumptions about world politics from a particular 
understanding of European experience”. (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006., p. 
330).  
Swati Parashar (2014) takes a postcolonial leaning and uses interviews as 
her method to explore women’s perspectives of the conflicts in Kashmir and 
Sri Lanka in order to analyse their involvement in anti-state armed 
movements. She demonstrates how conflicts are highly complicated by 
problematizing binaries such as “agency/victimhood, speech/silence 
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binaries.” (p.17). My thesis will similarly use interviews and postcolonial 
theory to avoid imposing Western-centric meanings on Iraqi women’s 
security and will instead emphasize cultural context and complicate 
reductive orientalist binaries.  
Methodologically, Christine Sylvester encourages empirical research into 
security (2013, pp. 444–445), where her argument highlights the importance 
of experience in offering life-grounded theoretical insight: 
 
US-based discussions of feminist security can make the mistake 
much of mainstream IR does: both dwell comfortably in an 
abstracted world. But security has experiential aspects, as does war 
[...] and focusing on those experiences [...] can provide reality tests 
that lead to episodes of life-grounded theoretical insight. 
 
To address the issue of feminists’ abstract approaches to security, my thesis 
seeks to build on Sylvester’s argument. I will adopt a standpoint 
epistemology which will help me be mindful in terms of allowing the 
interviewees to articulate their own understandings and experiences of 
security without being directed, or otherwise influenced by myself to speak 
about certain types of security (as defined by politicians, security ‘experts’, 
or academics). 
 
An example of another methodology used in feminist security studies 
include discourse analysis. Feminist scholar Carol Cohn (1987) has analysed 
the sexualised language of defence intellectuals in order to demonstrate how 
their discourse operates within their world by exploring themes such as 
domination and power. Linked to the study of discourse is the narrative 
approach. Laura Sjoberg has used a narrative approach in order to study 
security. She examined the “ ‘beautiful soul’ narrative to describe women’s 
relationship with war throughout its history” (2010, p.53). In doing so, she 
demonstrates how “the image of women’s innocence of and abstention from 
war has often contrasted with women’s actual experiences as soldiers and 
fighters.” (Ibid). Meanwhile, Annick Wibben also adopted a narrative 
approach to her study of the relationship between security and identity 
where she emphasizes the capture of “varied everyday experience” (p.15, 
2011), and which takes into consideration women’s social backgrounds in 
order to highlight differences in their experiences. I will extend Wibben’s 
work by demonstrating how my empirical case study, which takes a 
narrative approach to security, is operationalized and accounts for 
differences in experiences.  
 
Now that I have discussed the various feminist theoretical and 
methodological approaches to studying security, the following sections will 
introduce key themes in Feminist Security Studies and discuss how these 
inform the thesis. 
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Feminist Security Scholars have made significant contributions to the 
conceptualization of war and violence beyond the state-centric notions 
currently prevalent in mainstream IR. They have challenged traditional 
concepts of security with ideas such as a gendered continuum of violence, 
which draws links between different manifestations of violence. Cynthia 
Cockburn (2004, p. 43) writes: 
 
Gender links violence at different points on a scale reaching from 
the personal to the international, from the home and the back street 
to the manoeuvres of the tank column and the sortie of the stealth 
bomber: battering and marital rape, confinement, “dowry” 
burnings, honor killings, and genital mutilation in peacetime; 
military rape, sequestration, prostitution, and sexualized torture in 
war. No wonder women often say, “War? Don’t speak to me of war. 
My daily life is battlefield enough.”’.  
 
Cockburn demonstrates that applying the idea of a continuum of violence 
breaks down binaries such as private versus public, peace versus war, 
personal versus international, us versus them, and powerful versus 
powerless, which underpin mainstream approaches to studying war and 
violence. Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman have challenged the private 
versus public binary in the context of conflict through the observation that 
the divide between battlefront and civilian spaces no longer holds. It is 
increasingly common practice in warfare to incorporate civilians within 
battlefronts as most modern conflict occurs within states rather than across 
borders (Giles & Hyndman, 2004, p. 3). Recognizing the fact of the false 
divide between the public versus private domains will help us acknowledge 
how women are rendered more vulnerable to violence through the methods 
of modern warfare.  
 
Certainly, the interviewees demonstrated the breakdown of the homefront 
and battlefront as a result of war and conflict since 2003. However, it is also 
important to note that many of them also viewed the private sphere as a 
source of comfort and protection, and not necessarily as a sphere of 
violence—even when they are subject to patriarchal control. I explore the 
idea of private space as a source of security in the context of (post-) conflict 
situations; in this way, I shall contribute to complicating further the idea of 
‘continuum of violence’. The project will demonstrate the fact that 
standpoint theory foregrounds Iraqi women’s experiences and their 
narratives, disrupting feminist assumptions about the public and private 
spheres and sources of oppression and violence. 
Another example of how the idea of continuum of violence has been applied 
by Feminist Security Scholars is through their examination of the issue of 
rape. They have challenged the binary of war and peace, raising the question 
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as to whether appropriate security is provided for women, even in 
peacetime. For example, Pettman (1996, p. 105) makes the case that those 
who perpetrate rape continue to threaten women in the post-conflict 
rebuilding process. In the case of Iraq, the aftermath of the invasion created 
considerable unrest and lawlessness, which has subsequently resulted in all 
kinds of horrific violence. This raises the issue of the private sphere as a 
sphere of comfort and security. 
I will thus build on the black feminist’s approach of challenging the idea of 
the home as a sphere of patriarchal control versus the public sphere as a 
source of liberation – which is how white/Western feminists consider it. 
Kimberley Crenshaw, for example, emphasized the need for context:  
 
feminist literature may make the mistake of assuming that since the 
role of Black women in the family and in other Black institutions 
does not always resemble the familiar manifestations of patriarchy 
in the white community, Black women are somehow exempt from 
patriarchal norms. For example, Black women have traditionally 
worked outside the home in number far exceeding the labor 
participation rate of white women. (Crenshaw,1989, p.156) 
 
Thus, I aim to apply the idea of the continuum of violence in my study to 
demonstrate how the private sphere can be a source of comfort and security. 
My project also considers epistemic violence in an effort to further 
complicate the idea of continuum of violence. The reductive and generalized 
representation of Muslim women has to date portrayed them as oppressed. 
Thus, the impact of hegemonic knowledge on the lived experiences of 
women in question should be discussed in relation to security. 
 
Complementing the idea of a continuum of violence is the notion of 
structural violence, first coined by Johan Galtung, who describes the term in 
the sense of social injustice (1969, p. 171) and as indirect violence (1969, p. 
170), to which it is argued that women are particularly vulnerable. Tickner 
(1992), for example, believes that women experience direct and indirect 
violence; direct violence denotes physical violence, whilst indirect violence 
is understood to mean structural violence. She writes of the ‘insecurity of 
individuals whose life expectancy was reduced, not by the direct violence of 
war but by domestic and international structures of political and economic 
oppression’ (Tickner, 1992, 69). Meanwhile, Anne Runyan and Spike V. 
Peterson (2014, p. 72) are concerned that: ‘structural violence 
disproportionately affects women and groups subordinated by cultural 
markers and economic inequalities, and when we ignore this fact, we ignore 
the (in)security of the planet’s majority’. These social structures and 
inequalities are sometimes difficult to detect, as structural violence is: 
‘almost always invisible, embedded in ubiquitous social structures, 
normalized by stable institutions and regular experience’ (Winter & 
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Leighton, 2001, p. 1). From the interviews I conducted with Iraqi women, 
their narratives revealed that even previously privileged women from the 
middle classes also reported an erosion of their privileges and status as a 
result of the war, and so structural violence was not ultimately one of the 
themes I detected in my project.  
 
Feminist Security Scholars have not only focussed on the negative impacts 
of war and violence on women, but also on women’s agency in resisting 
this. For example, Giles and Hyndman (2004, p. 16) argue that ‘women, in 
particular, have subverted nationalist projects and developed solidarity 
movements across national, political, and economic divides, both locally 
and internationally’. Given the vulnerability and insecurity shown by most 
of the women that I interviewed, combined with their experiences of 
displacement and the effects of sectarianism, open examples of collective 
contestation were not evident. Indeed, scholars have observed that it may 
even be dangerous for women to engage in the open confrontation of direct 
and/or indirect violence. For example, Lene Hansen (2000, p. 291–293) 
examined how honour killing in Pakistan presents a difficult situation; 
reporting such cases can result in danger to the informant due to their 
infringement of local customs. This creates a situation where a strategy of 
‘security as silence’ is necessary to protect women from the threats posed by 
gender-based violence. Hansen’s ‘security as silence’ is applicable to 
contexts other than rape. This project will examine women’s choice of 
abstention on certain topics, drawing on the concept of ‘security as silence’ 
to argue that it can be considered a form of agency because it can be used as 
a coping strategy. 
 
The issue of war and violence was extremely important to the Iraqi women 
that I interviewed. In the past two decades alone, Iraqi women have faced 
military bombing by the US and its allies, the ‘shock and awe’ of the US-led 
invasion of Iraq, and the attendant breakdown in security largely as a result 
of the emergence of anti-US insurgencies, the outbreak of sectarian 
violence, the emergence of the Islamic State, and the US-led bombing of the 
Islamic State. These have led to millions of dead and displaced, as well as 
extensive damage to infrastructure and livelihoods (see Al-Ali, 2007; Al-Ali 
& Pratt, 2009, amongst others). 
 
Until now, scholarship has not considered how this particular conflict has 
reshaped the identities of Iraqi women or how this relates to perceptions of 
their security. Through an intersectional approach, I identified how the 
interviewees narrated security in relation to intersecting identities of gender, 
nationality, religious background and class, whilst keeping in mind that the 
‘feminist analysis of identity must not lose sight of the fact that all aspects 
of identity are not equal: some are frivolous and inconsequential, while 
others are all-pervasive and life-altering’ (Hekman, 1999, 22). Indeed, the 
nature of war and violence since 2003, and particularly the rise in 
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sectarianism, meant that many women prioritized either their religious or 




As critical scholars have highlighted, Western representations of non-
Western, specifically Muslim (including Iraqi), women are infused with 
orientalist, race-ed and gendered assumptions. It has long been recognised 
by postcolonial scholars that there is a need to redress these assumptions and 
counter the persistent marginalization of non-Western women. This has 
been particularly acute in the period since 9/11, as Western narratives have 
systematically conflated various groups of women, including Iraqi women, 
and collapsed them into the figure of ‘the Muslim woman’. Simultaneously, 
Iraqi women have been instrumentalized by US politicians and media to 
justify the invasion and occupation of Iraq.  
 
However, despite the importance of critiquing hegemonic discourses and 
narratives, there has been a failure to prioritize non-hegemonic knowledge 
or to engage with the women who are the objects of these representations. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to explore the experiences and attitudes of a 
range of Iraqi women in order to challenge monolithic representations of the 
‘Muslim Woman’ and binaries of ‘oppressed’ versus ‘agential’. It aims to 
capture a plurality and diversity of attitudes and experiences among Iraqi 
women in order to produce a critique of hegemonic knowledge production 
concerning Iraqi women and, more broadly, Muslim women. Moreover, it 
seeks to understand their experiences through their own personal narratives.  
 
This thesis therefore asks: How do Iraqi women’s narratives disrupt 
existing hegemonic knowledge about representations and experiences of 
Muslim women? 
 
To help me answer this main research question, I have formulated three sub-
questions: 
1. How do Iraqi women narrate their experiences of the 2003 
invasion and its aftermath, and what themes emerge within these 
narratives? 
2. How do Iraqi women relate to US foreign policy narratives and 
representations of Iraqi women?  
3. To what degree, if any, do the narratives and self-representations 
of Iraqi women reflect feminist critiques of hegemonic 
representations of Other women, particularly Muslim women?  
 
This thesis will uncover themes and experiences, both individual and 
collective, not addressed in either US foreign policy narratives or feminist 
critiques of these narratives. It will consider whether hegemonic narratives 
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matter to these women. This thesis will not only consider the gendered 
identities of Iraqi women but will also pay attention to the ways in which 
their gendered identities intersect with other social identities, such as class, 
religion and nation. The answers to these questions will contribute to 
forming alternative knowledge by recognising the complexities of Iraqi 
women’s experiences and positions, thus disrupting binaries produced by 
US foreign policy narratives, which are currently the focus of much of the 
existing literature. Moreover, the thesis will explore Iraqi women’s 
understandings of security in order to contribute to Feminist Security 
Studies, and it challenges conventional ideas of security, freedom and 
agency by offering a context-based analysis on security. I will argue for 
feminist scholars to take seriously the approach of standpoint theory, 
intersectionality and narrative analysis to better understand women’s 






























Chapter Two: Theoretical framework: Feminist 
Standpoint Theory 
 
This chapter presents the main analytical framework and the concepts that 
are employed in this thesis to analyse the narratives in US hegemonic 
representations of Iraqi women since 2003. This thesis situates itself within 
the field of Feminist International Relations (IR) and the sub-field of 
Feminist Security Studies, with epistemological underpinnings in 
Standpoint Feminism.  
 
The theoretical framework I employ draws insights from postcolonialism 
and intersectional feminism in addition to Feminist Security Studies to 
complement Feminist Standpoint Theory. While these theoretical 
approaches differ in certain respects, they share an essential overlap in their 
emphasis of the inclusion of women’s experiences.  
 
In broad terms, Feminist IR scholars do not practise a uniform approach 
(Wibben, 2004), but are united in challenging IR’s basic tenets, as rooted in 
Realism, which centre on studying powerful states and ‘the maintenance of 
hierarchy among states’ (Weldon, 2006, p. 67). A Realist model assumes an 
underlying positivist epistemology that prioritizes objective truth and 
disregards individual subjectivity. However, this epistemological approach 
inherently dismisses marginalized groups’ viewpoints, which creates a 
partial way of studying IR. As Gillian Youngs (2004, p. 87) argues, 
‘International Relations as a field focuses on power […] failing to take 
account of gender offers a partial account of power’ (see also, Elshtain, 
1987; Enloe, 1989; Tickner, 1992; Peterson & Runyan, 1993; Sylvester, 
1994; Zalewski & Parpart, 1998, amongst others). Cynthia Enloe argues that 
the ‘the personal is international,’ in order to point to both the role of gender 
in structuring international politics as well as the impact of international 
politics on gender itself. She (1989) famously asked ‘where are the women 
in international politics?’, going on to elaborate how studying women’s 
lives through feminist approaches can reveal the dynamics of power 
relations in International Politics. For example, Enloe (1989, p. 4) states:  
 
            Feminist-informed investigators pay attention to low-status 
secretarial women because they learned that paying attention to 
(listening to, taking seriously the observations of) women in these 
scarcely noticed jobs can pull back the curtain on the political 
workings of lofty state affairs. 
 
 
Enloe’s approach thus speaks to the current project’s aim of foregrounding 
the experiences and knowledge of Iraqi women who are in a position that 
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Enloe would regard as being on the ‘bottom rungs’, that is, those who ‘lack 
public power and [are] the object[s] of other people’s power’ (Enloe, 2004, 
p. 21). 
 
Feminist Standpoint Theory  
 
This section will provide an overview of Feminist Standpoint Theory and 
will further discuss the its limitation by highlighting its existing tensions 
with other theories. I shall also elaborate on how my project will overcome 
these tensions and make use of the associated theoretical developments in 
order to ensure this project’s epistemological coherence. 
 
Feminist Standpoint Theory first emerged in the 1970s “as a feminist critical 
theory about relations between the production of knowledge and practices of 
power” (Harding, 2004 p.1). Standpoint Feminists such as Nancy Hartsock 
(1983), Mary E. Hawkesworth (1989), Dorothy Smith (1990), Sandra 
Harding (1991, 1993) and Helen Longino (1990) were responding to 
mainstream academics who privilege knowledge that discounts the 
experiences and knowledges of women, in as much as the research at the 
time was rooted in academic work dominated by men and masculinist 
theoretical and epistemological approaches. As Harding (2004, p.4) notes: 
 
            the research disciplines and the public policy institutions that 
depended upon them permitted no conceptual frameworks in which 
women as a group—or, rather, as groups located in different class, 
racial, ethnic, and sexual locations in local, national, and global 
social relations— became the subjects—the authors—of knowledge. 
Could women (in various diverse collectivities) become subjects of 
knowledge? 
 
Feminist Standpoint Theorists have addressed the question of the validity of 
the knowledge associated with traditional scientific methods of claiming 
‘truths’.  For example, scholars such as J. Ann Tickner (2005, p.6) have 
noted that traditional scientific epistemologies and methods omit any serious 
and unbiased consideration of gender and women’s experiences:  
 
            While not rejecting in principle the use of quantitative data, 
feminists have recognized how past behavioral realities have been 
publicly constituted in state generated indicators in biased gendered 
ways, using data that does not adequately reflect the reality of 
women’s lives and the unequal structures of power within which they 
are situated.  
 
This suggests that scientific knowledge must also be questioned regarding 




For this reason, Donna Haraway (1988, p. 583) advocates the idea that 
knowledge should be socially situated, as ‘feminist objectivity is about 
limited location and situated knowledge’; she thereby emphasises the 
importance of context. This idea is further developed by Sandra Harding 
who introduced the idea of ‘strong objectivity’ as a means to reject the 
flawed assumption that there can ever be value-neutral knowledge. She 
instead believes that: 
 
            Knowledge claims are always socially situated and the failure by 
dominant groups critically and systematically to interrogate their 
advantaged social situation and the effect of advantages on their 
beliefs leaves their social situation a scientifically and 
epistemologically disadvantaged one for generating knowledge 
(Harding, 1993, p. 54). 
 
Dorothy Smith (1990, p. 28) further develops the idea of situated knowledge 
by establishing the “sociology for women” project whose aim was to 
embody the experiences of the “everyday world” as located knowledge: 
 
             The standpoint of women situates the sociological subject prior to the 
entry into the abstracted conceptual mode, vested in texts, that is the 
order of the relations of ruling. From this standpoint, we know the 
everyday world through the particularities of our local practices and 
activities, in the actual places of our work and the actual time it 
takes. In making the everyday world problematic we also 
problematize the everyday localized practices of the objectified 
forms of knowledge organizing our everyday world.  
 
Smith’s standpoint feminist strategy of “problematizing the everyday” 
exposes objectified and dominant forms of knowledge to understand the 
particularities of local practices. Smith influenced Feminist IR scholars to 
adopt her approach, and indeed we can trace her advice in the work of 
scholars such as Cynthia Enloe, who writes about women’s everyday 
experiences in the field of global politics (1989).  
Standpoint Feminist Theorists also argue that those who have been 
systematically excluded and marginalized by dominant knowledge 
production are in a position of “epistemic privilege”. As Alison Wylie 
(2012, p.47) explains: 
 
            [those] who are marginalized or oppressed under conditions of 
systemic inequity may, in fact, be better knowers, in a number of 
respects, than those who are socially or economically privileged. 
Their epistemic advantage arises from the kinds of experience they 
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are likely to have, situated as they are, and the resources available 
to them for understanding this experience.  
 
Nancy Hartsock further develops this idea in her own work, and she 
provides one of the earliest applications of Feminist Standpoint Theory. Her 
insights into women’s distinct perspectives of reality were inspired by 
Marxist theories in the sense that the proletarian standpoint should be 
privileged over that of the bourgeoisie on the basis of the former’s clear 
perspectives of their own material conditions. Hartsock (1987, p. 175) 
further noted: 
 
an analysis which begins from the sexual division of labor [...] could 
form the basis for an analysis of the real structures of women's 
oppression, an analysis which would not require that one sever 
biology from society, nature from culture, an analysis which would 
expose the ways women both participate in and oppose their own 
subordination. 
 
The essentials of Hartsock’s argument can be found in Tickner’s (1992, p. 
16) work, which recognizes that ‘those who are oppressed have a better 
understanding of their sources of oppression than their oppressors.’ My 
project responds to this important notion by privileging the knowledge and 
experiences of Iraqi women over both the foreign policy narratives of the 
US as well as the prevailing assumptions in the current corpus of scholarly 
research in the field of Feminist IR. Furthermore, In Chapter Five, I will 
demonstrate that in privileging Iraqi women’s knowledge, we should be able 
to understand the concept of “security” from their standpoints and what it 
means to them. This is important if we are seriously seeking to understand 
their post-conflict circumstances. I have discussed ‘security’, because it is a 
recurring theme that emerges from the interviews. The adoption of Feminist 
standpoint epistemology has led me to focus on the themes that were 
important to the interviewees as it privileges the capture of marginalized 
knowledge. 
Moreover, I argue that it is important to understand power relations from the 
perspectives of the oppressed as “the epistemic advantage that may arise 
even under social conditions that are likely to suppress evidence is the 
opportunity to understand how relations of power actually work.” (Rolin, 
2009, p. 224) In Chapter Four, I discuss how understanding women’s 
narratives regarding their positionalities in relation to power (US foreign 
narratives) allows us to understand their agencies and power in complex 
ways, and further to challenge binary assumptions made by scholars and US 
politicians, which leads to these women’s empowerment as their narratives 
hold the power to disrupt such binary assumptions. My project seeks to 
understand power relations in order to be able to challenge them. 
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Standpoint feminist theory has also discussed how it has the potential to 
contribute to social justice projects. As Harding (2004, p.10) explains: 
            Standpoint theory’s focus on the historical and social locatedness of 
knowledge projects and on the way collective political and 
intellectual work can transform a source of oppression into a source 
of knowledge and potential liberation, makes a distinctive 
contribution to social justice projects as well as to our 
understanding of preconditions for the production of knowledge. 
Thus, Iraqi women’s experiences are not to be considered as merely matters 
of opinion or of existing without emancipatory potential. Rather, when we 
begin to think of their experiences as “standpoints”, then we are offered, as 
Alison Jaggar (1997, p. 193) puts it, insights into the “mechanisms of 
domination and envisioning freer ways to live.” I use terms such as 
‘disruption’ and ‘agency’ as conceptual tools by which to understand Iraqi 
women as subjects, rather than objects, of knowledge and to recognize that 
their narratives are a source of empowered and alternative knowledge. Iraqi 
women’s narratives will enable them to define their experiences instead of 
having others define it for them, where the act of defining one’s own 
experiences can be considered a form of ‘agency’. In doing so, Iraqi women 
can ‘disrupt’ representations about themselves in dominant US narratives 
because they oppose the “objectification as the Other” (Hill-Collins, 2000, 
p. 101)  
Although Standpoint Feminism, in its favouring of alternative forms of 
knowledge, provides an important approach to highlighting women’s 
experiences, it comes with certain epistemological limitations. Post-
structural and postmodern feminists have been among the most critical of 
Standpoint Feminist projects. For example, Susan Hekman (1997, p. 348) 
criticizes Standpoint Feminists for attempting to define the nature of reality 
and for making claims of truth. She states: 
 
             Despite their significant differences, all of these accounts share the 
conviction that Feminist standpoint is rooted in a ‘reality’ that is the 
opposite of the abstract conceptual world inhabited by men, 
particularly the men of the ruling class, and that in this reality lies 
the truth of the human condition. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Standpoint Theorists such as Harding believe that Hekman 
mischaracterized their work. Harding (1997, p. 382) explains that, “it seems 
to me that Hekman distorts the central project of standpoint theorists when 
she characterizes it as one of figuring out how to justify the truth of feminist 
claims to more accurate accounts of ‘reality.’ Rather, it is relations between 
power and knowledge that concern these thinkers.” In my thesis, I will not 
attempt to claim that Iraqi women’s narratives are somehow indicative of a 
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more accurate form of reality but will rather focus on the point these 
narratives can complicate power relations. 
 
 I have discussed the relationship between power and knowledge by 
highlighting how the concept of “Occidentalism”, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, is a type of embodied knowledge of their experiences and 
positionalities that complicate power relations and dismantle the reductive 
Orientalist us versus them binary. Decoding theory will help operationalize 
Occidentalism by demonstrating that women do not only hold an 
oppositional position, but indeed hold many others. This, in turn, helps us 
rethink power relations in more complex terms rather than in a simplistic 
binary manner. 
 
Post-structural and postmodern Feminists have also accused Standpoint 
Feminists of essentialism and ‘assuming a single coherent female subject’ 
(Hansen, 2015, p. 20) by advocating the idea that all women share common 
experiences, thereby homogenizing the experiences of women. By contrast, 
post-structural feminists argue that women as a category are ‘only 
constituted in discourse. This means they believe that there is no extra-
discursive biological gender that stands apart from the social constitution of 
femininity and masculinity’ (Hansen, 2015, p. 21). 
 
This project will only adopt one key post-structuralist concept, namely that 
identities are constructed through discourse (Foucault, 1972). This is 
because the adoption of a post-structural feminist approach would dismiss 
the otherwise valid idea that women are not only constructed through 
language, but also by lived experiences. As the project emphasizes the need 
to focus on women’s experiences, adopting a post-structural feminist 
approach would ultimately prove irreconcilable, because: ‘if ‘women’ are 
not a subject that can be referred to, but ‘only’ constituted in discourse, it 
becomes difficult if not impossible to speak of the structural inequalities that 
women face’ (Hansen, 2015, p. 22).  
In addition to this, focussing on a post-structural approach dismisses the 
significance of considering bodies as embodied knowledge when shaping 
and reshaping stories and places: “people recreate and reconstruct social 
relations through lived experiences: experiences that are contingent upon 
their actual, material locations,” [and these experiences] “reverberate back 
through a larger social context” (Amy Mills, 2012, p. 780)  
Post-structural approaches also dismisses the importance of studying 
women’s lived experiences are impacted by the state and social structures: 
Hawksworth (1989, p.556) argues that “there is a modicum of permanence 
within the fluidity of the life-world: traditions, practices, relationships, 
institutes and structures persist and can have profound consequences for 
individual life prospects, constraining opportunities for growth 
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development, resisting reconstitution, frustrating efforts toward discretion 
and control.” Standpoint feminist theory scholars argue that focusing on 
lived experiences can bring out the impact of the state on women and 
marginalized lives:  
Standpoint feminism shift the study from abstract states to how real 
living women are impacted by economic and security structures 
within and across state boundaries. This involves a double shift of 
focus from mainstream IR and rationalist feminism in that it moves 
from states to gender and from abstract structures to concrete 
individuals. Standpoint feminists argue further that one should focus 
in particular on marginalised women as these are particularly 
disadvantaged, yet systematically overlooked. (Hansen, 2015, p.19)  
Throughout the thesis, I have resisted theorizing from abstraction by 
grounding my research with women’s lived experiences of (in)securities and 
their positionalities in relation to dominant power in order to foreground 
their knowledge of how the 2003 invasion of Iraq has impacted their lives. 
 
This thesis nevertheless acknowledges the concerns raised by Post-structural 
Feminists that caution against the risk of essentializing women’s 
experiences. Indeed, I shall track the commentary of Susan Hekman who, in 
critiquing the Standpoint Feminists’ essentializing approach, highlights the 
importance of recognizing “differences”:  
 
             Originally, feminist standpoint theorists claimed that the standpoint 
of women offers a privileged vantage point for knowledge. But if the 
differences among women are taken seriously and we accept the 
conclusion that women occupy many different standpoints and thus 
inhabit many realities, this thesis must be re-examined. (Hekman, 
1997, p.349) 
 
The project responds to Hekmen’s concerns about taking different 
standpoints seriously. This thesis will therefore not merely capture counter-
hegemonic positions, and consequently will avoid the binary and 
homogenous standpoint approach that favour recognizing differences. My 
project operationalizes this by highlighting women’s pluralistic “decoding 
positions”, which include the concept of the hegemonic, negotiated and 
oppositional positions, to operationalize our understanding of women’s 
positionalities in relation to dominant power. This is explored further in 
Chapter Four, with the aim of charting differences between women in 
terms of their attitudes towards US involvement in the 2003 Iraq invasion.  
 
Postcolonial feminists have extended post-structural critique by focusing on 
how Western women standpoints have universalized the experiences of 
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third-world women and have propounded the myth of the “global 
sisterhood”:  
 
The criticism on an epistemological level is aimed at the creation of 
global hegemony of Western scholarship by producing 
(ethnocentric) universal knowledge which negates cross-cultural 
differences. Women as an analytical category is treated as an 
already constituted group (Gouws, 1996, p.72) 
 
Capturing pluralistic accounts of women’s experiences is important to 
postcolonial scholars and indeed to my own project. In fact, even standpoint 
feminist scholars themselves acknowledge this as being an issue that needs 
to be resolved; as Allison Jaggar (2004, p.64) writes: “white/Anglo women 
who try to do theory with women of color inevitably disrupt the dialogue. 
Before they can contribute to a collective dialogue, they need to ‘know the 
text’, to have become familiar with an alternative way of viewing the 
world.”  
 
Another concern shared by Postcolonial theorists is linked to the issue of 
representation, and accordingly they often ask questions such as: ‘who has 
the authority to represent reality’ [or] ‘who must be silenced in order that 
these representations prevail?’ (Yeatman, 1994, p.191). I will be mindful 
about the issue of representation by adopting appropriate postcolonial 
principles such as speaking and listening to women. (Spivak 1988)   
 
This project acknowledges the concerns raised by post-structural, 
postmodern and postcolonial scholars and has addressed them. The project 
overcomes the risk of essentialism by recognizing the complexities and 
diversity of women’s experiences, drawing on postcolonial and 
intersectional feminism. Specifically, it adopts Patricia Hill-Collins’ (1990) 
and Kimberle William Crenshaw’s (1991) intersectional approaches. 
Intersectionality is an important and targeted tool that can help to refine the 
standpoint epistemological approach, as it serves to recognise the local and 
specific conditions in which power operates and upon which representations 
are drawn. Intersectional techniques highlight the different ways in which 
women may identify themselves (not only as women, but also as members 
of particular national, ethnic, and religious groups, in addition to their social 
class backgrounds). As a result, this thesis adopts intersectionality so as to 
acknowledge that women may be oppressed (or privileged) in a number of 
different and simultaneous ways, e.g., through class, race, or age. This helps 
to determine the experience of living as a woman in any given society as 
well as underscoring the differences amongst women. As Crenshaw (1991, 
p. 1245) notes, ‘focus[ing] on the intersections of race and gender […] 
highlights the need to account for multiple grounds of identity when 
considering how the social world is constructed’. The benefits of thinking 
about the concept of intersectionality, Crenshaw (1991, p. 1299) argues, are 
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that: ‘through an awareness of intersectionality, we can better acknowledge 
and ground the differences among us and negotiate the means by which 
these differences will find expression in constructing group politics’.  
 
Patricia Hill-Collins sought to develop Feminist Standpoint Theory in a 
manner that was resolutely intersectional. Maintaining sensitivity towards 
the critique of essentialism, she argues “despite African-American women’s 
potential power to reveal new insights about the matrix of domination, 
Black women’s standpoint is only one angle of vision” (Hill-Collins, 1990, 
p. 234). To address the intersection of gender and race, she develops the 
concept of ‘matrix of domination’ which helps to operationalize 
intersectionality (1990, p. 18): 
 
            Intersectional paradigms remind us that oppression cannot be 
reduced to one fundamental type, and that oppressions work 
together in producing injustice. In contrast, the matrix of domination 
refers to how these intersecting oppressions are actually organized. 
Regardless of the particular intersections involved, structural, 
disciplinary, hegemonic, and interpersonal domains of power 
reappear across quite different forms of oppression. 
 
She argues that the matrix of domination consists of four domains: the 
structural domains consist of institutions such as law and religion, which 
establish the parameters of power relations; the disciplinary domain, 
however, manages oppression through control and surveillance by 
bureaucratic organizations. The hegemonic domain ‘deals with ideology, 
culture and consciousness’ (Hill-Collins, 1990, p. 285), whereas the 
interpersonal domain influences everyday life. Hill-Collins (1990, p. 230) 
writes: 
 
            In essence, each group identifies the oppression with which it feels 
most comfortable as being fundamental and classifies all others as 
being of lesser importance. Oppression is filled with such 
contradictions because these approaches fail to recognize that a 
matrix of domination contains few pure victims or oppressors. Each 
individual derives varying amounts of penalty and privilege from the 
multiple systems of oppression which frame everyone’s lives.  
 
To recognise that Othering and oppression occur in different but interrelated 
ways demands that any critical approach be intersectional. In this thesis, I 
shall demonstrate that the matrix of domination will help the project 
consider Iraqi women’s security and narratives in a more comprehensive 
and appropriate manner. Deploying the idea of the matrix of domination 
helps us recognize that there are different forms of oppression and that each 
Iraqi woman will have a different personal relationship with them. This 
further helps us to better locate their source of oppression and de-
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essentialise women’s experiences by appreciating different situated 
knowledges. For example, some Iraqi women were concerned about their 
loss of class status, but each had a unique story about why that mattered to 
them and what their source of oppression or insecurity was.  
 
Meanwhile, drawing on postcolonial feminist approaches will help me to 
become attentive to the ways in which women’s experiences are shaped by 
multiple axes of power (e.g., patriarchy, imperialism, racism) at the local, 
national and international levels. Postcolonial Feminism not only focusses 
on gendered inequalities, but is also concerned with global hierarchies and 
deprioritizing Western-centric knowledge in favour of embracing the true 
diversity in women’s experiences (Mishra, 2013). The recognition that not 
every woman is oppressed in the same way means that postcolonial 
Feminist scholars also object to essentializing women (see Mohanty, 1984).  
 
However, this thesis does not intend to create a new binary of Iraqi women’s 
knowledge versus Western hegemonic knowledge; rather, it will be mindful 
of these differences in order to achieve a better understanding of their 
different knowledges in order to create solidarity between Eastern and 
Western societies rather than creating divisive divides. As Mohanty (2003, 
p. 226) argues: 
 
           Differences are never just “differences.” In knowing differences and 
particularities, we can better see the connections and commonalities 
because no border or boundary is ever complete or rigidly 
determining. The challenge is to see how differences allow us to 
explain the connections and border crossings better and more 
accurately, how specifying difference allows us to theorize universal 
concerns more fully. It is this intellectual move that allows for my 
concern for women of different communities and identities to build 
coalitions and solidarities across borders. 
 
In this respect, this thesis seeks to respond to Abu Lughod’s (2002, p. 783) 
challenge that: ‘we need to develop […] a serious appreciation of 
differences among women in the world—as products of different histories, 
expressions of different circumstances, and manifestations of differently 
structured desires’.  
 
Part of the issue of not appreciating differences is linked to methodology; 
namely, we need a theoretical framework that contributes to a critique of 
liberal feminism and its assumption of a ‘global sisterhood’ (Mohanty, 
1984) which ignores particularities and differences in favour of assuming all 
women have shared essentially equal experiences and struggles.  
 
Postcolonial feminist scholars have also highlighted the problem of 
including marginalized voices. The question of ‘can the subaltern speak?’ 
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emerged from Gayatri Spivak’s (1988) concern about how research was 
conducted by the ‘subaltern studies’ group, led by Ranjit Guha, who 
criticized Western scholars for ignoring the subaltern classes (1997). 
Subaltern Studies aimed to give voice to marginalized people who have 
experienced colonialism in order to assert their own historical narratives 
(Guha 1997). In this way, there are overlaps between standpoint feminist 
theory and the subaltern history group in terms of critiquing dominant 
knowledge for its exclusion of the experiences of marginalized groups. In 
‘Can the subaltern speak?’ Gayatri Spivak (1988) took issue with the 
subaltern studies group for unintentionally silencing the ‘Third World’ 
Other by mediating the voice of the subaltern through these scholars’ own 
frameworks of knowledge. Instead of this, Spivak (1987, p. 135) asserts 
that, ‘the academic feminist must learn to learn from them […] instead of 
correcting the experiences of disenfranchised women with our superior 
theory and enlightened compassion’. For example, it is vital not only to add 
women’s voices to our scholarship but to also consider how women’s 
experiences may challenge the concepts and categories of dominant 
knowledge, including Western feminist knowledge, such as reducing the 
cause of women’s oppression to patriarchy or reducing Iraqi women to 
being the ‘third world woman’. This approach can prevent us from 
understanding women on their own terms. In order to move away from this 
approach, we must prioritize situated knowledge and allow marginalized 
women to narrate their own experiences to avoid mitigating voices.  
 
Despite some differences, standpoint feminism and postcolonial feminism 
may complement one another, for both are interested in capturing 
knowledge produced by women who are otherwise (mis)represented in 
terms of global knowledge production. Chowdhry and Nair (2004, p. 13) 
note that much postcolonial theory ‘challenges the epistemic, ideological, 
and political authority of Western and elite knowledge’. I make use of 
standpoint theorists such as Harding (1993), Haraway (1988), and Tickner 
(1992), whose ‘socially situated knowledge’ approach seeks to prioritize 
how marginalized women convey their own experiences. They 
simultaneously avoid universalizing women’s experiences by paying close 
attention to individual experiences and by being mindful of Mohanty’s 
(1989) advice against categorization and the myth of the ‘global sisterhood’, 
and by further paying attention not only to gender inequalities but also those 
other inequalities produced through the processes of imperialism, 





My project adopts the epistemological approach of standpoint feminism and 
combines insights from intersectional and postcolonial Feminist IR in order 
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to build a theoretical framework that foregrounds women’s experiences and 
knowledge. As such, even when scholars contest US narratives and direct 
attention towards the insidious power relations at work therein, it is 
nonetheless US tropes and ideas that are allowed to dominate any 
discussion; therefore, hegemonic knowledge production is not sufficiently 
challenged. In line with much of feminist and, particularly, standpoint 
feminist epistemology, this project seeks to redress this imbalance by 
recording and centring Iraqi women’s experiences and self-representations. 
This thesis aims to reveal how Iraqi women’s narratives challenge US 
representations and narratives about them. The project relies on 
intersectionality to acknowledge differences between Iraqi women and to 


































Chapter Three: Data Collection and Methods 
 
In this chapter, I shall first discuss my primary source: the collection of my 
original empirical data on Iraqi women in the form of in-person interviews 
which I conducted on the ground in Jordan. This involved gaining access to 
some of the most disenfranchised groups of Iraqi women in the world. The 
collation of this material was crucial to cultivating pluralistic meaning and 
inclusivity. This, in turn, is central to underpinning the project’s aim of 
foregrounding alternative knowledge. I also lay out the purpose, process and 
limitations of conducting interviews as my method. This is carried out in a 
self-reflexive manner in order to enhance objectivity and make visible the 
power relations between the researcher and researched, in an effort to 
minimise the effects of such power dynamics.  
 
The analyses of the interviews with Iraqi women were undertaken using a 
narrative analysis approach. This is because, I argue, a narrative approach is 
fundamentally the most suitable mechanism for enabling the free play of 
meaning to surface. This was of particular help in interpreting these 
individuals’ intersectional identities and experiences. It is also the best tool 
for producing alternative knowledge. 
 
The project’s ontological direction is interpretivist in nature. I describe how 
this has complemented my epistemological feminist and postcolonial 
approaches. I discuss with particular focus marrying the idea of the feminist 
ethos of ‘objectivity’ with interpretivism, arguing that interpreting data as 
socially situated knowledge coheres with the goal of ‘listening to’ Iraqi 
women’s voices. I also highlight issues of hearing marginalized ‘voices’ and 
address how I treated this problem in practice. 
 
On researching marginalized women  
Interview process 
As women have so regularly been written out of recent history, Iraqi women 
in particular, interviews constituted a method to resist any such process. 
Interviews enabled the project to engage directly with the experiences of 
Iraqi women and to identify their agency, offering a more pluralistic account 
of Iraqi women’s experiences than that constructed by US politicians—or 
indeed by most Western scholars. This approach is needed because, as 
Cynthia Enloe (2009, pp. ix–x) notes, there is a danger of occluding 
attention to real Iraqi women when discussing the Iraq War and its legacy: 
 
Americans and British men and women say things like ‘Iraq should 
teach us a lesson’ or ‘Iraq is the reason he killed his wife.’ As if Iraq 
with its history of ancient civilisations, achievements, British 
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colonial rule, multi-ethnic marriages […] would be squeezed into 
Iraq, a newly blown small glass bottle of American and British 
angst. One way to release […] Iraq from its currently hardening 
confines of Iraq is […] by taking seriously the historical and 
political lives and ideas of women [so that] we can inoculate 
ourselves the temptation to treat any society simplistically or, worse, 
narcissistically. 
 
Thus, I sought to resist treating Iraqi society simplistically and instead have 
included women’s ideas and experiences in order to establish a microcosmic 
view of post-2003 Iraq as narrated by Iraqi women. I helped to address the 
scarcity of pluralistic knowledge about Iraqi women by carrying out 
interviews with them, directly. Doing so not only created a new collection of 
original empirical data. Moreover, unlike existing studies of Iraqi women, 
the women interviewed for this project constitute some of the most 
marginalized Iraqi women because of their displacement and political and 
economic vulnerability. 
 
Due to the deteriorating security situation in Iraq during 2015, the year in 
which I carried out my fieldwork, I was unable to travel to Iraq but instead 
conducted my fieldwork in Jordan, which hosts a large Iraqi refugee 
population (Al-Qdah & Lacroix, 2010, p. 523). 
 
The majority of women I interviewed experienced marginalization as 
refugees in Jordan. For example, many of the women I interviewed were 
unemployed. This was not by choice, but rather because Jordanian laws 
prevent Iraqi refugees from activities such as working. According to a 2009 
(Georgetown University Law Center, Human Rights Institute, p. 2) report 
on the situation of Iraqi refugees in Jordan:  
 
Iraqi refugees rarely enjoy legal protection and long-term self-
sufficiency in Jordan. The overwhelming majority of Iraqi refugees 
interviewed in Jordan could not secure legal employment in the 
formal economy. Not all Iraqi refugees are registered with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which 
compromises their ability to gain access to assistance. Moreover, 
most Iraqi refugees in Jordan do not have access to adequate legal 
protections such as residency, work permits, and police protection, 
and are discriminated against, extorted, and abused as a result.  
 
A more recent study conducted in 2013 suggests that the situation of Iraqi 
refugees in Jordan has not improved, although it indicates that wealthy 
Iraqis have some advantages over poor Iraqis:  
 
[R]esidence permit is only allowed to Iraqis if they deposit and 
maintain large sums of money in Jordan, or meet stringent 
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employment requirements[…]Work permits are almost prohibitively 
difficult due to requirements of active residency […]About 80% of 
wealthy Iraqis have work permits compared with only 22% of the 
poorest […] Limitations on legal employment not only exacerbate 
the already difficult situation of refugees but also largely prevent 
them from claiming the agency to improve their own situation 
themselves (Gibson, 2015, p. 201). 
 
The United Nations Right Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR) has tried 
to respond to the situation of Iraqi refugees, but a 2013 study suggest that 
aid provided by UNHCR to Iraqi refugees is decreasing. Moreover, some 
aid agencies are redirecting their aid to Syrian refugees:  
 
Many Iraqi refugees have dependence on aid; 40% registered with 
the UNHCR live below poverty level, and the need for aid is growing 
as Iraqis who may have come over with funds now after years see 
those funds running out, yet aid is decreasing or even stopping […] 
Some aid agencies, such as the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC) cut funding for Iraqi refugees altogether, in 
favor of Syrian refugees. Even financial assistance to Iraqi refugees 
from the UNHCR is being reduced […] Organizations cannot keep 
up with Iraqi refugee need due to funding limitations (Gibson, 2015, 
p. 203). 
 
I have interviewed a few wealthy Iraqis, but many of the women I spoke to 
were recent refugees who escaped persecution from Daesh and militias and 
are experiencing hardship. Thus, I strived to capture women from different 
class backgrounds. 
 
The sample of interviews with Iraqi women collected was sufficiently broad 
to encapsulate different experiences amongst Iraqi women. The sample 
consists of interviews with 19 Iraqi women. I included young Iraqi women 
who were born in Jordan due to their parents fleeing Iraq from previous 
conflicts. These women, despite being born in Jordan, still identified as Iraqi 
and maintained strong family ties in Iraq. The breakdown of the sample 
composition is as follows. I interviewed women with different levels of 
religiosity and who belong to different sects, religions and ethnicities. This 
included nine Sunnis, one of who still resides in Iraq and was interviewed 
on Skype. I interviewed two Shia women, three Christians, three Sabaeans 
and two women from the Islamic faith who did not wish to identify as either 
Shia or Sunni. My sample captured further diversity amongst Iraqi women 
as I included women who were employed and unemployed, women with 
university degrees and those with only secondary school degrees. I also 
included women with different marital status, some were married with 
children and some were single. The sample also included women with 
different political and ideological orientations. This diverse sample helped 
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me explore questions such as how each woman’s backgrounds link to the 
sources of violence inside Iraq and the different phases of violence since 
2003.  
 
It was important to interview women from minority backgrounds, as 
amplifying diverse voices is central to my project’s aim of producing new 
pluralistic knowledge of women to complicate and challenge existing ideas 
of women’s agencies, identities and experiences. The women from minority 
backgrounds I interviewed included Iraqi Sabaeans-Mandaeans (Sabaean 
refers to their religious affiliation and Mandaeans is their ethnicity). This 
ethno-religious group face extinction as a people; in 2003 their numbers 
were between 50–60,000 (International Religious Freedom, 2010, p. 68). 
That number has since dwindled: 
 
Since the outbreak of violence in 2003, most Sabean-Mandaeans 
have either fled the country or been killed. Today, there are fewer 
than 5,000 remaining in Iraq. As their small community is scattered 
throughout the world, the Sabean-Mandaeans’ ancient language, 
culture and religion face the threat of extinction’ (Minority Group 
International, 2017). 
 
Iraqi Christians have faced similar fate to that of Sabaeans in terms of 
withering population. In 2003 alone, the number of Christians residing in 
Iraq was halved. The Iraqi Christian population went from being 1.3 million 
to approximately 500,000, defined as those residing within the bounds of the 
Iraqi state: ‘Christian leaders [warn] that the result of this flight maybe ‘the 
end of Christianity in Iraq’’(US Commission on International Religious 
Freedom, 2010, p. 68). These data were recorded in 2010 before the 
emergence of Daesh. It is very likely that this figure has decreased even 
farther. 
 
The interviewees were selected through a snowballing method. This 
involved selecting a few participants that I, the researcher, identified, or who 
were recommended by personal contacts. These candidates were then asked 
to introduce other potential interviewees (with the option to decline if they 
so wished). (Noy, 2008, pp. 330-331). This ensured that interviewees had a 
strong connection with the project and an informed understanding of how 
the data would be used, without leading interviewees to focus only on 
particular themes and questions.  
The story of how I gained access to interviewing marginalized women is 
important to share, both for source documentation purposes as well as to 
adhere to the feminist ethos of objectivity.  
 
My journey began by connecting with a family friend, an Iraqi woman 
running her own charity providing support for Iraqi women and families. 
Subsequently, through her, I managed to gain access to and interview 
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women who were receiving aid from her. The network then expanded to 
include one of her friends, her daughter, and herself, all of whom identified 
as Sunni Muslim.  
 
I came to realise that this charity only offered support for Muslims who 
were mainly Sunni. As a result, I sought to overcome this issue of restricted 
access to other ethno-religious Iraqi women by asking the Iraqi women I 
met through the charity to introduce me to women they knew who were 
from Shia and minority backgrounds. I was told that it was not easy to find 
Shias and minority groups. I had expected some degree of difficulty with 
meeting Iraqis of minority backgrounds, but I was surprised by the fact that 
it was challenging to meet Shias, because they form the majority of Iraqis. 
The UNHCR in 2007 reported that of the Iraqis in Jordan, Sunni Muslim 
Iraqi refugees comprised 68% and only 17 % are reported to be Shias. 
(UNHCR, 2007, p. 3). I researched more into this issue and found that: 
‘Many Iraqis entering Jordan at the border and airport reported being asked 
whether they were Sunni or Shiite. Shiites were more likely to be turned 
away’ (Rosen, 2010, p. 17). Thus, Shias were likely to face sectarian 
discrimination. Nevertheless, one Sunni Iraqi I met was gracious to 
introduce me to her Shia friend. From that point, the network grew; I was 
then introduced to her family, and thereby gained access to interview Shia 
women. 
 
Practical difficulties arose at several points, such as when it came to search 
for minority groups. This was because none of the Iraqi women I spoke to 
personally knew Iraqis from minority backgrounds. One woman I met 
suggested I meet with her male Iraqi friend she knew, who himself was an 
Iraqi refugee living in Jordan and was knowledgeable about Iraqi enclaves 
where impoverished Iraqi refugees from minority backgrounds reside. I was 
advised to be chaperoned by him as he thought it was unsafe to wander 
around by myself. I agreed to that arrangement, and we proceeded together 
to visit several houses to find out whether there were any women willing to 
take part in my research.  
 
Upon arriving at these homes, as a result of this process, the families we 
visited were met by a person speaking a familiar Iraqi dialect (the Iraqi man 
who accompanied me). This was essential, because it made them at least 
willing to speak to us. I was introduced to these women as a Kuwaiti Arab 
researcher from a British university, who was interested in conducting 
research on Iraqi women’s experiences since the 2003 invasion. Some 
women were wary of me and refused to be interviewed. In line with research 
ethics, I respected their wishes and continued on my search for willing 
participants. 
 
During my journey to areas in which there was a high density of refugees 
living, the willing participants whom I met were all Sabaeans. Little 
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attention is paid to this community because they constitute a small 
percentage of the Iraqi population. Indeed, as previously mentioned, there 
are less than 5,000 Sabaeans in Iraq and much fewer in Jordan today.  
 
That said, in order to broaden my sample and amplify other marginalized 
voices, I decided it was important to meet more minority women in addition 
to Sabaeans. Knowing this, the man who accompanied me suggested 
speaking to church workers about the possibility of meeting Iraqi Christians. 
I confirmed this idea and, as a consequence, we went off to visit a church 
where I happened to encounter a nun. She was very pleasant to talk to and 
was happy to help me once I made my research aims clear to her. She put 
me in touch with an Iraqi Christian family that agreed to be interviewed by 
me. One of the Christians regarded Christian Iraqis as a vulnerable group 
and did not see a way of ever returning to Iraq; she expressed concern over 
her fellow Christian Iraqis ever returning to Iraq. This is consistent with a 
picture of Iraqi Christians comprising an endangered population. As a result, 
documenting their experiences took on a higher degree of significance. 
 
It was certainly challenging in many respects to interview Iraqi female 
refugees, but these complex measures were always done within the ethical 
boundaries and advice given to me by my university around consent and 
vulnerability. I did this by explaining very clearly what my project was 
about and asked them for their consent to take part in my research. I also 
ensured that the interviewees did not need to answer questions they felt 
uncomfortable to discuss and that they could ask me to stop the interview at 
any point without any further questioning.  
 
Sample size method 
As a study of Iraqi women that aimed to engage with theory through 
empirical work, the project does not attempt to claim that its sample is 
representative in the way that would be necessary for a research process 
based on a positivist epistemology. Instead, it aims to establish the 
important conceptual point that pluralistic accounts of Iraqi women’s 
experiences in order to highlight their knowledge. It is important to 
recognise that no qualitative research or purposeful sampling could claim to 
be comprehensive, whatever the sample size. Cuadraz and Uttal (1999, p. 
166) argue: 
 
Larger methods only falsely suggest that the comparisons are more 
inferentially valid. These larger samples are no closer to allowing 
inferential generalizations than smaller samples (whether the sample 
is 32 or 100) if they were initially collected from maximum variation 
or snowball sampling techniques […] For in-depth interviewing, the 
claim of societal significance and social validity needs to be made 
through analytical process, not because of sampling method.  
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The project thus attempted to provide a detailed understanding of Iraqi 
women’s lived experiences without spreading its attention too thinly. One 
could not hope to capture the infinite variety of these experiences. 
 
A suitable and practical sample size was selected that was sufficient to 
capture the demographics of Iraqi women, yet small enough to enable in-
depth interviews. The size of the sample was also determined by the 
difficulties of gaining access within the time period of this study, which, in 
turn, was determined by financial resources (especially as my fieldwork was 
self-funded). Moreover, this study was limited by the amount of time I was 
able to spend in the field and the difficulties of access.  
 
Interview format 
The interviews were designed to enable Iraqi women to narrate their own 
experiences and express their own self-representations. The research design 
recognised that some women might have little or no interest in discussing 
the themes identified within the literature review (in relation to US foreign 
policy narratives and orientalist representations of Iraqi women), and it was 
crucial not to influence them with leading questions. Instead, their narratives 
had to be allowed to emerge. As such, to identify what was and was not 
important to these women, interviews consisted of semi-structured 
questions, starting with interviewees’ backgrounds to build confidence and 
allow each woman to narrate her own experiences and identities, before 
opening the conversation up to include political and social issues and 
perceptions of the US. 
 
Semi-structured questions were adopted in order to avoid leading questions 
and ensure interviewees had scope to make their own autonomous 
responses, without straying from the central concerns of the research or 
producing data that was so varied as to be difficult to compare. While there 
was a list of questions to cover in order to produce narratives that were 
comparable, there was also the option of follow-up questions to pursue any 
unforeseen or unclear lines of discussion, so that each individual woman 
was not confined to predetermined questions and topics. There was 
therefore no time limit to each interview so that each woman was under no 
pressure to talk any more or less than she chose. 
 
Each interview was conducted with informed consent in a place of the 
interviewee’s choosing, so that she felt comfortable and secure. They were 
recorded, with the interviewee’s consent, for future transcription and 
repeated assessment. Each interviewee was anonymized to protect their 
identity and confidentiality.  
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Questions that related to background, to establish factors relevant to the 
project’s framework of intersectionality and the project’s aim of capturing 
pluralistic experiences of Iraqi women, include: 
1. Where and when were you born?  
2. Did you study at university (if so, what and where?) or undertake 
any further training after leaving school?  
3. Are you religious? If so, what faith do you follow? 
4. Do you plan to return to Iraq? 
 
The collection of biographical details about each woman enabled me to 
understand individual women’s narratives in relation to their security. 
 
Questions that relate to the US hegemonic narrative about Iraq and Iraqi 
women after 2003 included: 
1. What do you think of women’s rights in Iraq over the last decade? 
2. Did you vote in the Iraqi parliamentary elections? 
3. Do you think Iraq is a democracy? 
4. What would freedom for Iraqi women look like? 
5. Do you feel that the Obama administration treated Iraqi women in 
the same way as or differently from the Bush administration? 
6. Is the situation of women in Iraq improving or deteriorating? 
 
These questions helped determine what themes, if any, Iraqi women 
prioritized or had an investment in, to reveal the positions they held. This 
provided useful data for comparison with existing scholarship on US 
representations of Iraqi women, women and conflict/post-conflict 
reconstruction, as well as informing an understanding of the relationship 
between intersectional factors and positionality.  
 
Interviewees were not confined just to these themes. Questions that made 
broader discussions and personal interests possible included: 
1. Are there any important issues relating to women in Iraq, or 
yourself, that you would like to discuss? 
2. Is there anything you would like to add 
Limitations 
One limitation to the interviews was that the demographic of interviewees 
was restricted to those living in urban areas. Given the limitations of time 
and resources, as well as of safety considerations, it was not feasible to 
interview women in Iraq due to safety issues. The project instead sought to 
minimise any bias in the sample towards middle-class urban women by 
considering these interviews in light of existing empirical research on Iraqi 
working-class women (Al-Jawaheri, 2008; Efrati, 2012), and by using 
intersectionality to recognise these limitations and to circumscribe the 
claims that the project made. As previously established, no qualitative 
sample can ever claim to be representative or comprehensive, so the effort 
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to acknowledge limitations within the participating demographics affected 
the conclusions drawn rather than undermined them. 
 
Another limitation of the interviews concerned issues of memory: the 
invasion of Iraq occurred well over ten years ago and so accurate or 
consistent recall on the part of the interviewees was unlikely. This did not 
comprise a significant obstacle as what was at stake was not some objective 
insight into the ‘true’ nature of the invasion, which would be a false 
premise, but rather how Iraqi women presently remember the invasion and 
narrate their experiences. Daniel Schacter (2001, p. 9), a leading influence 
on oral historians, argues that memories are not to be thought of as:  
 
Snapshots [which] if stored properly could be retrieved in precisely 
the same condition in which they were put away [but understood 
instead as a process in which] we extract key elements from our 
experiences and store them. We then recreate and reconstruct our 
experiences rather than retrieve copies of them.  
 
Memories should not be regarded as flawed depictions; rather they suggest 
adaptability: ‘If all events were registered in elaborate detail, regardless of 
the level or type of processing to which they were subjected, […] the result 
would be an overwhelming clutter of useless details’ (Schacter, 1999, p. 
196). It is important to understand the issues raised by inherently unreliable 
memory not as compromising our insight into another’s experiences, but as 
revealing how individuals choose to construct narrative and identity. 
 
Narrative analysis  
I shall first describe what I mean by narrative analysis before discussing 
how I would use narrative analysis to interpret my interviews with Iraqi 
women. To quote Steans (2013, p. 140): 
 
Narrative is the means by which we make sense of our everyday 
lives, the events we observe or participate in and/or what we 
experience and how we convey our ‘sense making’ to others in a 
coherent manner.  
 
Narrative is considered a subset of discourse analysis, as it is the study of 
language and structure in order to reveal how meaning has been constructed. 
Most forms of discourse analysis, such as Foucauldian discourse analysis or 
critical discourse analysis, tend to involve the analysis of a discourse 
through time and across both texts and other social practices; they draw 
upon a wide range of materials and endeavours to trace an entire discourse 
from origin to terminus (see for example Dijk, 1993 & Wetherell et al., 
2001). Such broad approaches would not have been appropriate for this 
project; the more refined focus of narrative analysis accorded with the goal 
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of amplifying Iraqi women’s voices over the distracting noise of dominant 
narratives. 
 
There are different approaches to narrative analysis, with the two major 
schools being paradigmatic and narrative-type, as identified by Donald 
Polkinghorne. He describes the former as involving the collection of ‘stories 
as data’, which are then examined: 
 
to identify particulars as instances of general notions or concepts. 
The paradigmatic analysis of narrative seeks to locate common 
themes or conceptual manifestations among the stories collected as 
data. Most often this approach requires a database consisting of 
several stories (rather than a single story). The researcher inspects 
the different stories to discover which notions appear across them 
(Polkinghorne, 1995, p. 13). 
  
‘The paradigmatic analysis’, Polkinghorne (1995, p. 12) explains, ‘results in 
descriptions of themes that hold across the stories or in taxonomies of types 
of stories, characters, or settings’. Narrative-type narrative analysis moves in 
the opposite direction: instead of recognising common elements from stories 
in the manner of paradigmatic-type narrative analysis, narrative-type 
narrative analysis constructs stories from common elements (Polkinghorne, 
1995, p. 12). The former was clearly more applicable to this project, 
enabling the analysis of the stories collected in the interviews to identify 
common themes and differences. Polkinghorne (1995, p. 13) makes an 
important clarification about this approach: 
  
Two types of paradigmatic search are possible: (a) one in which the 
concepts are derived from previous theory or logical possibilities 
and are applied to the data to determine whether instances of these 
concepts are to be found; and (b) one in which concepts are 
inductively derived from the data. 
 
The first type (a) tallied with my project’s use of the predetermined 
framework of intersectionality in order to explore how Iraqi women narrated 
their identities. Moreover, this type also helped to identify the degree to 
which Iraqi women’s narratives converged with or diverged from the 
hegemonic representations identified in the literature review, that is, (1) the 
‘saving’ of Muslim women by the US; (2) the veil as a symbol of the 
oppression of Muslim women; and (3) the homogenization of Middle 
Eastern and South Asian identities into the discursive figure of ‘the Muslim 
woman’. In addition, the project also drew on Feminist Security Studies in 
order to identify other themes, such as, women’s experiences of conflict, 
exile and migration, and concepts of security. The second type (b) was 




Narrative analysis was thus an appropriate method for understanding Iraqi 
women’s experiences, in line with a postcolonial feminist epistemological 
approach that sought to include marginalized women’s voices. A narrative 
approach allows us to capture ‘what might otherwise be considered 
incommensurable differences’ (Wibben, 2011, p. 145); that is, on the one 
hand, personal perspectives of an event and, on the other hand, to offer 
crucial insights into events because we are able to ‘identify the whole to 
which they belong’ (Polkinghorne, 1995, p. 18). An approach on these 
premises enabled me to pay attention to difference and avoid universalizing 
and/or homogenizing Iraqi women’s experiences and identities, whilst also 
allowing these particular experiences to illustrate wider dynamics of power 
relations.  
 
The study of narratives is thus necessary for understanding the complexities 
of women’s experiences. For example, Wibben (2011, p. 2) discusses 
Mattingly and colleagues’ study of 9/11 narratives and quotes a story of one 
African-American mother who revealed that 9/11 did not bother her, as she 
was too busy caring for her handicapped mother in day-to-day life. In telling 
this story, Wibben (2011, p. 2) makes a larger point about the importance of 
paying attention to day-to-day narratives:  
 
Staying attuned to varied everyday experience, through the telling of 
women’s stories in this case, is central to feminists’ resistance to 
abstraction. It provides a corrective to the generalizing and 
universalizing tendencies in traditional science that work to institute 
bias and obscure responsibility. Insisting on specificity also reveals 
how there is always more than one point of view and more than one 
story to be told. The choice to privilege one perspective over another 
is never innocent or obvious but always intensely political. What is 
more, the insistence on a singular narrative is itself a form of 
violence. 
 
More personal narratives can help provide access to alternative voices and 
offer alternative understandings of canonical events compared to dominant 
narratives. I plan to build on Wibben’s work on the importance of a 
narrative approach to examining the relationship between women’s agency 
and security. 
 
One of the ways in which my project will use narrative analysis to interpret 
interviews is by understanding women’s experiences: 
 
The intersection of gender with class, nationality and race and other 
markers of identity have come to inform conceptualization of 
women’s experience and subjectivity. Staying attuned to varied 
everyday experience, through the telling of women’s stories in this 
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case is central to feminists’ resistance to abstraction (Wibben, 2011, 
p. 15). 
 
My project further guards against homogenization by considering 
intersectionality as an approach which helps us pay attention to the 
particularities of differences in social grouping, as:  
 
there is no such thing as suffering from oppression ‘as Black’, ‘as a 
woman’, ‘as a working-class person’ […] Any attempt to 
essentialize ‘Blackness’ or ‘womanhood’ or ‘working classness’ as 
specific forms of concrete oppression in additive ways inevitably 
conflates narratives of identity politics with descriptions of 
positionality as well as constructing identities within the terms of 
specific political projects (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 195). 
 
We must therefore recognize ‘different kind of differences’:  
 
By incorporating these different kinds of differences into our 
analysis we can avoid conflating positionings, identities and values. 
We can also avoid attributing fixed identity groupings to the 
dynamic processes of positionality (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 200). 
 
One way my project will operationalize intersectionality is by studying 
women’s identity in relation to security and will pay attention to context, as 
‘What they considered as threats and envisioned as promising safety and 
security depended on who they were’ (Stern, 2005, p. 5). 
 
Embedded in the concept of intersectionality is the idea of identity—this is 
necessary to define in order to avoid ambiguous and universal use of the 
term. Identity is a contested concept (Yuval-Davis, 2010, p. 261). However, 
‘identity is an important and useful concept if it is kept within the boundary 
of a very clear and specific definition’ (Yuval-Davis, 2010, p. 262). I shall 
adopt Yuval Davis’s (2011, p. 14) use of the term identity which allows for 
free play of meaning to surface:  
 
Identities are narratives, stories people tell themselves and others 
about who they are (and who they are not) […] Not all of these 
stories are about belonging to particular groupings and 
collectivities – they can be, for instance, about individual attributes, 
body images, vocational aspirations or sexual prowess. However, 
even these stories will often relate, directly or indirectly, to self 
and/or others’ perceptions of what being a member of such a 
grouping or collectivity (ethnic, racial, national, cultural, religious) 
might mean. Identity narratives can be individual or they can be 
collective, with the latter often acting as a resource for the former. 
Although they can be reproduced from generation to generation, it is 
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always in a selective way: they can shift and change, be contested 
and multiple. These identity narratives can relate to the past, to a 
myth of origin; they can be aimed to explain the present and 
probably; above all, they function as a projection of future 
trajectory.  
 
An example of a work which adopts a narrative approach to identity is 
Maria Stern’s research on Mayan women’s narratives. Stern-Pettersson 
(1997, pp. 125-126) makes the compelling argument about why a narrative 
approach is needed to enable us to study the links between identities and 
security: 
 
Security for one person in one context may differ drastically in 
another context; what security means in the family, for example may 
differ from what it means in encounters with Ladino society, or in 
the Guatemalan state in general. Moreover, security for one person 
may represent insecurity for someone else. Similarly, security 
depends upon where people are located on intersecting systems of 
oppression or ruling, such as sexism, classism, or racism. 
 
The advantage of taking a narrative approach is that it not only brings out 
intersectional identity, it also has the potential to detect unfamiliar 
narratives:  
 
Mayan women’s narratives also exposes [sic] the limitations of 
understanding and practices of security: Mayan women’s 
in/securities cannot be reduced to a location, level, or category 
ultimately determined by the logic of state sovereignty. Their 
narratives disrupt the familiar relationship that provide many of the 
building blocs for understandings and practice of politics, political 
community, identification, and conceptions of in/security (Stern 
2005, p. 193). 
 
Capturing narratives of women in this way will help the present project 
recognise more ‘invisible’ psychological forms of insecurities, such as 
nostalgia, which often produced anxiety for women who felt apprehensive 
about their future. However, feeling nostalgic also acts as a source of 
security for some women, because positive memories can create a sense of 
comfort. I shall later explore the idea of how women have constructed their 
past and present as a coping tool to produce feelings of security.  
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Interpreting interviews  
Inductive reasoning 
As the project was concerned with understanding Iraqi women’s 
experiences, the stipulation of conceptual approaches to the data collected, 
rather than prescriptively predetermined approaches, proved beneficial. This 
avoided imposing assumptions on what Iraqi women would opt to discuss. 
The project thus adopted an inductive direction, according to Stanley and 
Wise’s (1990, p. 22) precepts:  
 
Deductivism treats experience as ‘tests’ of previously specified 
theoretical hypotheses; and so, within its theory precedes both 
experience and research, and these latter two are in a sense 
predicated upon theory. Inductivism specifies a model of research in 
which theory is derived from research experience. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that no study could ever be purely inductive 
(just as it could never be purely deductive); as Stanley and Wise (1990, p. 
22) argue, ‘researchers cannot have ‘empty heads’ in the way that 
inductivism proposed, nor is it possible that theory is untainted by material 
experiences in the heads of theoreticians in the way that deductivism 
proposes’. The project, to an extent, had to rely on a theoretical 
underpinning—in particular, Feminist epistemologies, as these complement 
inductive approaches, discussed in detail shortly—to enable the researcher 
to know how to treat and interpret the material. Nonetheless, an approach 
that was at least in part inductive and that allowed for theoretical building 
was important to the project.  
 
The theoretical underpinning’s most profound manifestation is in the 
structure of this thesis, which is designed to discuss specific theories as they 
emerge as appropriate analytic tools in response to the data, rather than 
predetermining or imposing them within a rigid methodological framework. 
Therefore, references are made to any conceptual work that emerged as 
particularly appropriate at the beginning of the relevant chapter, rather than 
within this methodology. Again, the project’s adherence to feminist 
epistemologies supports this approach, providing the most applicable range 
of theories on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Interpretivism 
Ontologically, this project operated from an interpretivist stance. 
Interpretivism is seen as the opposite of positivism; the latter seeks 
objectivity while the former believes that the world is socially constructed. 
As Jonathan Grix (2010, p. 84) notes, ‘the emphasis in this paradigm is on 
understanding as opposed to explanation, as interpretivists do not believe in 
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relying on mere observation for understanding social phenomena’. This 
thesis takes an interpretivist stance, as it seeks to understand how Iraqi 
women construct meanings and how perception shapes Iraqi women’s 
experiences; the emphasis is on interrogating ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ as 
there could be no objective truth behind these. The historian Trevor Lummis 
(1988, p. 75) has argued that such emphasis on perception is vital, because 
‘even ‘hard’ contemporary statistical data is only what somebody told 
somebody and if they have good reason and the opportunity to conceal the 
truth, the ‘facts’ will be erroneous’.  
 
Thus, I took an interpretivists approach to analysing the interviews, as 
awareness of the limits of objectivity and the commitment to understanding 
knowledge as context-dependent were important principles in interpreting 
the interviews for this project. Feminist scholars challenge the positivist 
assumption that ‘facts’ can be regarded as objective. Sandra Harding (1991, 
pp. 11–12) for instance, asks why the ‘conventional view refuses to 
recognise knowledge’s socially-situated character, and what would happen 
to conventional understandings of ‘‘objectivity, relativism, rationality and 
reflexivity’ […] [once knowledge is understood to be] socially-situated’. 
Moreover, she suggests:  
 
The inquirer him/herself [should] be placed in the same critical 
plane as the overt subject matter […] We need to avoid the 
“objectivist” stance that attempts to make the researcher’s cultural 
beliefs and practices invisible while simultaneously skewering the 
research objects, and practices to the display board. Only in this 
way can we hope to produce understandings and explanations which 
are free (or, at least, more free) of distortion from the unexamined 
beliefs and behavior of social scientists themselves (Harding, 1987, 
p. 9).  
 
The goal of being self-reflexive demanded an understanding of the 
differential power between the researcher and the researched. Since I adopt 
a feminist ethos in line with the project’s epistemology, self-reflexivity was 
key when considering the interviews themselves. As a result, the thesis had 
to be able to overcome the inherently uneven power relationship between 
scholars and interviewees, which I sought to achieve by acknowledging the 
researcher’s role instead of masking it.  
 
This thesis recognizes the fact that in examining the representations of Iraqi 
women by US politicians and themselves, researchers need to become an 
active part of such representations. By acknowledging one’s own 
positionality as a co-producer of knowledge within the interviews, research 
objectivity is increased.  In doing so, awareness of one’s own position helps 
to correct ‘pseudo-objectivity’ (Harding, 1987, p. 28). 
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As a non-Iraqi carrying out research for a British university, I had the 
potential to distort the self-representations of Iraqi women without being 
aware of it, in a similar way to Gayatri Spivak’s (1988) criticism of 
Western-based postcolonial scholars who try to speak on behalf of the 
subaltern. I also had the potential as an Arabic speaker, unintentionally, to 
encourage the interviewees to assume shared frames of reference. Thus, as 
an Arabic-speaking citizen of an Arab country and a non-Iraqi in a Western-
based university, I held both insider and outsider status. It is worth noting 
that:  
 
Recent discussions of insider/outsider status have unveiled the 
complexity inherent in either status and have acknowledged that the 
boundaries between the two positions are not all that clearly 
delineated. In the real world of data collection, there is a good bit of 
slippage and fluidity between these two states (Merriam et al., 2001, 
p. 405). 
 
Having an insider/outsider status shaped my approach in interpreting the 
interviews. The constructive aspect of this was that a shared language and 
understanding of Arab communities meant that the interviewees were better 
able to express themselves in their own words, without the inhibitions of 
translation. As I am an Arab from Kuwait, the interviewees were able to 
speak in their mother tongue, make references to Arab culture, and use 
Arabic expressions. I understood their dialect, as it was very similar to that 
of Kuwait, and there were some overlaps between Kuwaiti and Iraqi culture. 
Thus, I was able to interpret their cultural references, and this opened up a 
set of knowledge that may not otherwise have been possible. Conversely, as 
an outsider—a student at a British university—some of the interviewees 
believed that I was able to offer help with their migratory plans and that may 
have influenced their responses to some degree. I sought, however, to make 
it clear that I was not in a position to offer such assistance and was 
transparent about my reasons for conducting interviews. This awareness of 
the power relations between the researcher and researched helped me 
approach such complex situations with caution rather than pretending these 
influences did not exist, facilitating a richer and more honest analysis. As 
Lizzi Milligan (2016, p. 242) notes: ‘Relationships of power between 
researchers and participants influence the way in which knowledge is 
constructed and what becomes ‘known’’. Thus, a feminist approach enabled 
the project to identify the power relations not just between the US and Iraqi 
women but also between the researcher and the researched. 
 
Thus, having an outsider/insider positionality in this situation proved to be a 
strength, as it enabled me to detect slippages in meaning by being exposed 
to multiple contexts. The interviews were conducted in Arabic before being 
translated for this thesis, which therefore necessitated reflection on the 
‘language barrier’ between English and Arabic. The problems this posed are 
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identified by George Steiner (1975) who examined issues with translation 
and its relation to culture. Translation is not simply the act of turning words 
in one language into a direct equivalent in another; it is also about 
transferring ideas from different cultures. Indeed, terms and phrases in one 
language did not always have direct equivalents in the other language. For 
example, one interviewee used an Arabic phrase to describe a situation ‘as a 
film’. This is an Arabic expression to mean almost unbelievable or 
fictitious. It proved helpful therefore to bear in mind Helmuth Berking’s 
(2003, p. 255) work on globalization to encompass an understanding of how 
global ideas have a local context:  
 
The global circulation of cultural artefacts is leading to a permanent 
de- and recontextualization of spatially bound cultural knowledge, 
lifestyles, etc. This means that while integrated in global circulation, 
they are at the same time permanently (re)defined by an 
incorporation of images and scripts from [local context].  
 
For instance, some global terms with an apparently fixed definition, such as 
‘democracy’ or ‘women’s rights’, may in fact vary according to local 
contexts. Drawing upon anthropological and sociological insights into 
cultural understanding of semantic differences helped to surmount such 
linguistic and cultural barriers. Even if these insights could not fully resolve 
the semantic barriers, Berking’s argument about globalization and local 
context provided an explanation for the complexities borne of translation. 
This suggested the importance of a relativist stance: 
 
In the anthropological sense, then, relativism suggests that in order 
to understand the meaning that humans give to certain practices, 
here [women’s] rights, we must better understand the contexts 
through which they attribute meaning and give significance to such 
practices (Osanloo, 2009, p. 2).  
 
Being mindful of these precepts enabled more effective translation of the 
interviews; it facilitated reflexivity and made it possible to work around 
them. Reflecting on these problems also obliged the researcher to better 
‘listen’ to Iraqi women’s narratives and to actively avoid making 
assumptions about social meanings. This was especially necessary, because 
it also reflected the recognition that self-representations are not independent 
of dominant narratives. One’s ideas of what constitutes gender or class are 
confined and rooted in already established and recognised socially 
constructed norms. This meant that it was essential to identify the dominant 
narratives in which an Iraqi woman’s narrative was embedded. In this 
respect, the national or regional context (of Iraq and of the Arab world) may 
prove more significant than the global context (of the ‘War on Terror’), or 
the global context may be mediated via the national/regional context. In this 
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respect, the identification of the relevant context was a necessary step in the 
interpretation of women’s narratives. 
 
Rooting the project in interpretivism highlighted another issue I had to be 
mindful of when interpreting interviews: understanding the limits of Iraqi 
women’s self-representation. Stuart Hall (1997, p. 15) defines representation 
as ‘the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between 
members of a culture’. Thus, representation is the construction of meaning 
through social interaction, primarily via language. This was of fundamental 
importance because, in the drive to recognize non-hegemonic alternatives to 
how impoverished or marginalized women were presented in dominant 
narratives, there was a risk of falsely assuming there was a definitive, ‘real’ 
representation. It was imperative to guard against this, as one’s own 
preconceptions are liable to distort narratives and colour understanding, as 
well as preclude other interpretations.  
 
Another risk that had to be avoided was that of homogenizing Iraqi 
women’s experiences by regarding the interviews as symbolic of a 
collective response, rather than as responses of individuals differently 
positioned in relation to structures of power. Thus, intersectionality serves 
as an important tool. As such, it was necessary to understand that the 
women being interviewed might each have reflected different self-identities 
in relation to the category of ‘Iraqi women’ and adhered to or advocated 
different representations of what it means to be an Iraqi woman. Thus, the 
project simultaneously sought to recognise what is specific and unique about 
each individual Iraqi women’s experiences, whilst also holding on to the 
fact that Iraq as a birthplace, a place of residence and/or the issuer of 
citizenship and official documents is a key player in shaping the experiences 
and identities of the women whom I interviewed. Highlighting the 
specificity and uniqueness of their experiences did not serve as another 
factor in the ‘Othering’ of Iraqi women; rather, it took seriously the 
particularities of their situation in order to illuminate both their 
representation and larger structural issues in world Politics and Feminist IR.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the methodology for this thesis. In line with the 
project’s postcolonial feminist epistemology to create alternative knowledge 
about Iraqi women, their experiences and their identities, the research was 
based on semi-structured interviews with Iraqi women. This thesis will 
adopt a narrative analysis approach in order to capture women’s personal 
experiences and self-identities. By establishing how the interviewees 
narrated their own identities, in terms of gender, class and religion, attention 
was brought to bear on the relationship between identity, subjectivity and 
experiences, as well as revealing the degree to which Iraqi women narrated 
identities that resisted, negotiated or complied with their hegemonic 
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representation. Narrative analysis enables identification of wider themes 
from the interviews that were separate from hegemonic knowledge informed 
by Western narratives, thereby presenting alternative knowledge on its own 
terms in order to foreground the voices of marginalized women.  
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Chapter Four: Iraqi Women’s Narratives of US 
Foreign Policy Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
.  
My main research question asks: How do Iraqi women’s narratives disrupt 
existing hegemonic knowledge about representations and experiences of 
Muslim women? Therefore, Chapter Four provides an analysis of Iraqi 
women’s own narratives in response to US foreign policies and foreign 
policy narratives. The primary purpose of this is to capture Iraqi women’s 
diverse positionalities, and in doing so, demonstrate how their narratives 
constitute an alternative knowledge. In line with my feminist standpoint 
approach, I focus on Iraqi women’s own narratives about US foreign 
policies and demonstrate how these create alternative knowledge about US 
foreign policy. In particular, women’s narratives challenge the notion that 
there is a clear periodization between the Bush and Obama presidencies in 
terms of their policies towards Iraq. In conjunction with standpoint theory, I 
draw on Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding theory in order to demonstrate the 
complexity and plurality of Iraqi women’s narratives in terms of their 
relationship to hegemonic knowledge. Meanwhile, I deploy the concept of 
Occidentalism in order to understand agency in relation to hegemonic 
knowledge. 
 
In order to contextualize the interviewees’ narratives, I have provided an 
overview of US hegemonic narratives of the Bush’s and Obama’s 
administrations. I then detail how Stuart Hall’s decoding theory—which 
includes the concept of the hegemonic, negotiated and oppositional 
positions—enabled the study of women’s positionality in relation to US 
foreign policy narratives with degrees of complexity and nuance. This 
facilitated my goal of offering a pluralistic account of women’s voices. I 
discuss the concept of Occidentalism as a supplement for decoding theory in 
order to demonstrate for example, that even a hegemonic position is an 
agential position thereby challenging binary oppositions such as ‘us vs 
them’, ‘powerful vs powerless’. This finding will provoke feminist IR 
scholars to re-evaluate their approach of prioritising hegemonic knowledge 
to understanding power relations. This also allowed me to address the 
subsidiary research question: How do Iraqi women relate to US foreign 
policy narratives and representations of Iraqi women? 
 
The key finding of this chapter is: Iraqi women’s narratives disrupt 
hegemonic US narratives and postcolonial feminist critiques of US 
narratives because of the different ways in which they relate to US 
narratives. Moreover, the relationship between different positionalities and 
agency is more complex than the terms hegemonic/oppositional/negotiated 
suggest.   
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Chapter overview  
This study aims to address the main research question: How do Iraqi 
women’s narratives disrupt existing hegemonic knowledge about 
representations and experiences of Muslim women? In this chapter, I aim to 
answer the main research question and meet the study’s objective of 
providing a pluralistic account of Iraqi women’s positionalities and 
experiences in relation to US hegemonic knowledge as way of disrupting 
dominant knowledge about Iraqi women in particular and Muslim women in 
general. In doing so, I intend to address the gap identified in the literature 
review—mainly that feminist scholars who have critiqued US foreign policy 
narratives tend to neglect the vital issue of how these are received by the 
Muslim women who are their objects. This chapter will demonstrate how a 
standpoint feminist epistemology of foregrounding marginalized voices will 
help us understand power relations from women’s perspectives and 
therefore offer a different perspective of the Iraq war narrative.    
 
More specifically, I seek to understand how Iraqi women perceive US 
foreign policy and foreign policy narratives, including the 
instrumentalization of Iraqi women within these narratives, and how they 
position themselves in relation to these. To what degree, if at all, do Iraqi 
women reject US foreign policy narratives, in line with postcolonial 
feminist critiques of US foreign policy? Or do Iraqi women acknowledge or 
even appropriate aspects of US foreign policy narratives? The chapter will 
thus contribute to the project’s overall concern with capturing pluralistic and 
complex positions of Iraqi women in order to avoid essentializing and 
homogenizing Iraqi women’s experiences. 
 
The chapter will begin by offering an overview of US foreign policy 
narratives on Iraqi women since 2003. Then, I shall discuss the lack of Iraqi 
women’s sense of periodization of the bush and Obama administration’s 
policy. I then discuss how a standpoint feminist epistemology facilitated in 
producing alternative knowledge that is socially situated. And 
complementing this approach is the theory of encoding/decoding and its 
application to my interview material, as well as the concept of 
‘Occidentalism’, which is discussed in relation to the theory of 
encoding/decoding. Following these micro-level theoretical discussions, the 
chapter provides an analysis of Iraqi women’s narratives and their position 
in relation to US foreign policy narratives.  
 
The Bush and Obama administration’s foreign policy narratives of 
Iraqi women since 2003 
Based on the interviews with the Iraqi women, the three key themes that 
recur in their narratives and the narratives of the Bush and Obama 
administration are:  
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1. Attitudes towards US officials and personnel; 
2. Attitudes towards the US narrative of ‘saving’ and 
‘empowering’ Iraqi women; 
3. Attitudes towards the US narrative on its role in bringing 
democracy and development. 
 
I shall now provide an overview of the relevant US foreign policy narratives 
under each theme in order to reference Iraqi women’s engagement with 
these themes. This will serve to draw a more comparable and consistent 
analysis between US narratives in relation to Iraqi women’s positionalities. 
This will also help me apply the idea of Occidentalism in order to detect 
how the interviewees reworked knowledge about themselves in relation to 
these themes.  
 
US Foreign Policy sources 
It is important to note that I have collected the US foreign policy remarks 
from the US State Department archives. These narratives were comprised of 
‘remarks’, a designated term taken from the US State Department website to 
include various forms of public address such as speeches, question and 
answer sessions, interviews and press releases, which are archived on the 
website. These were all thereby implicitly considered ‘official’ statements, 
and it was justified to regard them as espousing US foreign policy 
narratives. 
 
Theme 1: Attitudes towards US officials and personnel 
This theme refers to the image of the Bush and Obama administration that 
they constructed for themselves. The Iraqi women I interviewed often 
referred to the personalities of US officials or the administration itself. Their 
perception of the leadership of each administration and its representatives in 
Iraq, which many interviewees differentiated between, is best understood by 
examining the policy approach to Iraq that each administration adopted. I 
must note that the interviewees occasionally conflated the Bush and Obama 
administrations; they sometimes ascribed characteristics to the Obama or 
Bush administrations that confused the two. 
 
The Bush administration’s foreign policy approach stemmed from a belief 
that the US had not only a right but in fact an obligation to intervene on 
behalf of Iraqi women. This relied on a model of exceptionalism, which 
Lipset (1996, p. 18) describes as ‘qualitatively different’ from most 
countries, denoting the US as an outlier rather than superior. Still, it is a 
position which is used to justify intervention in lesser nations (Lipset, 1996, 
pp. 18–19), to embed the idea that America’s moral superiority not only 
justified but made paramount the invasion of Iraq and, more widely, the 
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US’s post-9/11 foreign policy; this was the duty of a greater people to a 
lesser.  
 
Andrea G. Bottner, Director of the Office of International Women’s Issues 
who served under the Bush administration, evoked Ronald Reagan in 
advocating a morally superior America that could and should elevate the 
rest of the world. She cited him in a speech specifically in the context of 
women in Iraq, in an address entitled ‘Courageous Women in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Beyond’: 
 
He said, ‘This, then, is our task. We must present to the world not 
just an America that’s militarily strong, but an America that is 
morally powerful, an America that has a creed, a cause, a vision of a 
future time when all peoples have the right to self-government and 
personal freedom’ (Bottner, US State Department, 2008). 
 
Bottner expressed the Bush administration’s conviction that to intervene in 
Iraq on behalf of Iraqi women was to advance U.S. values of ‘freedom’ and 
‘self-government’, an obligation espoused by Reagan. Bush’s 2004 (The 
White House, 2004) speech entitled ‘Information Sharing, Patriot Act Vital 
to Homeland Security’ affirms:  
 
There’s nothing they [terrorists] can do to intimidate, to make us 
change our deepest beliefs. They’re trying to kill to shake our will; 
we’re too tough, too strong, too resolute, and too determined to have 
our will shaken by thugs and terrorists. 
 
The reiteration of ‘too’ and the litany of masculine qualities (‘tough’, 
‘strong’ and ‘resolute’) assert American strength. The US expressed their 
‘hypermasculinity’ (Nandy, 1983) by presenting Iraqi women as part of an 
inferior geographical region and by offering protection which can be 
regarded as having a paternalistic quality.  Bottner’s depiction of the US as a 
moral power intervening to rescue victimized Iraqi women thus interweaved 
with and advanced a broader narrative of the universality and masculine 
force of America in a post-9/11 world. The continual assertion of Iraqi 
women as victims allows the US to construct itself as paternalistic. This 
echoes Youngs’ (2003, p. 2) assertion:  
 
The gendered logic of the masculine role of protector in relation to 
women and children illuminates the meaning and effective appeal of 
a security state that wages war abroad and expects obedience and 
loyalty at home. […] The logic of masculinist protection justifies 
aggressive war outside. 
 
In contrast, the Obama administration diverts from the Bush 
administration’s habit of inferring US superiority from the narrative of the 
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saving of Iraqi women. The Obama administration instead adopt an 
‘internationalist’ approach. For example, then Secretary of State John Kerry 
(US State Department, 2014) expressed interest in building a coalition: ‘And 
that’s precisely why we are building a coalition to try to stop them from 
denying the women and the girls and the people of Iraq the very future that 
they yearn for’. Kerry has also frequently invoked international law and 
human values to justify the need to intervene against Daesh. Kerry (US 
State Department, 2014) made clear the commitment of the Obama 
administration’s policy of adopting an internationalist narrative of human 
rights: 
 
I want to emphasize this coalition is not just a military campaign. It 
is a multinational effort, increasingly, as I said, marshaled by the 
Arab community, to promote stability and peace throughout the 
region for the benefit of everyone in the region. And although the 
center of our activities is Iraq – and Syria, to some degree – ISIL’s 
influence is by no means confined to one part of the world.  
 
I shall explore whether the interviewees embrace the idea of autonomy as 
initially implied by the Obama administration, or endorse Bush’s more 
paternalistic approach, in order to capture the diverse views of Iraqi women.  
 
Theme 2: Attitudes towards the US narrative of ‘saving’ and 
‘empowering’ Iraqi women 
A central theme in US narratives in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, as 
discussed in the literature review, was to ‘save’ Iraqi women from the brutal 
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein as well as to ‘empower’ them in building 
the ‘new Iraq’. As feminist scholars have noted, discourses of ‘saving’ 
Other women are often based on assumptions that they are oppressed by 
their ‘culture’. I have demonstrated in the literature review that the Bush 
administration presented Iraqi women as victims in order to justify ‘saving’ 
them. There is often an assumption in the literature that Iraqi women did not 
want to be ‘saved’; the possibility that they might indeed see themselves as 
victims in need of saving is ignored. The interviewees suggest that this is 
not necessarily the case, presenting a more complex relationship with the 
theme of saving. Accepting the idea of saving does not necessarily signal 
victimization but can highlight agency. 
 
The narrative that Iraqi women need saving from Saddam Hussein is 
encapsulated by Charlotte Ponticelli, Senior Coordinator for International 
Women’s Issues, in her October 2004 speech entitled ‘Women in War and 
Reconstruction: The US Commitment to Women in Afghanistan and Iraq’. 
In this speech, she declared that: 
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These individual examples are mirrored in the thousands of other 
Iraqi women whose rightful roles in their society we are helping to 
restore. Indeed, Iraqi women were once among the best educated 
and most professionally accomplished in the region. That is why it 
was shocking to hear from UN experts that, by the end of Saddam’s 
rule, more than two-thirds of all Iraqi women were actually 
illiterate, and each year at least 400 of them were murdered in so-
called “honor killings” he had legalized. Many thousands more 
were slaughtered by Saddam’s own militias, and left to rot in mass 
graves. As one Iraqi woman who survived this reign of terror told 
us, ‘You can stop searching for weapons of mass destruction; you 
have already found them. They were the regime’ (Ponticelli, US 
State Department, 2004). 
 
Ponticelli highlights women’s situation in Iraq in order to emphasize the 
corrupt, destructive nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime, figured as the 
factor in Iraqi women’s victimization. In addition to ‘saving women’ from 
Saddam Hussein, Yasmin Al-Jawahri (2008 p. 77) argued that this statement 
operates to erase the impact of many years of international sanctions, which 
impoverished Iraqis and led many to drop out of school.  
 
The Bush administration made the saving narrative about liberating women 
from the oppression of Saddam Hussein’s regime rather than religion. Bush 
(September 2002, the White House) focused on seeming tolerant towards 
Islam:  
 
The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity […] These nations 
can show by their example that honest government and respect for 
women and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the 
Middle East and beyond. 
 
Moreover, the Bush administration also constructed the image of Iraqi 
women as empowered after being liberated from the tyranny of Saddam 
Hussein. The majority of the literature on the Bush administration’s 
representation of Iraqi women iterates a reading of a narrative of victims in 
need of rescue. A number of scholars detect a simultaneous and more 
ambiguous narrative at work, which also attributes a degree of agency to 
Iraqi women and enables us to understand the Bush administration’s 
conception of women’s rights in another way. Al-Ali and Pratt (2009, p. 80) 
argue that Iraqi women were presented as agents of change, not just as 
victims, and Katherine Allison (2013) argues that US foreign policy 
discourse more broadly represented Muslim women as ‘agential’. The 
subsequent section ‘Theme 3: attitudes towards the US narrative on its role 
in bringing democracy and development’ will discuss in detail how Iraqi 
women were constructed as collaborators and as empowered.  
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There is a noticeable difference between the Bush and Obama 
administrations’ narrative of saving. The Obama’s administration harnessed 
Iraqi women’s rights to justify US military intervention to combat Daesh 
through a narrative of ‘saving’ victimized women. Iraqi women are 
presented as victims of Daesh’s sexual violence, rather than of undemocratic 
tyranny, which was the notion the Bush administration associated with 
Saddam Hussein. It is important to note that there was sexual violence and 
other violence against Iraqi women when the Bush administration was 
involved in Iraq in 2003. A Human Rights Report published in 2003 (as 
cited in Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009, p. 157) noted: 
 
While men constitute the majority of victims of violence, the lack of 
security affects women in particular ways. Violence against women 
has increased since the immediate post-invasion chaos, when an 
alarming number of cases of sexual violence and abductions of 
women and girls were identified in Baghdad alone.  
 
However, the Bush administration did not focus on discussing these 
violences as it would have tarnished the invasion that was supposed to be a 
‘liberation’. By contrast, the Obama administration is able to refer to sexual 
violence against women because it boosts the case for their military 
involvement. The Obama administration posited victimization based on 
sexual violence in order to establish the urgent nature of the security issue in 
Iraq. In response to the feminist group Code Pink protesting against the 
military campaign, John Kerry (US State Department, 2014) explicitly 
invoked this narrative and claimed that US military intervention was crucial 
for the safety of Iraqi women from such barbarous men: 
 
You ought to care about fighting ISIL, because ISIL is killing and 
raping and mutilating women, and they believe women shouldn’t 
have an education. They sell off girls to be sex slaves to jihadists. 
There is no negotiation with ISIL; there is nothing to negotiate. And 
they’re not offering anyone health care of any kind. They’re not 
offering education of any kind, for a whole philosophy or idea or 
cult, whatever you want to call it, that frankly comes out of the Stone 
Age. They’re cold-blooded killers marauding across the Middle East 
making a mockery of a peaceful religion.  
 
Perhaps as pertinent was the need to represent Daesh as a barbaric and 
chaotic organization, rather than a legitimate entity. Where Saddam 
Hussein, a long-serving president with all the apparatus of government, was 
portrayed as a ruling tyrant, Daesh is portrayed as brutish and illegitimate. 
Obama (The White House, 2014) himself said ‘ISIL is not Islamic [...] and 
[is] certainly not a state’. As such, the narrative of saving Iraqi women 
constructed by the Bush administration resurfaced in the later stages of the 
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Obama administration, but in an adjusted form reflecting the different foe 
the US faced. 
 
Through the representation of Daesh as generally barbaric and irrational, 
sexual violence is deployed to emphasise this barbarism and irrationality. 
Obama (The White House, 2014) referred to Daesh as perpetrators of 
multifarious evil deeds: ‘They execute captured prisoners. They kill 
children. They enslave, rape, and force women into marriage’. The faceless, 
unidentified ‘they’ hints at a gendered and familiar evil; the assumption is of 
a male, monstrous category, implicitly drawing on the historical orientalist 
figure of the ‘brown men’ perpetrating barbaric and uncivilized practices 
against ‘brown women’ (Spivak 1988, p. 297). Malinowski (US State 
Department, 2015) reiterated this in a speech entitled ‘ISIL's Abuses 
Against Women and Girls in Iraq and Syria’: 
 
I emphasize this to say that the defeat of Daesh and the defense of 
human rights, especially the rights of women, go hand-in-hand. We 
will restore human rights by defeating Daesh, but the reverse is also 
true: we will defeat Daesh in part by defending the rights of its 
intended victims. 
 
In positing this, Malinowski conjures the sense of Muslim men persecuting 
Iraqi women. Indeed, the Obama administration notably departed from the 
Bush administration’s determination that the US should be ‘saving’ Iraqi 
women on non-religious grounds. Saddam Hussein’s tyranny was replaced 
by the extremism of Daesh; correspondingly, the Obama administration 
frequently emphasized that Iraqi women were being victimized by a 
perverted form of Islam. 
 
The Obama administration demonstrated that the situation with Daesh had 
deteriorated by premising it on a representation of Iraqi women’s status and 
wellbeing that is measured in terms of the veil, a trope avoided by the Bush 
administration for its Islamic connotations. The US State Department 
(Senior State Department Officials, 2014) archive records unnamed officials 
at a briefing in Jordan remarking that: 
 
If you go back and read stories from when [inaudible] fell, and it 
says, ‘Oh, they’re treating everyone well and the women can show 
their hair,’ and everything, fast-forward to now, and there’s a public 
crucifixion in the town square. That’s just what ISIL does.  
 
Theme 3: Attitudes towards the US narrative on its role in bringing 
democracy and development 
The Bush administration constructed itself as culturally superior, and this 
was manifested in US discourses relating to bringing ‘democracy’ and 
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‘development’ to Iraq. Therefore, Iraq implicitly was regarded as inferior 
because democracy and development is absent in Iraqi society. The Bush 
administration also constructed a narrative about Iraqi women as necessarily 
supportive of the invasion and natural allies of the US in the building of a 
‘new Iraq’. Alternatively, the Obama administration constructed the 
narrative of Iraqi women as autonomous, to signal that they had been 
liberated and that the US was ready to withdraw its troops from Iraq. 
However, with the emergence of Daesh, the saving narrative was resurrected 
by the Obama administration in order to combat the threat of Daesh. The 
interviewees complicate this narrative; however, democracy was generally 
recognized as a laudable goal but not in the fashion envisaged by the US. 
Most Iraqi women appear to harbour a distinct conception of democracy, 
suggesting that its values are not as universal as assumed by US politicians.  
 
The Bush administration’s narratives on democracy were premised on the 
idea of delivering progress as manifested in the Freedom Agenda. This 
progress was most commonly associated with and defined by Western 
notions of women’s rights and democratic participation. Iraqi women were 
thus used to symbolise the democratic and moral values being instilled in 
Iraq, as rescued victims turned democracy-makers through US patronage. 
The Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (US State Department, 2005) 
claimed that: 
 
[We] send a clear message to the women of the world who are not 
yet free: As you stand for your rights and for your liberty, America 
stands with you. (Applause.) The United States believes that no 
country can succeed without the contribution of its entire 
population. In recent months, we supported the women of 
Afghanistan, Iraq and of the future Palestine as they heroically went 
to the polls.  
 
Iraqi women are conflated with women across a ‘broader Middle East’; this 
not only maintained the important process of Othering but also represented 
these women as symbolic markers of the potential for similar ideological 
improvements to be made throughout the region. Guney and Gokcan (2010) 
suggest that the war in Iraq was used as an exemplary model of democracy 
in the newly expanded Middle East, in order to seduce the rest of the region 
to follow suit. 
 
Another example of the US homogenizing Muslim and Middle Eastern 
women is the speech given by Paula Dobriansky (US State Department, 
2005), Under Secretary for Global Affairs, who declared on International 
Women’s Day in 2005: 
 
First Lady Laura Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
hosted at the State Department this morning an extremely vibrant 
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and incredibly accomplished group of women from 15 Muslim 
countries. These women came together at our invitation for an open 
and frank discussion on the challenges and opportunities that 
women face in strengthening democracy in their countries and also 
how the United States can help. 
 
The conflation of 15 separate but unidentified nations, summed up as 
‘Muslim’ without regard to variation in political systems, influence of other 
religions or secularism, or particular histories or contexts, seems staggering 
in this context.  
 
The US sought to implement democracy by making a regional 
generalization about literacy issues. Andrea G. Bottner (US State 
Department, 2008), Director of the Office of International Women’s Issues, 
remarks:  
 
In the broader Middle East, of the estimated 70 million people who 
are illiterate, two-thirds of them are female. This administration is 
dramatically expanding our English-language programs to address 
this issue.  
 
Bottner’s assumptions about women in the ‘broader’ Middle East 
presumably included Afghanistan and other non-Middle-Eastern but 
predominantly Muslim countries. Part of the US narrative of democracy and 
development was realized by bringing programs that were American in style 
to the region. This includes the notion that the only viable solution to female 
illiteracy is US-provided English language programmes. This presents the 
US as the ‘saviour’ of a homogenized Middle Eastern woman cohort, and 
assumes that literacy must be premised on fluency in English rather than 
Arabic or other local languages. 
 
In eliding this progress, Bottner uses women’s illiteracy as a marker of the 
general ‘backwardness’ of the region. American intervention in Iraq was 
thus premised in large part on a narrative of ‘saving’ Iraqi women from 
oppression and limited opportunities; in order to associate this inextricably 
with the narrative of the ‘War on Terror’, the Bush administration posited it 
as a rescue mission against a tyrant—Saddam Hussein—which would 
therefore curtail this endemic ‘backwardness’. That these women were 
understood to be eager for American rescue, however, was also the strongest 
argument for intervention. 
 
The narrative that, following their liberation from Saddam Hussein’s rule, 
Iraqi women were rising heroically to new democratic opportunities was 
made clear two years later in a panel discussion chaired by Dobriansky. This 
panel was boldly named ‘Founding Mothers: Next Steps in Post-Election 
Afghanistan and Iraq’, punning on the US’s vaunted Founding Fathers to 
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situate the agency and heroism of Iraqi women within a US framework. 
Introduced by Dobriansky, Iraq’s new Minister of Women’s Affairs Narmin 
Othman (US State Department, 2005) validated the Bush administration’s 
narrative: 
 
Iraq’s present and future is rich with possibilities and potential and 
we need to ensure democracy and freedom are secure; therefore, we 
need help from all the world to help Iraq, and from our friends we 
need help to reach our mission, to reach a new world, which Iraqi 
people always dreamed about. We dreamed that we have a 
democracy, we can speak, we can write in a newspaper what we 
will, what we want. Never could we say (anything) against the 
previous regime. Never could we say that he used a wrong policy. 
Never could we use, why you are killed me? Why you put me in a 
prison? For he have rights and he had rights for everything [sic]. 
 
It is worth noting that the Iraqi women the US invited to speak endorsed the 
narratives of the US. The likelihood is that only approved collaborators were 
granted this platform. Othman (US State Department, 2005) went on 
provide an example of an Iraqi woman literally giving birth to democracy, 
‘A pregnant woman had a baby at the polling place and she get the name for 
her daughter, Al Intekhabat, it means election [sic]’. Further, Tanya Gilly 
(in Dobriansky, US State Department, 2003), an Iraqi-Kurdish woman, 
appeared at a Bush administration event and noted:  
 
It’s our duty here as women who have been able to have the 
privilege of learning about through [sic] democracy that has existed 
in Europe and the United States to take some of that back and to 
show our women that they could do more because Iraqi women are 
fairly educated. 
 
Gilly represents Iraqi women as similar to, but lacking the opportunities of, 
American women. She implies that she, and other Iraqi women who have 
had the ‘privilege’ of learning from the West, have in effect been rescued 
and can now act as heroines, using their privileges to rescue other Iraqi 
women in turn. She is thus the exact model of an Iraqi woman the Bush 
administration sought to represent, and is therefore permitted the expression 
and opportunity to exercise her own agency. The ambivalence underlying 
this—of a victimized Iraqi woman enabled to speak in the terms of the 
US—is noteworthy for the simultaneity of the victimization and collaborator 
tropes.  
 
The Obama administration was eager to withdraw from Iraq and end the 
occupation; Iraqi women almost entirely disappeared from official foreign 
policy narratives, only occasionally being mentioned as having attained 
autonomy in order to justify the US withdrawal. Thus, the Obama 
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administration foreign policy narrative underwent considerable adjustment 
from the Bush administration’s foreign policy narrative, perhaps most of all 
in the abrupt U-turn in the representation of Iraqi women. The narrative of 
saving, so prevalent under the Bush administration, disappeared, and with 
them passed the obligation for America’s presence in Iraq.  
 
The Obama administration infrequently invoked the idea that Iraqi women 
were empowered by the ‘birth’ of democracy and other development 
opportunities in Iraq, in order to suggest their autonomy and independence 
from the US’s support. Hillary Clinton (US State Department 2009) made a 
rare comment on Iraqi women when she insisted that ‘women have 
committed to supporting this new democracy’. Her assertion came as a 
response in a Q&A, when she was asked a direct question as to what the US 
was doing to ‘advance’ or ‘empower’ Iraqi women (Clinton, US State 
Department, 2009). Clinton’s response is highly suggestive; she did not 
nominate any form of US engagement with or support for Iraqi women, 
instead reframing the issue as one in which Iraqi women had made a 
commitment to democracy, thereby suggesting that the US had already 
saved and trained Iraqi women. They are simply autonomous Iraqi citizens.  
 
The contrast with the Bush administration’s reiterated representation of 
close, collaborative links with Iraqi women through specific training 
programmes is illustrative; Clinton adopts and adapts the old theme of 
empowerment to justify the Obama administration’s change of direction. 
The representation of Iraqi women as autonomous allies was echoed in a 
2010 panel to mark the visit of Iraqi women council leaders to the US (the 
kind of trip that the Bush administration frequently used to promote the 
imparting of US democratic skills to Iraqi women). Clinton refrained from 
highlighting or celebrating the panellists’ gender or their contribution to 
Iraqi democracy. She described the visit as being ‘to participate in an 
exchange of ideas on public service in the US and in Iraq’ (Clinton, US 
State Department, 2010), considering the countries as sharing ideas on an 
equal footing, rather than expressing the power relationship of the Bush 
administration which advocated one nation rescuing and building another 
nation through a female franchise. The narrative of autonomy and 
independence seemed to crystallise in the Obama administration’s 
representation of Iraqi women. 
 
With the emergence of Daesh, however, the Obama administration’s 
narrative on autonomy was altered. Malinowski (US State Department, 
2014a) described how: ‘We could only calm down after hearing US jets 
above us. We felt, ‘There is still someone there to save us’.’ The US’s 
relationship with Iraqi women is figured here as that of a protector in the 
skies rather than a collaborator on the ground; it was defined in military not 
nation-building terms, and consequently Iraqi women were represented only 
 102 
in terms of passive victims in need of immediate, military rescue, not as 
nascent champions of democracy. 
  
Iraqi Women narratives about the aftermath of the 2003 US led 
invasion of Iraq 
The following section will discuss the theories which will facilitate in 
highlighting women’s situated knowledge advocated by standpoint feminist 
epistemology. 
Encoding/Decoding Theory 
To reflect on the wide range of positions maintained by different women on 
different topics, these are each discussed under sections based on Hall’s 
concept of positionality in relation to dominant narratives as being 
hegemonic, negotiated, or oppositional. This allows women’s narratives to 
be studied systematically according to position. Under each position, I 
consider the interviewees’ attitudes towards US foreign policy and US 
foreign policy narratives under three main themes: 1) attitudes towards US 
officials and personnel; 2) attitudes towards the US narrative on its role in 
bringing democracy and development; and 3) attitudes towards the US 
narrative of ‘saving’ and ‘empowering’ Iraqi women. 
 
I shall highlight the importance for considering Hall’s encoding/decoding 
theory, in order to understand the positions of Iraqi women in relation to US 
foreign policy narratives and to complicate the idea of what constitutes as 
agential when considering an individual’s positionality. I will also identify 
possible shortcomings and seek to address these by modifying or extending 
the theory in this study.  
 
Stuart Hall (1973) originally developed the encoding/decoding model of 
communication to study the transmission of media messages. Hall 
problematizes the traditional model of communication for its linearity, in 
which the sender sends the message and the receiver accepts the message. 
Such a model understands receivers as passive. Instead, Hall believes that 
receivers are not disempowered, but rather play an active role in shaping 
messages.  
 
According to Hall’s communication model, encoding explains the process in 
which texts are produced and disseminated while decoding denotes the ways 
in which the receiver interprets these messages. His theory will be adapted 
for this study; the encoding part will comprise the questions posed to Iraqi 
women. These questions are linked to the narratives and themes emerging 
out of US foreign policy narratives regarding its mission in Iraq, as 
articulated in the literature and in remarks retrieved from US State 
Department archives. The decoding part will consider how Iraqi women 
choose to interpret these themes and questions. 
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Hall (1973, p. 125) makes the important point that individuals do not 
necessarily receive hegemonic narratives in the way intended by those who 
create such narratives: ‘decodings do not follow inevitably from encodings’. 
This is a fundamental point that is neglected in much of the literature, in 
which the hegemonic narratives of the US are allowed to hold undue sway. 
In analysing the narratives of the interviewees, I deploy the three positions 
as developed by Stuart Hall: the hegemonic, that is, wholly agreeing with 
US narratives; the negotiated, that is, only in part agreeing with US 
narratives; and the oppositional, that is, completely disagreeing with US 
narratives. The negotiated position is particularly under-researched in the 
literature. To begin understanding the significance of studying this position, 
one must consider Homi Bhabha’s argument that identities are not stable. 
Bhabha (1994, pp. 1–2) illustrates this point by noting that when two 
cultures meet and interact, interstices arise: 
 
‘in-between’ spaces [that] provide the terrain for elaborating 
strategies of selfhood – singular or communal – that initiate new 
signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and 
contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself.  
 
Therefore, the negotiated position allows for the marking of fluctuated 
presence in one’s identity and experience, enabling new meanings to 
surface. 
 
Despite the importance of Hall’s encoding/decoding model for producing 
pluralistic meanings, his communication model is not without limitations. A 
key limitation in Hall’s theory is the rigidness of the three decoding 
positions. To rectify this, each of these positions will be treated as an 
umbrella term, with degrees of variance within them, as my project takes the 
view that agreeability, or a lack of it, is a spectrum. In doing so, I will be 
able to bring out the ‘multiform, fissured, schizophrenic, unevenly 
developed, culturally, discursively and politically discontinuous, forming 
part of a shifting realm of ramifying differences and contradictions’ (Stam, 
2000, p. 233) These positionalities should therefore be understood as 
schematic; my analysis will provide justification for classifying narratives in 
a particular way, but this should not preclude a fluidity of readings. The 
pluralist possibilities of decoding are integral to my project.  
 
Adopting Hall’s terms opens up the interpretability of US foreign policy 
narratives and confers control of the meaning of the message to Iraqi 
women. One of the main purposes of this chapter is to highlight Iraqi 
women’s agency through a study of their decoding positions. Taking a 
position and interpreting a message are not passive roles. Revealing the 
positionalities of Iraqi women recognizes that Iraqi women have the power 
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to destabilize or reclaims meanings, thereby subverting hegemonic 
knowledge production.  
 
This broadens the concept of agency beyond its understanding in some of 
the literature, which amplifies women who oppose hegemonic knowledge 
and assumes that this form of agency is most valid. This leads to a reductive 
binary, pitting Iraqi women against the US; scholars including Lila Abu-
Lughod (2002), Nadia Al-Sajji (2009) and Maryam Khaled (2011) highlight 
Muslim women who oppose US narratives but disregard women who look 
to the US positively. Instead, this project foregrounds women’s pluralistic 
decoding positions as a way of highlighting the wide-ranging ways that 
agency may be expressed. In this way, I build on the work of the late Saba 
Mahmoud (2005), who believes in broadening and complicating rather than 
restricting the concept of agency. 
 
Through tracing Iraqi women’s decoding positions, I can better understand 
Iraqi women’s complex attitudes towards the US. By allowing for a range of 
positions associated with an individual woman, I aim to reflect individual 
perspectives while still identifying possible broader trends of hegemonic, 
negotiated or oppositional positions within which such individual 
perspectives may be situated. An individual woman can also adopt different 
positions in relation to different themes or components of a narrative; 
indeed, many women who validate one element of US narratives may 
oppose another. This could be indicative of the ambivalent position towards 
the US as encapsulated by the logics of Occidentalism.  
 
Occidentalism 
The concept of Occidentalism is necessary to engage with in order to make 
sense of why we need to take seriously Iraqi women’s decoding positions as 
agential and why it could complicate the way we think about power 
relations. This section will discuss key interpretations of Occidentalism and 
will offer the most appropriate definition, which enhances and deepens our 
understanding of Iraqi women’s decoding positionalities and can better 
highlight their alternative knowledge. 
 
Why is Occidentalism significant for understanding women’s positionality, 
and what kind of Occidentalism offers the best mechanism to do so? Little 
attention has been given to the study of Occidentalism in Feminist IR. This 
is partly due to their adherence to Edward Said’s Orientalism. Although 
Said presented a compelling case about how Western hegemonic discursive 
power controlled and authenticated knowledge over the Orient, he 
overlooked the Orient’s power in shaping knowledge about themselves and 
the West. This had the consequence of rendering their agency invisible. 
Occidentalism was not a central concern in his work because Said thought 
of the study of Occidentalism in simplistic terms. Notably, he exemplified 
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this by arguing ‘no one is likely to imagine a field symmetrical to 
Orientalism called Occidentalism’ (Said, 1978, p. 50). While I agree with 
Said’s point that the Orientalism is not symmetrical to Occidentalism, the 
nature of power relations is best understood as a complex process. My 
project therefore seeks to demonstrate that their pluralistic positionalities 
dismantle binary oppositions. 
 
Said was faced with criticism by a number of scholars, such as Mehrzad 
Boroujerdi (1996, 2006) and Tavakoli-Targhi (2001), who disagreed with 
his thesis on Occidentalism and sought to study Occidentalism as 
Orientalism in reverse. These scholars’ understanding of Occidentalism as 
symmetrical to Orientalism is problematic, because it assumes even 
distribution of power in knowledge between the West and East—such an 
understanding is counter-productive. As Neil Lazarus (2002, p. 54) has 
argued, ‘one cannot hope to displace or overturn Eurocentric reason by 
inversion, not least since such a strategy merely replicates, rather than 
challenges, the thoroughgoing essentialism of the dominant optic.’  
 
Some scholars, such as Fernando Coronil (1996, p. 56), sought to study 
Occidentalism with more complexity and have thus not regarded it to serve 
as the flipside of Orientalism but as its mirror image:  
 
I am primarily interested in the concerns and images of the Occident 
that underwrite their representations of non-Western societies, 
whether in the Orient or elsewhere. This perspective does not 
involve a reversal of focus from Orient to Occident, from Other to 
Self. Rather, by guiding our understanding toward the relational 
nature of representations of human collectivities, it brings out into 
the open their genesis in asymmetrical relations of power, including 
the power to obscure their genesis in inequality, to sever their 
historical connections, and thus to present as the internal and 
separate attributes of bounded entities what are in fact historical 
outcomes of connected peoples. Occidentalism, as I define it here, is 
thus not the reverse of Orientalism but its condition of possibility, its 
darkside (as in a mirror).  
 
This approach recognises that, for instance, US hegemonic knowledge holds 
more sway in altering images of Others, but it also recognises that such 
power is limited. Thus, it opens up the idea of alternative knowledges that 
have the mechanism to challenge hegemonic knowledge. As a consequence, 
this definition should underpin the way in which we treat Iraqi women’s 
positions as a vehicle for change. Moreover, I shall also explore the concept 
of Occidentalism in part because, as a ‘double reflection’ according to 
Meltem Ahiska (2010, p. 51), it involves how the self can be posited: ‘I am 
what I think how the others (who are symbolically significant informed by 
the hegemonic discourse of signifiers or the ‘master-signifier’) see me’. This 
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concept is important in order to establish how Iraqi women’s positionalities 
produce, reproduce, alter, negotiate and contest US narratives, and, in turn 
their own identities. 
 
Positionality  
The following sections discuss how hegemonic, negotiated and oppositional 
positions in relation to the US and US narratives were articulated in the 
narratives of the interviewees. These articulations are explored through 
different themes as identified by the interviewees. Each of these sections 
will reveal the degree to which the interviewees endorsed or rejected US 
narratives. These sections seek to demonstrate that Iraqi women’s narratives 
revise and reclaim Western assumptions, which in turn create new space for 
knowledge. These varying positions are reflective of the fluidity of the 
narratives of Iraqi women in relation to the changing policies of the US, 
exploring contradictory views, negotiated and indifferent positions. 
 
Hegemonic 
The term ‘hegemony’ is deployed in this thesis to denote instances where 
knowledge is presented as objective and serves the interest of the powerful. 
The hegemonic position, which some Iraqi women have adopted, challenges 
the orientalist binary opposition of modernity vs backwardness or civilized 
vs uncivilized by complicating ideas towards the Occident and by reimaging 
themselves. Therefore, it is important to note that those Iraqi women who 
adopt what Hall labels a hegemonic position in relation to US narratives are 
not dupes of Western knowledge or lacking in agency. These women 
navigate a complex relationship that reflects their desire to maximise their 
autonomy in relation to the environment in which they find themselves and 
in relation to their own identities and experiences. 
 
Attitudes towards US officials and personnel 
Several women believed that US politicians supported Iraqi women’s 
agency, a recognition of ‘the collaborator’ and ‘heroine’ tropes endorsed by 
the Bush administration. However, this trope is actually challenged by many 
feminist scholars. Most feminist scholars writing about the subject have 
only detected themes of victimization (for example, Abu-Lughod 2001; Alia 
Al Sajji, 2009).  
 
The interviewees expressed a hegemonic position towards US officials and 
personnel to the degree to which they expressed positive attitudes and 
believed that Americans respected Iraqi women. This would seem to 
endorse the US narrative that Iraqi women were supportive of the invasion 
and natural allies of the US. 
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Take the example of Shayma, who is a 50-year-old Sunni. Iraq remains her 
place of residence, and she is a feminist activist. Shayma met some US 
individuals, more specifically Human Rights lawyers, to discuss the writing 
of the constitution and the mechanisms of Iraqi democracy. She kept in 
touch with US officials who were stationed in her town long after the 
invasion came to an end. Her experience dealing with America colleagues 
shaped Shayma’s position positively:  
 
US politicians regard the Iraqi woman as accomplished, highly 
educated, with a strong personality. Iraqi women are viewed with 
high esteem. If you offer her freedom and implement laws that 




I’ve met US officials and they do treat Iraqi women differently from 
other women. They treat us with respect and consideration. There 
are women in Iraq who are modernised, educated and have 
awareness and are well read. We have people like Zaha Hadid.1 
 
Shayma does not suggest that Americans are universally courteous and 
respectful towards women. Rather, she believes that Iraqi women in 
particular have earned the right to respect from Americans because of a 
shared affinity to modernity. She draws on Iraqi national narratives about 
Iraq’s modernity, of which Iraqi women are a marker (for example, Al-Ali, 
2007), to endorse US narratives about Iraqi women, thereby reaffirming her 
self-identity as a modern Iraqi woman. This is not unique to Shayma—the 
notion that US politicians responded positively to Iraqi women was also 
expressed by other interviewees.  
 
Aisha, like Shayma, also expressed positive views. Aisha is a 36-year-old 
woman who was born in Baghdad but currently resides in Jordan. She 
doesn’t have a university degree and is currently unemployed. She also 
considers herself a devout Sunni. Despite the difference in their social 
backgrounds, Aisha states that ‘Americans’ impression of Iraqi women is 
that they are stubborn and do not surrender easily’.  
 
Similarly, Hajjar, a 40-year-old Sunni woman and unemployed mother, 
believes that US politicians respected Iraqi women because they are the 
strongest in the Arab world:  
 
The Iraqi woman managed to cope with difficult times and find 
alternative paths to recovery. She did not leave her job, did not leave 
her home, she did not pull her children out of school. 
                                               
1 The Iraqi-born, internationally-acclaimed, architect. 
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Unlike Shayma, who emphasizes Iraqi women’s modern-ness and, 
therefore, their affinity with the US, Hajjar stresses Iraqi women’s particular 
characteristics with regards to their family responsibilities. Whilst feminist 
scholars have criticized US narratives for homogenizing and essentializing 
Muslim women (Abu-Lughod, 2002; Al-Ali & Pratt 2009; etc.), it is 
interesting to note that Iraqi women may also essentialize themselves. In 
Hajjar’s case, the reference to a singular Iraqi woman may be an example of 
‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak, 1987, p. 205) to distinguish Iraqi women 
and affirm her self-identity as an agential Iraqi woman, rather than a victim 
of US foreign policy.  
 
In other cases, the endorsement of the US foreign policy narrative also 
enables the speaker to distinguish herself from, rather than to identify with, 
other Iraqis. For example, Ebtihal is a 55-year-old mother and holds a PhD 
in Media and Communications. She currently is unemployed but has 
previously worked with US personnel as a PR manager. While working with 
US personnel, she recounted a story of being stuck in heavy traffic to 
demonstrate how her accomplishments had earned her respect from the US: 
 
We reached a checkpoint. One of the Americans recognised that we 
worked together and noticed that we wanted to buy bread so he went 
and bought us some. He valued the fact that I worked with them. 
They respect me. Americans would check all of the houses in my 
area except mine.  
 
By holding a hegemonic position, Ebtihal was able to highlight her value in 
terms of viewing herself as an equal US partner. 
 
Obama was almost universally preferred to Bush. Consider Asra’s narrative: 
she is a 43-year-old Sunni woman who holds a teaching diploma. She is 
married with children and is currently unemployed. It is interesting to note 
that Asra does not belong to a minority group. Asra singled out Obama as 
sympathetic on the basis of his perceived Arab/Muslim identity: ‘Obama 
might be more sympathetic because he is ethnically an Arab. So he has 
feelings. Whereas Bush is a villain. He really did harm Iraqis. He did 
nothing for women’s rights’. Obama has made a concerted effort to counter 
the myth of his Muslim or non-American identity (Parlett, 2014), and yet 
ironically it is this myth that endears him to Asra. Asra assumes that Obama 
can be trusted only because of a perceived shared ethnicity. Thereby, she 
privileges identity above policies as well as essentializing and reifying an 
Arab identity. In this respect, she appropriates essentializing and 
homogenizing dimensions of US foreign policy narratives but reverses them 
to critique Bush’s foreign policy.  
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Iman is a 27-year-old, university-educated woman born in Jordan to Iraqi 
parents. She describes herself as Muslim but refuses to affiliate herself with 
a particular sect. Iman, in contrast, favoured Obama not because of his race 
but because of his perceived policies and because her experience visiting the 
US was positive: 
 
President Obama is very different from Bush. In my opinion, Obama 
is better than Bush because Obama is more peaceful in some 
respects. He loves peace. He promotes freedom. He’s thoughtful to 
his citizens. 
 
Tala is a 36-year-old Sunni mother. She left Iraq after her father was killed 
in 2006 and first migrated to Syria before settling in Jordan in 2013. She has 
no university degree and works as a seamstress at home and also at a salon. 
Tala has no plans to return to Iraq but wishes to settle in the US where her 
two brothers currently reside.  Tala presents a sympathetic appraisal of 
Obama based, like Iman’s, on his policies rather than his identity. She draws 
on the testimony of her brothers in America: ‘I think Obama mashallah 
comforted his people. My brothers are comfortable. I feel that Obama is 
better [than Bush]. Obama is more in touch with people’. These opinions on 
Obama endorse the view of the US as a land of opportunity, particularly for 
refugees, but challenge US foreign policy narratives to the degree that they 
make the US’s positive role in the world contingent upon a particular 
individual (Obama) rather than upon the idea that the US is itself inherently 
a force for good in the world (the idea of US exceptionalism).  
 
Attitudes towards the US narrative of ‘saving’ and ‘empowering’ 
Iraqi women 
The Bush administration narrative on ‘saving’ was about toppling Saddam 
Hussein in order to bring democracy, whereas the Obama administration’s 
saving narrative is linked to liberating Iraqi women from Daesh. Only Tala 
offered a hegemonic position towards the US with regards to the US 
narrative of saving and empowerment. Tala constructed herself as a victim 
in need of saving from the US. She has endorsed the narrative of the US 
removal of Saddam Hussein, but her reasons differed from the US narrative. 
The Bush administration narrative argued that Saddam Hussein was the 
source of women’s insecurity, whereas Tala’s narrative was not gender 
specific.  Instead, it was more to do with the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi 
government to offer security for Iraqis. Tala believes, ‘ Saddam destroyed 
us’. She adds: 
 
Saddam Hussein would threaten to execute soldiers if they refuse to 
defend [Iraq]. The army would hide between houses and that created 
repercussions. Saddam was the one who tormented people […] If he 
did not lead the Iraqi soldiers to hide between houses […] A war 
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should be conducted in a battlefield, don’t get them to hide between 
houses. Those pilots [US] spotted them [Iraqi soldiers] hiding 
between houses and would start firing.  
 
I asked her whether she faced any challenges after the US invaded Iraq, to 
which she responded: 
 
There were no difficulties, they did not harm us. The American army 
did not harm people. I felt that they adored people [...] Americans 
have sent envoys to comfort the people but once these people [that 
is, the Iraqi government] intruded [...] I told you, in 2003, 2004, 
2005 we lived in security, really, in security. We lived, we ate, and 
we drank and lived the best life but those who intruded, those, Al-
Abadi, Al-Malaki and the likes of them are the ones who created a 
mess. 
 
Tala views the US in a paternalistic way whilst blaming Iraqis, or 
specifically the Iraqi government, for the problems facing Iraq. She also 
endorses the US narrative that those fighting against its presence in Iraq 
were all terrorists and that the US was fighting them in the interests of the 
Iraqi people: 
 
Americans would pass by in their military tanks […] kissing children 
and offering them sweets. The terrorists on the other hand would 
frighten them [children] with their rifles. They [Americans] would 
offer them food and sweets from their own special supplies. They 
[terrorists] would scare children and tell them not to go near them 
[Americans] or else they’ll offer sweets which are filled with poison 
and that’s a big lie. We had all kinds of terrorists in the past; you 
would never know who’s who, as they are usually clandestine 
members of Al-Qaida.  
 
Between the US and the ‘terrorists’, Tala constructs herself as a victim in 
need of saving. She seeks redemption through migration to the US: 
 
Why do you think I want to live in America? My brothers reside in 
America and have told me that Americans are better than the ones 
that are there [in Iraq]. I have two brothers who live there, one of 
whom has lived there since 2008. My uncle also left for America 
from Jordan. They are content and have integrated into American 
society. Mashallah,2 they are so comfortable there. I have this desire 
                                               
2 This is an Arabic expression that means god willing, or can be used to express 




[to live there] because I trust my brothers’ judgment. If my brothers 
weren’t comfortable living amongst Americans, they would have told 
us so. They say they [Americans] are lovely, compassionate, have 
kind hearts and love children. 
 
Tala’s assessment of the US, her endorsement of US ‘saving’ narratives of 
both the Bush and Obama administrations, and her rejection of Iraq are 
indicative of the frustration felt by many Iraqis towards the corruption and 
ineffectiveness of the Iraqi government. Tala’s identification with Iraq is 
conditioned on the benefits that she perceives herself, or not, as associated 
with Iraqi nationality.  
 
Attitudes towards the US narrative on its role in bringing democracy 
and development 
In some cases, Iraqi women endorsed US narrative of progress by 
identifying a lack in Iraqi culture or cultural differences between the US and 
Iraq. For example, Tala said:  
 
I think that they [US politicians] feel that we should be more 
progressive but in Iraq there is no progress. Women in Iraq merely 
eat and drink but in America she would have the opportunity to 
progress. The Iraqi woman would flourish.  
 
Tala’s assumption that Iraqi women could progress in the US does not 
necessarily mean that she wholly embraces US values, but she echoes the 
tenets of American cultural superiority that underpin US foreign policy 
narratives.  
 
Similarly, Ruby, a 38-year-old mother who is a religious Christian and was 
a doctor before leaving Iraq, recalls the exact date when she left, 18th of 
August 2014. She has no desire to return to Iraq. Her goal is to migrate to 
Melbourne, Australia in order to reunite with her husband. The desire to 
distance herself from Iraq has enabled her to hold a hegemonic position. She 
opines, ‘I imagine they [US politicians] think that both [Iraqi] women and 
men are regressive and yes, we are like that’. Both Ruby and Tala accept 
that US politicians have the right to assume Iraqi women are in need of 
progress; the possibility of mutual respect remains but is stymied by Iraqi 
women’s own limitations due to Iraqi culture. 
 
In some cases, the endorsement of US narratives may reflect US soft power 
rather than the content of US narratives per se. This is germane to 
understanding Iraqi women’s perceptions of the US attitude to the veil, 
which were not actually explicitly articulated by US officials. Yet a wide 
range of Iraqi women expressed an admiration of US liberalism with regard 
to veiling. For example, Ruby told me: ‘I imagine Americans believe in 
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freedom of expression. If she [an Iraqi woman] decides to wear the veil or 
not makes no difference to them’. That she imagines this American attitude 
is telling; she has no tangible evidence but is influenced by her wider 
perception of US values.  
 
Heba, a 25-year-old Sunni who is quite educated (having studied medicine) 
and has a stable job working as a University teaching assistant, likewise 
asserts: ‘I do not imagine they think negatively of veiled women. I know 
that Americans love freedom and personal freedom is important to them’. 
Shayma echoes this: ‘Americans believe in freedom of expression and this 
reflects their views on the veil’. The narrative of the Freedom Agenda thus 
informs Iraqi women’s perceptions of US attitudes towards veiling, even 
though US officials largely avoided articulating any position on this issue.  
 
It is easy to interpret such hegemonic stances as evidence of the 
conditioning of soft power alone. As Joseph Nye (2004, pp. 39–41) 
describes:  
 
Soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: Its 
culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values 
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign 
policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral 
authority. […] If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes 
without any explicit threat or exchange-taking place—in short, if my 
behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction—
soft power is at work. 
 
While as scholars we must recognise the power relations that underpin 
hegemonic narratives, we should also recognise that endorsement of these 
narratives does not necessarily translate into women’s passivity. These 
women are not merely repeating US narratives but are attempting to 
appropriate them to reclaim their representation and assert their identity 
even within a broadly hegemonic position.  
 
Negotiated  
The occidental perception of women who hold negotiated positions tends to 
fluctuate between both hegemonic and oppositional views of the US, 
depending on the particular subject. Negotiated positions like hegemonic 
positions chart ambivalences, which further destabilize binaries between the 
US and Iraqi women. Al-Ali (2007, p. 139) argues that, ‘Conflict-generated 
diasporas tend to involve identities that emphasise links to symbolically 
valuable territory and an aspiration to return once the homeland is freed or 
conflict has subsided’. While this might hold true in general terms, Iraqi 
women who are in a transitional migratory position tend not to think about 
returning home but rather veer towards narrating an optimistic view of US 
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narratives to fit their migratory ambitions. A negotiated position may reflect 
moral ambivalence, an attempt to reconcile complex and contradictory 
experiences, as well as a reluctance to express a clear position that may 
provoke unfavourable responses.  
 
Abstention as a Decoding Position 
In Stuart Hall’s decoding theory, he discounted the idea of indifference or 
abstention. Here I seek to explore and problematize these limitations. It is 
vital to recognise that Iraqi women need not adopt a position of either for or 
against. A negotiated position can also stem from a stance of abstention or 
the avoidance of passing judgement. Jürgen Habermas (1999, p. 417) 
explains:  
 
Abstention is also a rationally motivated position, just as much as a 
“yes” or a “no” and in no way relieves us of the necessity of taking 
a position. Abstention in this context does not really signify a true 
declaration of neutrality but only signals that we are putting off 
problems for the time being and wish to suspend our interpretive 
efforts.  
 
For example, adopting an apolitical view could be classified as an abstaining 
stance. In this regard, it is worth noting that many Iraqi women who held 
negotiated positions professed to deliberately avoiding political news and 
were reluctant to proffer opinions on such matters, focusing instead on less 
charged subjects.  
 
The preponderance of negotiated and/or abstaining positions on several 
issues—most notably attitudes to and perceptions of US politicians and 
democracy in Iraq—reflects the possible risks involved in expressing 
opinions and/or the vulnerability of the speaker. This notably characterised 
minority groups such as Christians and Sabaeans, who almost uniformly 
opted not to comment on American politicians or policies, claiming lack of 
knowledge or a strong desire to remain neutral. Some Iraqi women from 
non-minority backgrounds also abstained from certain issues they deemed 
‘highly political’.  
 
Christina, who is a 71-year-old Christian woman, married with children, 
was a teacher before retiring. When I asked Christina how she felt about US 
troops pulling out of Iraq in 2010, she said: ‘Americans did not occupy my 
area and so I haven’t witnessed the effects of the war on women or on 
anyone in general’. Similarly, Christina was wary about passing judgement 
on Daesh: ‘I can’t answer your question on how I feel about Americans 
fighting Daesh’. Christina did not elaborate as to why she preferred not to 
respond. She may have felt that expressing an opinion on topics over which 
there are conflicting opinions may open herself up to charges of being on 
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one side or another. As a member of a religious minority that has been 
targeted by Daesh, she may have felt that she was vulnerable to being 
targeted or harassed. Alternatively, in abstaining from these major issues, 
she could be signalling her separation from the common experience of Iraqi 
women because of her minority status. This would suggest that abstaining is 
a mark of alienation from Iraq.  
 
Asra also abstained from stating a position in response to a question of what 
she thought of US officials; she replied: ‘I don’t know. I told you I don’t 
like politics and anything that will cause distress to me […] So I don’t know 
what they did or what they didn’t do’. Asra makes clear that she is 
abstaining from this topic because she deems this to be too risky. The 
implicit opposition is negotiated through silence and a refusal to fully realise 
this challenge. This silence is akin to the silent security dilemma of the 
‘Little Mermaid’ in Lene Hansen’s critique of securitization theory (2000), 
whereby to ‘speak security’ would further endanger the victim of violence. 
This stance, I argue, can be regarded as a form of agency, because women 
chose to hold this position as a strategy to resist insecurity.  
 
Another reason for abstention may be because particular events may be of 
minor importance for particular women, despite their importance to people 
in the West. For example, consider Samantha, a 40-year-old Christian, 
single and educated woman. She holds a degree in biology, has worked in 
the health sector in Iraq previously, but is now unemployed in Jordan. When 
I asked Samantha whether there was a difference between Bush and Obama, 
she replied: ‘To be honest I can’t remember because the wars were 
continuous’. Her remark implicitly suggests that there isn’t a clear enough 
difference between the Presidents to be worth highlighting. Moreover, her 
comment points to an experiential gap between researchers based in the 
West and the interviewees—an event such as a Presidential election and 
inauguration is attended with mass coverage and significance for the 
Western researchers but may go unnoticed or be unimportant for the 
interviewees.  
 
Attitudes towards US officials and personnel 
Some of the interviewees problematized certain aspects of US foreign 
policy; they also recognized that this was not representative of the views of 
all American people. Indeed, some consciously and carefully distinguished 
between the American people or the US as a whole and US politicians or 
particular US policies. In addition, some constructed affinities with 
particular politicians on the basis of shared identities rather than their 
specific foreign policies. 
 
In contrast to the differing and negotiated representations of Bush and 
Obama found in some Iraqi women’s narratives, their opinions about female 
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politicians were in general much more approving. When asked whether 
there was a difference between the way the Obama and Bush 
administrations treated women in Iraq, Ruby replied: ‘I don’t know, you 
can’t form an opinion until you personally have dealt with them. I just don’t 
know’. Ruby then contradicted herself by taking a stance on US female 
politicians: ‘Condoleezza Rice was a real woman. Condoleezza compared to 
Hillary Clinton was stronger’. Similarly, Heba believes that: 
 
Condoleezza Rice and Hillary are strong people. Under the Bush 
administration Condoleezza Rice was the head and mastermind of 
Bush. Hillary is also strong and also has an opinion. She has 
achieved great things in America. I love Hillary. Her personality is 
alluring to me. 
 
Whereas some of the interviewees judged male politicians based on their 
perceived policies, others assessed female politicians based on their 
perceived character. Heba comments, ‘Obama’s position is quite negative in 
terms of the whole [Iraq] situation. He doesn’t take a strong position’. 
Hillary Clinton, who served under the Obama administration, is nonetheless 
looked upon favourably. Heba thinks Hillary Clinton is strong and has 
‘achieved great things’, while Condoleezza Rice ‘was the head and 
mastermind of Bush.’ Tala, who is somewhat reserved about the Bush 
administration, expressed admiration for Condoleezza Rice, claiming: 
‘Condoleezza Rice cares about refugees, she gets emotional about it when 
she sees them [refugees] on the street’. The policies of the male Presidents 
are condemned, whilst the women who were responsible for developing and 
implementing these policies were respected as strong, independent and/or 
sympathetic characters. Moreover, many of the interviewees referred to 
male politicians by surname but to female politicians by forename, which 
perhaps indicates a less politicised and more personal view of women 
politicians and suggests that they identify with female US politicians on the 
basis of their gender.  
 
This sense of solidarity with certain US figures was also expressed in 
relation to US personnel stationed in Iraq. Perhaps paradoxically, some Iraqi 
women perceived US personnel in Iraq as victims. Several of the 
interviewees made clear that they differentiated between US politicians and 
US personnel. Heba for instance recognises that some of the US personnel 
involved in the controversial war were just following orders from their 
commanders. I asked her whether she had met any US officials or US 
soldiers, to which she replied: 
 
No, not politicians, but the army, yes. I can’t speak about the US 
army in a general way. They are people just like us. The soldiers I 
met were nice […] Most troops upon returning to America have 
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realised that it [the war] was a lie. They thought they were fighting 
for peace but realised it wasn’t the case. They were also the victims. 
 
Heba empathizes with US soldiers on the basis of a shared victimhood and, 
in so doing, challenges US narratives about the war. Not only did the war 
fail to save Iraqi women, it turned them into victims and also turned US 
troops from rescuers to victims of their own politicians. 
 
Shatha is a 24-year-old from Baghdad, who holds a degree in genetic 
engineering. She similarly made a clear distinction between US politicians 
and their citizens: 
 
The American people are different from their government. I can’t 
say whether the government distinguishes between Muslims, 
Afghanis and Iraqis. The American people however do. My relatives 
and friends say that Americans are friendly. They do not cause 
disturbance or anything of that sort. 
 
Iman, like Shatha, also illustrates a view of Americans that negotiates 
between the positive experience in America and the negative experience in 
Iraq: 
 
I like Americans but I don’t like their politics. They colonised my 
country even if I don’t live in it, it’s still my country […] In America 
they did not treat me as an Iraqi or Arab or Muslim. I would tell 
them I am Iraqi; they would welcome me. 
 
Ebtihal complicates her attitudes towards the US by differentiating between 
what she perceives Obama accomplished in Iraq versus what he 
accomplished in the US: 
 
Obama did nothing for Iraqi women. The only thing I heard is that 
refugees who move to America have a good life. Iraqi women there 
are appreciated, and they receive an allowance. For example, as a 
mature woman I would receive an allowance. They would help cover 
my treatments as I suffer from heart problems. Obama just pulled his 
troops out and allowed the killings to fester […] That is what 
Obama did. 
 
Ebtihal’s attitudes towards Obama appears to be conditioned by her 
expectations of the role that the US should play in protecting and providing 
security, particularly to the women of Iraq.  
 
Many Iraqi women demonstrated ambivalence in their attitudes to the US 
and its actions in Iraq. In some cases, their attitudes towards the US were 
contingent upon the perceived policies of particular individuals. In other 
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cases, it was contingent upon their affinity or not with particular individuals 
based on a perceived shared identity.  
 
Attitudes towards the US narrative of ‘saving’ and ‘empowering’ 
Iraqi women 
Some of the interviewees held ambivalent views about US narratives on 
Iraqi women. Sameera explains that she believes that US politicians make 
no effort to distinguish between Iraqi women and Arab women in general: 
‘The Arab woman is perceived as backwards; her sole purpose is to please 
her husband in bed and take care of domestic chores’. Sameera doesn’t think 
the opinions of women matter to Americans: ‘If it did then they wouldn’t 
seek to destroy the Iraqi woman and her future’. Paradoxically, however, 
Sameera believes that Americans do distinguish between Iraqi and Afghani 
women. In her view: 
 
Americans know that Iraqis are more enlightened, civilized and 
educated than Afghani women and the evidence for this is that 
American men married Iraqi women but I never heard of American 
soldiers marrying Afghani women. 
 
Sameera negotiates her view of US narratives about ‘Muslim women’ 
between a recognition of the failure of US narratives to distinguish Iraqi 
women from other Arab women and simultaneously an acknowledgement 
that the US has differentiated between Iraqi and Afghan women. Yet, she 
endorses this differentiation on the basis of a racialized hierarchy in which 
she positions Iraqi women above Afghan women, thereby perpetuating the 
same racializing logics as US narratives. Similarly, Ebtihal also suggested 
that Iraqis are more educated than Afghans, which is why the US 
differentiated between Afghan and Iraqi women and why the US sought to 
destroy Iraq: 
 
They don’t treat Afghan women and Iraqi women similarly. The 
Afghan people are complicated because the Taliban isolated them. 
But when it comes to us, Americans did good and bad. Their plan 
was to kill most of our scientists and researchers; the rest left for 
Europe and the US They killed the most educated because they want 
to destroy Iraq. The good part is that they welcome the educated to 
America. They even opened their doors to Iraqi officers in the army 
to live over there.  
 
In perceiving that the US differentiated between Iraqi women and Afghani 
women, Ebtihal voiced a confused and contradictory view. She believes 
Americans deliberately killed most Iraqi scientists with the intention of 
ravaging Iraq yet has also welcomed the educated survivors to its shores. 
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This may reflect her wider view of how the US has dealt with the Iraqi 
situation; it invaded Iraq, it killed Iraqis, but it welcomed refugees.  
 
Thus, the interviewees expressed resentment towards perceived US attitudes 
to Muslim or Arab women, challenging the culturalizing logic that 
underpins these. Nonetheless, they also aligned themselves with US values 
in order to present Iraqi women as superior to Afghani women, reinforcing 
the same culturalizing logic.  
 
Attitudes towards the US narrative on its role in bringing democracy 
and development 
Some women voted or professed hope that democracy will one day be 
realized. The attitudes of the interviewees toward democracy are based on 
their different understanding of democracy from US politicians. The Bush 
administration claimed that they were bringing democracy to Iraq by 
introducing elections and a multiparty system in which women could 
participate as both voters and members of parliament. In contrast, the 
interviewees viewed voting as an empty mechanism unless and until more 
fundamental reform of Iraqi institutions is realized. Thus, while many of the 
women I interviewed voted in recent Iraqi elections, this doesn’t necessarily 
indicate support for the model of democracy introduced by the US. They 
voted out of despair rather than belief in the system.  
 
For instance, Hanady is a 67-year-old Sunni with four children, one of 
which has died. She settled in Jordan in 2004 and highlights the fact that she 
comes from a privileged background. As her father was an Ambassador, she 
completed her GCSEs in England. She is currently involved in humanitarian 
work in Jordan, helping Iraqi refugees. She, like Sameera, holds the view 
that:  
 
There is no democracy in Iraq so how would I be able to participate 
in it? I voted but votes do not matter. In the end votes are 
manipulated. They [US officials] instate whomever they please. 
Whether we vote or do not vote we get the same outcome. 
 
The position thus serves as a condemnation of the Bush administration for 
not implementing their stated objectives of democracy-making with 
integrity.  
 
Similarly, Abeer takes a negotiated position in relation to the US role in 
bringing democracy and development: 
 
Americans did not bring any kind of freedom at all. Americans did 
not bring change to Iraqi women, Iraqi men or Iraqi children. Quite 
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the contrary, we regressed to the state we were at one thousand 
years ago. 
 
Whilst Abeer does not necessarily think that the US brought democracy and 
development, she nevertheless expressed a need for the US to remain in 
order to guarantee future democracy and development:  
 
I was not happy when they pulled out of Iraq because they invaded 
Iraq, destroyed it and then left without sorting out the mess they 
created. I hope Americans return so that they clean up the mess they 
left behind. 
 
Shayma alternatively suggests cultural reasons for the failure of democracy 
in Iraq:  
 
I work for democracy in Iraq and I am the head of the first feminist 
organisation—focusing primarily on women’s interests and 
spreading democracy—in my district. However, democracy differs 
from one country to another. The democracy I envisaged for Iraq 
has yet to exist. The democracy that the US tried to introduce did not 
take into account Iraqi cultural sensitivities and particularities […] I 
voted but voting took place before the constitution was completed. 
 
Whilst Shayma endorsed democracy in terms of an abstract concept, she 
objected to the way in which it had been implemented in Iraq. This position 
is rooted in a commitment to democracy in Iraq, therefore endorsing US 
foreign policy narratives about the desire for democracy and freedom in the 
Middle East, including Iraq; however, it challenges the notion of a universal 
model of democracy (in the case of Shayma) or it challenges the notion that 




The oppositional position can complicate the way in which Iraqi women 
interpret hegemonic knowledge about them. It can also challenge the way in 
which the literature has understood their oppositional position. For instance, 
the women who held an oppositional position did not refute the idea of 
being saved. 
 
What is more, focusing on how Iraqi women construct Occidental images of 
the West produced a number of crucial points. Often scholars choose to 
highlight an oppositional stance against hegemonic power to demonstrate 
the idea of agency as resistance. Indeed, some Iraqi women did resist by 
deploying similar reductive binary tactics in order to make Americans seem 
as insignificant. What my research has also found is that holding an 
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oppositional position did not always correspond to a sense of empowerment. 
For instance, some interviewees have expressed ideas that do not exist and 
are rooted in conspiracy theories. This most directly exposes their 
vulnerability and their sense of fear of the Other.  
 
Attitudes towards US officials and personnel 
Sameera insisted American politicians do not deserve to be distinguished or 
presented in a good light; all are equally suspect. She believes the difference 
between Bush and Obama is simple: ‘one is black and the other is white, 
and besides that they are both equally culpable’. She explains: 
 
Bush was daring, he wanted to appear brave in order to gain fame 
and recognition. Bush started it all and Obama is trying to complete 
his mission in a less pronounced way, not because he was more 
peaceful, but he is this way so as to avoid infuriating the American 
public as they are fed up of their games. The American public would 
not allow more American troops to be killed and so American 
politicians are plotting to turn Iraqis against each other instead. 
 
While she thinks Obama treats Iraqis more cynically than Bush, this is only 
an extension of the latter’s policy and not a revision of it. Sameera has heard 
that Obama admires Haifa Wehbe, a very glamourous Lebanese singer, and 
that he even met her, prompting the sardonic reflection: ‘Women’s rights 
can be granted to you if you’re beautiful. He’ll give her rights […] 
Everyone I know shares the same opinion’. Sameera likewise deliberately 
refuses to distinguish between the two administrations or indeed between 
Americans in general: 
 
I hate them [Americans], they don’t deserve the effort of 
distinguishing between them or to recognize decent people amongst 
them. In reality, I’m sure some of them are okay. Some troops were 
forced to fight. He’s [American soldier] here to earn a living, to 
receive his pay cheque. Whenever I come across soldiers they look 
mortified. They are always on the look for enemies and are ready to 
kill. They don’t feel secure themselves. 
 
Sameera purposefully constructs a monolithic image of the US, even as she 
simultaneously concedes that they are not all the same, in order to 
emphasize her rejection of US foreign policy and foreign policy narratives. 
Whilst this is an act of refusal, it is based on similar homogenizing logics as 
those of US narratives about Iraq, the Muslim world and Arabs.  
 
Abeer is a 40-year-old, university educated, mother of three and describes 
herself as both Sunni and Shia. When asked about what she thought of US 
officials and personnel, she initially differentiates between different US 
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politicians: ‘Hillary Clinton did not get too involved in the Iraq war but 
Condoleezza Rice is guilty of decaying Iraq with her politics’. She then 
reversed her statement: ‘[Hillary Clinton and Condoleezza Rice] were both 
involved in what’s going on in Iraq. They are part of the team which 
destroyed Iraq’. Hanady also perceives no difference between different US 
administrations: 
 
I imagine they are the same [Obama and Bush administrations]. 
There is no difference. [My opinion of them] is indifferent. They are 
leaders who only serve their country’s economic interest, so that 
they keep participating in arms trading. Every other year they start a 
new war in a different country so that the young and unemployed 
join the army and are able to receive a good salary – and we are the 
terrorists and they [soldiers] are made to believe that they have to 
fight them [terrorists].  
 
Hanady’s oppositional position is constructed through a monolithic and 
negative representation of the US, which exposes the extent of their 
wrongdoing. In this instance, victimhood is not to be understood as a merely 
weak and helpless position but as one that pinpoints the US’s transgressions, 
demonstrates how US politicians have manipulated their own people, and 
thereby subverts the supposed superiority of the US. 
 
Attitudes towards the US narrative of ‘saving’ and ‘empowering’ 
Iraqi women 
The US narrative that intervention in Iraq was justified in order to save 
women from the hands of a barbaric dictatorship was generally not endorsed 
or even recognized by the women that I interviewed. Opposition was 
premised not on a positive defence of the previous regime, but on 
condemnation of the actions of US personnel, the effects of the US 
occupation or the ignorance of Americans. As previously discussed, many 
of the interviewees perceived favourable treatment in US narratives. 
However, there was a minority who perceived US representations of Iraq 
and Iraqis as negative. For example, Abeer said: 
 
The way they imagined us and still imagine us [Iraqi women] is of 
living in the Stone Age. Yes, they invaded with the intention of 
spreading democracy and all that, but that was all empty talk […] 
Despite the invasion that happened, there are Americans who do not 
know where Iraq is or anything about Iraq […] and yet Americans 
think we are regressive! 
 
Ebtihal shares Abeer’s views and challenges US narratives of ‘saving Iraqi 
women’ by asserting Iraq’s modernity and highlighting the achievements of 
Iraqi women:  
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The image they have of the Iraqi woman is regressive and not 
advanced or educated. They [Americans] do not know that Iraq is an 
advanced and civilized country; we have our female doctors, 
engineers, professors and scientists and many more.  
 
Similarly, Bushra states: 
 
I imagine they perceive us as backwards. They do not see us as 
conscious and educated people. They imagine us as an ignorant and 
barbaric mob and they [US] are here to civilize us […] Most of the 
accomplished American scientists have Iraqi roots. The best doctors, 
politicians and engineers from around the world can trace their 
roots back to Iraq. They do not consider immigrants from Iraq to be 
Iraqi, only ones who live in Iraq are backwards. This image could 
not be further from reality. 
 
Bushra perceives that US narratives echo historical colonial discourses, in 
which the non-Western world is constructed as ‘backward’ and in need of 
‘civilization’. By contrast, Bushra constructs Iraqis as the most civilized. 
Moreover, where other women have lauded the US for receiving Iraqi 
migrants, Bushra condemns the US for accepting Iraqi migrants in order to 
appropriate their achievements of Iraqis. Bushra’s opposition to the US is 
constructed through a monolithic and hyperbolic representation of Iraq and 
Iraqis, thereby reversing the homogenizing logics of perceived US 
narratives about Iraq. 
 
Others spoke about how the US occupation itself had been negative for 
women. Hajjar said:  
 
Americans blocked access to roads, which prevented women from 
going to work or university. There are families who have restricted 
their female relatives from attending school, university or work 
because people consider these places to be a foreign occupation. 
 
Hajjar rejects the notion that Iraqi women are victims of Iraqi patriarchal 
oppression, but rather blames the US occupation for restrictions placed on 
women. Bushra also blames the American presence for restricting female 
mobility: 
 
As a big family we prefer travelling by car instead of plane, as it’s 
more affordable to be honest. So we travel by car […] to Baghdad. If 
the journey normally takes 6 hours, it would take up to 10 hours if a 
tank column appears. We are not permitted to walk freely in the 
street if there are American tank columns visible […] Americans 
don’t account for complicated situations. They will not make any 
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exceptions even if a woman wants to give birth. They prefer her to 
give birth in the car but not to overtake the American tank column. 
 
Ebtihal spoke about direct violence committed by US soldiers: 
 
The Bush administration helped get rid of Saddam Hussein […] 
They did not do anything for women. Americans raped and killed an 
Iraqi girl by the name of Abeer in Muhammadiyah and they were 
tried in America. A lot [of US soldiers] developed mental illnesses 
from the things they were exposed to in Iraq. 
 
Ebtihal also spoke of her personal experience of restrictions imposed by US 
personnel:  
 
Americans did not permit us veiled women to wear the hijab to work. 
Anyone who works for parliament is banned from wearing it. There 
are cameras installed to examine our bodies. We were against that 
kind of inspection but their excuse was [that it was] to ensure that 
we weren’t carrying any weapons. I later found out that those 
cameras expose women’s bodies and they sometimes had dogs sniff 
you. You know this is not Islamic. I refused to be searched in that 
manner.  
 
In contradistinction to those women who believed that the US was accepting 
of veiled women, Aisha believed that ‘Americans portray all veiled women 
as terrorists. Sameera agreed, adding: ‘There’s a YouTube video which has 
recently been posted, of an American man beating a veiled woman’. These 
statements are constructed on the basis of a monolithic representation of the 
US as well as the perception that the US government and ordinary 
Americans do not differentiate between veiled women.  
 
Ebtihal’s earlier position, in which she stated that Americans who knew her 
through work respected her and did not search her house, is contradicted by 
her direct criticisms of US personnel. On the one hand, Ebtihal views Iraqis 
as victims of the US invasion and occupation. On the other hand, she refuses 
to see herself as a victim, as illustrated by her stated refusal to comply with 
US security measures.  
 
A different challenge to US narratives was presented by Ruby, who 
highlighted the plight of Christians as a result of the US occupation: 
 
We Christians are peaceful but when Americans were in Iraq, people 
assumed that Americans are Christians and therefore we must have 
collaborated with them and this made us vulnerable. Christians got 
killed. A lot fled persecution during the war. They blamed us 
because they considered us ‘kiffar’ [infidels] like Americans. 
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Indeed, following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, it is estimated 
that Iraq’s Christian community dropped from approximately 1.3 million to 
500,000 residing in Iraq as of 2010 (US Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, 2010). 
 
Moreover, the narrative of ‘empowering’ Iraqi women was also challenged 
by the complaints of some of the interviewees regarding the lack of US 
assistance and humanitarian aid for Iraqi women. None of the Iraqi women I 
interviewed directly received any form of aid from the US. Hanady is 
privileged enough to be able to provide aid to the less fortunate, and her 
humanitarian work shapes how she regards foreign aid. According to her, 
the US has not provided any assistance to Iraqis:  
 
I personally did not get affected […] but I am irritated by what’s 
happening to the refugees. Every day I receive distressing messages 
on WhatsApp. The vast majority, which includes young girls, are 
suffering from illnesses and can’t receive treatment. The problem is 
there is no aid or funding in Iraq. Even Caritas [a confederation of 
165 Catholic relief] helped with operations and provided medicine 
but they have currently stopped their support. Even the U.N.D.P 
[United Nations Development Programme] used to give out an 
allowance, that fund now goes to Syrians [...] Children used to go to 
state schools in Jordan but this year […] Iraqis are required to pay 
their children’s tuition fees or else they face expulsion […] 




In Jordan, England and everywhere you’ll find Iraqis united to help 
each other out. But Americans have only observed.  
 
Hanady thus refutes the US narrative of bringing development to Iraq and 
emphasizes instead the agency of the Iraqi diaspora in this regard. However, 
clearly some Iraqis are more agential than others in this regard because of 
the vastly different humanitarian circumstances facing different Iraqi 
women. In this respect, Hanady also suggests the need to differentiate 
between Iraqi women in terms of their experiences.  
 
Attitudes towards the US narrative on its role in bringing democracy 
and development 
Some of the interviewees completely refused the narrative that the US had 
brought democracy and development to Iraq, instead emphasizing that the 
US invasion and US policies had led to insecurity and a lack of 
development. Others opposed the act of voting, as they believe it is not 
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effective. Some once thought they had the opportunity to make a difference 
by voting, but the outcome deflated their hope. This was either on the 
grounds that the US had actively undermined democracy through 
manipulation of election results, or through the failure of the US to build or 
support Iraqi state institutions, or because of a failure to take into account 
Iraqi cultural particularities. Moreover, opposition to US foreign policy 
narratives was very apparent in relation to the subject of the withdrawal of 
US troops from Iraq in 2011.  
 
For example, Sameera is a 46-year-old, has a degree in mechanical 
engineering, and is a mother of three children. She describes herself as a 
religious Sunni but sees no difference between different sects of Islam. 
Troubled by the war, Sameera decided to leave Iraq. She first moved to 
Syria for 8 months before settling in Jordan where she is currently based. At 
the time of the interview she had no official job but worked secretly for a 
charity supporting refugee Iraqi families. When asked about whether she 
voted or participated in democracy, Sameera echoed this sense of US-
imposed democracy as fraudulent:  
 
I did not vote at the Iraqi election, as I was not in the country 
around that time. Everyone I knew including myself backed Ayad 
Allawi […] He’s fair and doesn’t espouse the politics of favouritism 
[…] He’s a British-educated Shia man. Most Iraqis were sure he 
would succeed but because he failed to gain American support, he 
did not win. After which I decided never to participate in elections. 
 
Heba was totally dismissive of US promises of bringing democracy to Iraq: 
‘they [US officials] did not do anything. They were sent to create a federal 
state or something like that. They are full of talk and no action’. However, 
she not only blames the US but also those Iraqis who collaborated with the 
US:  
 
They [US officials] brought their own politicians and their own 
Iraqis to represent us. Yes, they did allow us to vote […] but the 
elections were fraudulent […] They have installed them [Iraqi 
politicians] into power and later decided they were not apt to 
govern. 
 
By using the term, ‘their own Iraqis’, Heba suggests that anyone who aligns 
with the US political project in Iraq cannot be considered a true Iraqi, 
thereby drawing a distinction between authentic versus inauthentic Iraqis.  
 
Heba’s attitudes towards the US-installed democracy and those that 
participated in it may be linked to what she has experienced as an assault on 
her position as part of the Sunni community, which was marginalized by the 
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US and its Iraqi allies after 2003 on the assumption that they must have been 
supporters of Saddam Hussein.  
 
Ebitihal further expounds on the underlying flaws that render Iraq’s 
democracy unsuccessful:  
 
I did not vote. I do not think our parliament is a successful one; 
rather it’s a failure. The parliament has no authority, power or 
meaning. The government did nothing for their citizens. They were 
not able to provide us with water, electricity or employment. People 
are afraid to leave their house. Americans were not involved in 
improving the situation. They would work and then return to their 
hotels. Maybe soldiers helped out but not other Americans that I 
worked with. 
 
Ebtihal finds voting irrelevant, since the state has failed to provide basic 
necessities. She therefore implicitly links the idea of democracy to the 
ability of government to provide necessary services and security to its 
citizens. Moreover, Ebtihal believes that US personnel failed to help, 
thereby challenging the narrative of the US narrative as an agent of 
democracy and development, not only in Iraq but globally. Where Sameera 
and Heba to one extent or another believe that the US has actively interfered 
to undermine democracy, Ebtihal instead believes that the US has stood by 
passively, neglecting to support Iraqi institutions. 
  
Many Iraqi women expressed opposition to the US withdrawal. The 
interviewees referred largely to the period under the presidency of Obama. 
The Obama administration’s determination to end the combat mission in 
Iraq and simultaneously refrain from the discussion of Iraqi women’s rights 
underwent a significant U-turn in 2014 with the dramatic emergence of 
Daesh. As pressure mounted on the administration to counter this terrorist 
threat to the region, the rights of women in Iraq reappeared in the remarks of 
US politicians pushing for public approval of airstrikes on Daesh targets in 
Syria and Iraq. The previously discarded foreign policy meta-narrative of 
the Bush administration—of a ‘War on Terror’ supported by a foundational 
narrative of ‘saving’ victimized women—resurfaced, but in slightly 
different forms, reflecting the altered nature of the enemy. 
 
Reasons given by the interviewees for opposition to US withdrawal of US 
troops were not unified. However, in key respects, their responses could be 
organized into three categories. First, some women were in fact content to 
see US troops pull out of Iraq, though for reasons which do not accord with 
the US narrative. Second, some did not believe that the US actually pulled 
out of Iraq, and are convinced that it was a subterfuge for sinister and 
clandestine political operations. Third, a few were both respectful of and 
satisfied with the US’s decision to leave but are now confronted with the 
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chaos this left behind. These three oppositional attitudes to the withdrawal 
of the American military presence attest to the different perspectives Iraqi 
women have on the US, but all challenge the narrative that the US mission 
in Iraq had ended and that Iraqis were ready to take responsibility for their 
security.  
 
Shayma for instance was glad the US troops withdrew, but for reasons 
different from the US narrative:  
 
We were very happy to see the US withdrawing its troops from Iraq. 
Americans accidentally killed civilians and the Iraqi army because 
they kept missing their target. It was far from a smooth operation.  
 
In other words, she challenges the notion that US troops were ever 
supporting Iraqi security and, rather, were contributing to insecurity.  
 
Other women opposed the US narrative of withdrawal because they believed 
it to be an outright falsehood. According to Sameera ‘They publicly 
announced they would leave, but their presence was still felt. I imagine that 
all Iraqis feel this way’. She believed the withdrawal was fabricated and that 
the US publicly announced their departure whilst maintaining a more 
clandestine operation.  
 
Similarly, Asra mirrors Sameera’s argument by arguing that the US 
withdrawal resulted in mayhem whilst simultaneously claiming that US 
interests prevent them from leaving:  
 
Americans won’t pull out. There is no way Americans will leave an 
Arab area. The whole world knows this. When Americans left they 
created sectarianism […] There wasn’t any sectarianism in the past; 
if there was, it was at a minor scale. 
 
Asra contests the US narrative that Iraqis have gained autonomy, which the 
Obama administration sought to establish, by claiming that the rise of 
sectarian tensions has been created by the US, either deliberately or 
unintentionally, which enables its continuing involvement. She too desires 
the final, and total, withdrawal of US personnel and yet simultaneously fears 
the consequences. Heba also expresses ambivalence about the US 
withdrawal: 
 
I wasn’t happy. The experience was very absurd. They came to Iraq, 
created a havoc […] It was best that we got rid of this [US] control 
[…] But when the US troops pulled out it [Iraq] turned into a jungle. 
 
Thus, despite their unilateral opposition to US narratives on withdrawal, 
Iraqi women are divided on exactly what the flaws in this narrative are. For 
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some, it is rooted in the destruction that Americans brought and a gladness 
they have gone; or it is rooted in the destruction their withdrawal 
engendered; for others, it is rooted in a sense that Americans remain and 
insidiously plot further destruction. All these different attitudes demonstrate 
that these women view the US as all-powerful and the Iraqi state and Iraqis 
as powerless. These assumptions also underpin attitudes towards Daesh. 
 
Every Iraqi woman I interviewed held Daesh to be a negative or hostile 
force, though their views on Daesh’s origins and nature differed, with 
conspiracy theories particularly salient. The conspiracy theories put forward 
by the women that I interviewed mirrored conspiracy theories heard more 
broadly in Jordan and other Arab countries. These conspiracy theories might 
serve as alternative narratives to the US’s hegemonic narrative, regardless of 
their feasibility. As Gray (2010, p. 5) observes, ‘conspiracy theory or 
conspiracism [can be regarded] as the act of developing and sustaining a 
discourse, usually a counter-discourse, which challenges conventional or 
accepted explanations for events’. In particular, the discrepancy in power 
between the US and Iraqis provides a fertile context for the emergence of 
conspiracy theories.  
 
The conspiracy theory that Daesh has been deployed as an American tool to 
destabilise Iraq was common among the women I interviewed. I asked Asra 
what enabled Daesh to spread, and she replied: ‘So that Americans gain 
control. They are the ones that brought them and want them to spread in 
order to control Iraq. They just want to kill the Iraqi people’. Hanady 
similarly presents Daesh as a non-Iraqi force, facilitated by Americans, and 
she also accuses Iranians of having had a hand in this: 
 
When he [Saddam] left, Iranians governed us. They [Iranians] 
dishonoured us. They are loyal to Iran […] Americans brought them 
[…] When they [Americans] left I thought it would force Iraq to 
stand on its feet and things will move smoothly. We thought the 
Americans were the occupiers. But things became worse. It’s a film.3 
Americans brought Daesh and they’re pretending to fight them. It’s 
a game they are playing in order to annihilate Sunnis in Iraq. All the 
areas they are taking over are Sunni. 
 
Hanady suggests Iran is an American ally (although in the West the two 
countries are considered foes) and the two countries colluded on the rise of 
Daesh in order to victimize Sunnis and splinter and weaken the country. Her 
reference to Iranians governing Iraq refers to the Shia-led Iraqi government 
and her perception (alongside other Sunni Iraqis) that Iraq’s Shia are not 
loyal to Iraq because of their religious identity. Her own position as a Sunni 
                                               
3 This is an idiomatic phrase common in Arabic which loosely translates as ‘it’s 
unreal’, or ‘it almost feels real but is fictitious’.  
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possibly influences this conception, since Hanady felt marginalized within 
Iraq because of her religious identity. She makes no mention of other 
minorities who are also under threat from Daesh. Moreover, Hanady’s fear 
of Daesh is therefore shaped primarily by her religious identity within the 
context of Iraq, rather than by her gender, despite the many reports of Daesh 
violence against women. This in a way is a counter-narrative to the US, 
which has emphasized the threat Daesh poses to all Iraqi women, 
particularly the barbaric threat of sexual violence.  
 
Sameera, a Sunni, also regards Daesh as a product of malign foreign powers 
taking advantage of Iraq’s instability: ‘Daesh is an Israeli-formed 
organisation and is supported by the Americans’. That Sameera, like 
Hanady, attributes the rise of Daesh to outside forces rather than any Iraqi 
factors operates to downplay the responsibility of Iraqis for this destructive 
force as well as reiterate the external threats facing Iraq. Shayma similarly 
asserts that foreign powers are seeking to destroy all Iraqis: 
 
The reports I read confirm that Daesh is an American product […] 
Americans even transport food to Daesh. This war is to serve the 
interest of America. America is not after Daesh but the Iraqi army. 
 
Bushra is a 40-year-old who has not completed any formal education. Often, 
education is an indicator of class, but in her case this does not apply. She 
comes from a middle-class background, as her father was an engineer and 
her mother worked for the Ministry of Planning. She is a Shia, who left 
prior to the 2003 invasion. She fled persecution by Saddam Hussein with 
her children and husband to settle in Jordan. Despite having not experienced 
Daesh rule, she still holds strong views that the rise of Daesh is the latest in 
a long history of US manipulation of regional events: 
 
In Iraq, we all know that Daesh was brought over by them 
[Americans]. Saddam and Bin Laden were fostered by Americans 
and were then sent to us. Daesh was not any different. Saddam was 
America’s puppet. He followed their orders. For example, they 
ordered him to bomb Iran and so he did. They instructed him on 
when to end the war. They also ordered him to invade Kuwait and he 
did […] Even Osama from Saudi Arabia was backed by America. 
And to be honest it’s not even America [that controls them]. It’s free 
masons that Americans instruct as well. Free masons are the real 
political enemies. It’s not only our enemy but also the whole world’s 
enemy. They are not just against Iraq or Arabs but the whole world. 
Our first and only enemies are free masons. 
 
Bushra’s narrative, constructing a far-reaching and broad conspiracy theory, 
reflects her incomprehension and sense of powerlessness in relation to 
reoccurring episodes of barbaric and destabilizing violence. Attitudes 
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towards Daesh are not only shaped the actual impact of the organization but 
also a wider set of anxieties about the lack of Iraqi sovereignty and the 
negative impact of outside powers.  
 
Conclusion 
In line with feminist standpoint theory, this chapter has prioritized Iraqi 
women’s own narratives and experiences in order to reveal alternative 
knowledge about US foreign policy towards Iraq after 2003. In particular, 
Iraqi women’s narratives have highlighted that there is no clear 
periodization between US presidents in how Iraqi women experienced US 
foreign policy. Moreover, this chapter has demonstrated how Iraqi women’s 
narratives disrupt hegemonic knowledge about their representations as a 
result of the multiplicity of their decoding positions. This not only 
challenges the assumptions of US foreign policy makers but also corrects 
the tendency of postcolonial feminists to focus on hegemonic discourses 
rather than the narratives of those who are the object of those hegemonic 
discourses.   
  
Using Hall’s approach of hegemonic, negotiated and oppositional positions, 
I identified patterns in how Iraqi women perceive US foreign policy 
narratives. Interestingly, most of the interviewees held hegemonic or 
negotiated positions on most themes. None of these positions can be 
regarded as absolute, and a degree of ambiguity attaches to each woman’s 
narrative. However, attributing these positions still identifies helpful trends 
without simplifying the complexities inherent in the multiple positions and 
viewpoints available to these women. This finding is important, as it 
demonstrates that we cannot assume that Iraqi women’s narratives represent 
an oppositional stance. Therefore, a more complex reading is needed in 
order to better understand Iraqi women’s narratives. This finding also 
problematizes Said’s Orientalism, which essentially places the relationship 
between the West and East or Iraqi women and US officials into the 
dichotomy of powerful vs powerless—this does not allow room for 
ambiguity to be recognized. This chapter demonstrates that adopting 
Occidentalism allows us to approach power relations in a complex way.  
 
These findings build on the existing literature that has examined the US 
representations of Muslim women since 9/11. However, these neglected the 
women who have been instrumentalized in US representations and made 
assumptions about Muslim women’s agency: namely, that they unanimously 
oppose US narratives about them. This chapter has helped to fill this gap by 
demonstrating that studying the Occidental positions of Iraqi women allows 
us to think beyond binary oppositions. My findings demonstrate that Iraqi 
women have not attained wholly negative attitudes towards US narratives. 
In fact, Iraq women have endorsement or semi-endorsement of US 
narratives. This should not necessarily be interpreted as a form of passivity 
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or necessarily reflective of subordination. Rather, this chapter has 
demonstrated that women’s position towards US narratives were often part 
of a strategy to empower themselves vis-à-vis other actors. Moreover, in 
some cases hegemonic or negotiated positions demonstrated nuanced 
attitudes towards issues such as US foreign policies and democracy. Even in 
those cases where women abstained from expressing an opinion out of fear 
for their safety or possible negative repercussions, this should also be 
considered a form of agency.  
 
Meanwhile, oppositional positions often rested on rather monolithic 
representations of the US, thereby reproducing an ahistorical binary of us vs 
them that mirrored the logics underpinning Orientalist discourses. In 
addition, some oppositional positions were linked to conspiracy theories or 
narratives that emphasized a lack of agency. In this sense, the narratives of 
the interviewees complicate notions of agency, empowerment and relations 
to hegemonic narratives, demonstrating the value of feminist standpoint 
theory. 
 
The findings of my interviews also emphasized the heterogeneity of Iraqi 
women, in terms of their attitudes towards the US and its policies. These 
interviews therefore are illustrative of the degree to which highlighting 
individual narratives and the particulates of each women’s situation has 
undermined a collective Iraqi identity, let alone an Iraqi ‘sisterhood’. I thus 
argue that there is a need to recognise personal circumstances and to resist 
categorizing women. 
 
Iraqi women’s alternative knowledge, and their prioritization of different 
themes from those maintained by US narratives, are explored in the 
following chapter, which discusses how Iraqi women prioritize security 
more than the abstract values, such as progress and women’s rights, which 
the US has often championed. These are considered a privilege rather than a 
necessity, and while lauded, are not understood as central to how Iraqi 
women measure the US’s role and value in Iraq. The following chapter will 
examine the notion of intersectional identities to demonstrate its importance 
in making sense of such complex experiences and alternative knowledge. 
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Chapter Five: Iraqi women’s narratives of the 
violence and conflicts in Iraq since 2003 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the attitudes and perceptions of the Iraqi 
women interviewees in relation to US foreign policy narratives and US 
foreign policies. Chapter Three demonstrated the complex relationships 
between Iraqi women and the US administration, which goes beyond 
binaries of domination/subordination or domination/resistance, in 
contradistinction to both US foreign policy narratives as well as critiques of 
US foreign policy narratives. The previous chapter was, therefore, primarily 
concerned with Iraqi women’s relationships with the US. By contrast, this 
chapter considers how the interviewees narrated their own experiences of 
war and conflict in Iraq since 2003. 
 
This chapter thus seeks to address my project’s secondary question of: How 
do narratives of Iraqi women reveal the relationship between security and 
identity? I do this by focusing on women’s narratives and experiences since 
the 2003 US invasion. In answering my secondary research question, this 
chapter will also address my main research question about challenging 
dominant US narratives. As noted in the previous chapter, US government 
discourses claimed that they were ‘saving Iraqi women’ and bringing 
security through freedom from dictatorship. The chapter challenges these 
claims by complicating ideas of Security and Freedom as highlighted in 
Iraqi women’s narratives. 
 
It also challenges traditional security approaches. In this respect, it draws on 
Feminist Security Studies, particularly with regards to thinking beyond 
conventional, or state, security as it deploys the narratives of the 
interviewees to highlight alternative or potentially counter-hegemonic 
notions of security. 
 
I will argue that the idea of human security should take seriously a feminist 
standpoint theory approach together with the study of intersectional 
identities and narratives in relation to security, in order to develop our 
understanding of the concepts of security and agency. I also argue for the 
importance of linking both theory and empirical research using a narrative 
and intersectional frame in order to highlight the importance of a context-
based understanding of security and to examine the relationship between 
Iraqi women’s identities and security. I shall conclude by assessing how 
prioritizing alternative knowledge as an epistemological direction has 
disrupted existing knowledges about Iraqi women. Finally, I will highlight 
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the implication of my study for the field of IR and Security Studies, and 
Feminist IR and Feminist Security Studies, more specifically. 
 
Since this chapter will discuss three of the seven sub-themes of security of 
the UNDP’s definition of human security: economic, community and 
personal, a closer look at these three terms is needed to understand how the 
present project diverges from these common perceptions of security. 
According to UNDP: 1) personal security stresses preventing physical 
violence from the state, other states, individual, groups, self, threats directed 
against women and children. 2) Community security includes ethnic 
tensions, and highlights how one derives ‘security from their membership in 
a group – a family, a community, an organization, a racial or ethnic group 
that can provide a cultural identity and a reassuring set of values’ (UNDP 
1994, p. 31). 3) Economic security is defined as assuring a basic income 
through job security or as a last resort through public funds. While efforts by 
the UNDP to breakdown the idea of human security into subsets of security 
themes is an important move away from broad brush language, these ideas 
are still problematic, as they are rooted in abstraction and remain vague.  
 
I have thus categorized women’s narratives according to the different types 
of human security: namely, personal security, community security and 
economic security. My categorization is an effort to order their narratives. 
However, to guard against imposing a false sense of coherence or 
homogeneity, I highlight the contradictions and disagreements found within 
different narrative themes. It is my hope, therefore, that in discussing 
broader narratives I bring out common themes or trends but do not iron out 
complexities or individualities. 
 
Building on the work of Maria Stern (2005) and Annick Wibben (2011), the 
chapter considers women’s understandings of security as constructed 
through their identities, since ‘securing something requires its identification’ 
(Wibben, 2011, p. 105).  
 
Both this and the previous chapter seek to amplify Iraqi women’s agency by 
demonstrating the value of feminist standpoint theory as an epistemology in 
enabling us to recognize agency. In the previous chapter, agency was 
understood as how the interviewees positioned themselves in relation to the 
US. In this chapter, Iraqi women’s agency is considered in terms of how 
they chose to narrate their security. As Stern notes: ‘the people with whom 
we [researchers] converse also wield power over, what, whether and how 
they choose to narrate’ (Stern, 2005, p. 67). Stern (1997, p. 128) also argues:  
 
Treating in/security as a construction site of political identities, 
whereby in writing in/security, the subjects write themselves, their 
histories, and their visions of a better future (a more ‘secure’ world), 
indicates the political nature of the assignment of threat and danger, 
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as well as safety and well-being. In/security thus can be seen as an 
ontological yet contingent condition of identity.  
 
Thus, I will also explore the idea of how security can also be thought of as a 
site of agency and serve as an illuminating way of understanding an 
individual’s identity. I will adopt the idea that: ‘They are certainly also 
agents in forming their stories’ (Stern, 2005 p. 67). In recognizing how the 
interviewees chose to define their own insecurities, I seek to avoid a 
prescriptive definition of agency. In this way, I am able to recognise Iraqi 
women’s agency beyond the parameters of US narratives as well as feminist 
theorizing. As Saba Mahmood (2005, pp. 14–5) argues in relation to the 
Egyptian women’s mosque movement, it is important to understand 
women’s agency in relation to their particular socio-cultural and political 
context and not some universal, abstract notion: 
 
we recognize that the desire for freedom from, or subversion of, 
norms is not an innate desire that motivates all beings at all times, 
but is also profoundly mediated by cultural and historical 
conditions, then the question arises: how do we analyse operations 
of power that construct different kinds of bodies, knowledge, and 
subjectivities whose trajectories do not follow the entelechy of 
liberatory politics? Put simply, my point is this: if the ability to effect 
change in the world and in oneself is historically and culturally 
specific (both in terms of what constitutes ‘change’ and the means by 
which it is effected), then the meaning and sense of agency cannot be 
fixed in advance, but must emerge through an analysis of the 
particular concepts that enable specific modes of being, 
responsibility, and effectivity. Viewed in this way, what may appear 
to be a case of deplorable passivity and docility from a progressivist 
point of view, may actually be a form of agency—but one that can be 
understood only from within the discourses and structures of 
subordination that create the conditions of its enactment.  
 
Therefore, agency cannot be predetermined. This points to the need for 
contextualisation, which helps to conceive agency in non-Western centric 
ways, as well as in unpredictable ways. 
 
In particular, Mahmoud (2005, pp. 14–15 & 20–22) criticizes the tendency 
of some feminists to consider women’s agency solely within the parameters 
of resisting patriarchy, failing to recognize that women’s agency may also 
consist of reinscribing and inhabiting patriarchal gender norms. Similarly, 
Amy Hinterberger (2013, p. 10) criticizes Western feminism for continuing 
to ‘discursively colonize the material and heterogeneities of non-Western 
women by presenting them as either ‘prisoners of patriarchy’ or ‘dupes of 
patriarchy’.’ My research suggests that the agency of Iraqi women is more 
complex than this. In some cases, the interviewees endorsed conservative 
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gender norms as a means of enhancing their security, reflecting that 
‘Agency works in conjunction with and is formed through the very things 
we often see as limiting agency, the operation of power’ (Amy Hinterberger, 
2013, p. 9). Thus, I seek to recognise agency in ways that are sometimes 




Personal security, particularly with regards to gender-based violence, has 
been a central concern of Feminist Security Studies scholars. Examples of 
gender-based violence, including rape, forced marriage and forced veiling, 
were raised by the interviewees. In addition, women also spoke about the 
particular gendered effects of lawlessness and political and criminal 
violence as well as the gendered impacts of a failing state. Often women’s 
response to this violence was in terms of seeking further protection from 
patriarchal structures, rather than a rejection of these, or was expressed in 
terms of nostalgia for Saddam Hussein.  
 
Heba spoke of the particular threats to women after 2003: 
 
After the 2003 war, […] militias began to infiltrate our society. The 
Iraqi woman started being raped, kidnapped, and killed. We would 
walk around and find corpses on the streets. I was 13-years-old and 
I would see these sights in front of me. Some parents stopped 
allowing their girls to study out of fear. Should I send my daughter 
to school and risk her being kidnapped or wait until they take her 
virginity away […] If they are looking to imprison her brother or 
husband and if they can’t find either, they would capture the women 
and rape them. These stories will not be mentioned in the news […] 
If a woman leaves prison, whether she was raped or not, you know, 
as part of Middle Eastern societies, her parents would kill her. 
 
Heba demonstrates that Iraqi women’s bodies become a weapon of war in 
order to intimidate Iraqi men. She also makes the point that women’s 
virginity is highly prized in Iraqi culture; this adds to women’s insecurities 
and the fear of death resulting from any perceived failure to protect this 
virginity. Other women focused on the rise of Daesh and how it had affected 
women in particular ways. According to Heba: 
 
Of course [the rise of Daesh affected me]. First of all, we had no 
freedoms. Women’s freedom is in the house. [There were] no jobs. 
Secondly, we used to be very proud of our Islam but the Islam that 
they brought us is not Islam. It has degraded women and the 
Prophet, peace be upon him, never degraded women. 
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As a result of Daesh, women and children have been forced to flee their 
homes, but they have not necessarily found security in other parts of Iraq. 
According to Heba: 
 
We left those districts [controlled by Daesh] by foot […] Once we 
reached the nearest city, they told us we’re not allowed to enter […] 
Why? Am I not part of your honour? [This is said to symbolise the 
‘honour’ of the nation] I am your sister. I am your daughter […] All 
of what I have said would never be featured in the media. No one 
would mention these things […] Aren’t we people, don’t we have 
rights?  
 
Hanady described how Daesh introduced a particular dress code and 
imposed marriage on unmarried women and girls:  
 
They mostly abused women with forced marriages and made them 
wear ‘boshiya’.4 Unmarried women would wear white ‘boshiya’ and 
married women would wear black ‘boshiya’, in order to marry the 
ones who aren’t already. Women and girls have no value. 
 
Nadje Al-Ali and Pratt (2011, p. 35) have also demonstrated how Islamic 
parties after 2003 imposed the veil as a means of imposing their authority: 
 
Public morality campaigns strongly encourage women to wear the 
correct “Islamic” clothing, through such instrument as posters 
illustrating the “proper” and “improper” forms of hijab or modest 
attire. Militias, many of which are linked to parties in government, 
are involved in harassment of women on the streets and at 
checkpoints based on how they are dressed. These paramilitaries 
have also intimidated and even murdered professional women with 
impunity.  
 
The issue of increased violence against women in post-2003 Iraq has also 
been raised by feminist scholars. For example, Nadje Al-Ali and Pratt 
(2006, p. 5) traces this phenomenon to the lack of police as well as the 
general rise in political violence:  
 
The insecurity plaguing Iraq has a distinct and debilitating impact 
on the daily lives of women and girls. Although men make up the 
majority of the victims of the violence, the climate of fear prevents 
women from participating in public life.  
 
                                               
4 Boshiya is a veil that completely covers the face including eyes. It is typically 
worn with an abaya, which is a type of ‘cloak’. 
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Whilst Al-Ali and Pratt laments the effects of the violence on women’s 
mobility, I found a general acceptance of this restriction as a ‘natural’ 
response to gender-specific insecurities. Sameera told me:  
 
Of course there are difficulties facing Iraqi women. Do you think if 
you were my daughter, I would allow you to leave the house knowing 
there will be Americans around? No, that’s impossible. How can you 
accept it?  
 
 Sameera went on to say: 
 
In Mosul girls are locked up to avoid any contact with Daesh. 
Equally, they avoided Americans. Americans would stay in Iraq for 
months without women and you know how they’re like; they are used 
to having sex with women. They have no jealousy. But there are 
Iraqi women who did have sex with Americans and even married 
them. My husband forbids me from leaving the house for those very 
reasons. 
 
Her use of the word ‘forbid’ suggests masculine force and dominance, but 
Sameera’s tone was approving and she wholeheartedly endorsed her 
husband’s protective zeal. This complicates the debate around the false 
private and public sphere in Feminist Security Studies. This demonstrates 
that although the private sphere might be construed as being unsafe and 
restrictive, women have a different point of view. Sameera not only thinks it 
is necessary to restrict her mobility, but welcomes these restrictions in order 
to protect her sexual purity and avoid the possibility of being in a mixed 
relationship with foreigners. 
 
Some women did question restrictions on their mobility. For example, 
Christina said: ‘I wish we had freedoms, the kind of freedom which enables 
women to be mobile without requiring a chaperone’. However, she did not 
reflect on why it is exclusively female and not male bodies that are 
vulnerable to these restrictions and in need of chaperoning or protection. 
Instead, it was simply accepted as common sense in a time of insecurity. 
Only Tala completely rejected restrictions on women: 
 
Freedom, first and foremost, is security for women. They [Iraqi 
society in general] shouldn’t intimidate her or consider that she is a 
woman to be confined only to domestic and sexual use. Women need 
freedom to go out and work and have self-confidence. This is what I 
wish it were like. I am one of these people that feel I’m a leader. 
 
Many women pointed to women’s rights and freedoms as indicative of the 
changes to personal security since 2003. For example, Shayma believed that 
women had more freedom before 2003:  
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Life before the [2003] war had its drawbacks, but it nevertheless 
was a stable and safe period. Women were free to leave the house 
and dress freely. […] The Iraqi woman wasn’t obliged to wear the 
hijab; it was a choice. After overturning Saddam’s regime, wearing 
hijab became compulsory. Islamic parties and militias were in 
control and forced as young as first year primary students to wear 
the hijab and they even imposed it on non-Muslims. 
 
For Shayma, women’s dress and mobility are symbolic of the status of 
women’s security. She does not regard the veil as an inherently oppressive: 
‘I’m veiled because I’m old. I’m 50 years old’. Rather, she objects to 
women being forced to wear the veil: ‘No one has the right to foist the hijab 
on young girls who are aged 9 or 10’. Similarly, Shayma points to what she 
perceives as a rollback in women’s legal rights since 2003 as indicative of 
the threats to women’s security. Noga Efrati (2005, p. 557) documents how 
‘On December 29, 2003, the US-appointed Interim Governing Council 
(IGC), headed by ‘Abdul al-Aziz al-Hakim, the Shi’i cleric who also leads 
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), passed 
Decree 137 to abolish Iraq’s Personal Status Law’. Efrati (2005, pp. 594–
595) describes how women’s rights activists had to fight to preserve a law 
that was not progressive enough in the first place:  
 
Women’s rights activists have been forced to channel energies under 
chaotic war-time conditions into preserving a law which ignored 
many of their long-sought demands: outlawing polygamy, equal 
rights in divorce and inheritance, and further extending maternal 
child custody. Thus preoccupied, feminists were hindered from 
advancing personal status issues as they had in the past when 
regimes perceived as favourable had assumed power. A valuable 
opportunity was lost. In the ‘new Iraq’ women have found 
themselves running just to stay in place.  
 
Throughout Shayma’s narrative, she blamed the Iraqi government and US 
politicians for failing to deliver laws that protect women and expressed 
nostalgia for the previous regime. That is not to say that laws before 2003 
granted gender equality but rather that some women, like Shayma, view 
legislative changes since 2003 as worsening women’s situations. Hanady 
also expressed nostalgia for life before 2003 on the basis that women had 
more freedom:  
 
We had [sports] clubs, a woman would go out and drive, she had 
freedom and she worked. There were a lot of developments in the 
70s and beyond. When the [2003] war broke nothing changed but 
she would be afraid to go out. If she has a job, she would go to work 
and then straight back home. She needs someone to protect her. 
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There was more safety in the past. We would be out until 3am or 
4am visiting people. 
 
Similarly, Heba contrasts security for women before and after 2003: 
 
Before the war, we at least had a system in place. If someone raped 
a woman, he would be sent to jail for his acts. When the war broke 
[...] men would rape women. Some of the rapists are Iraqis but there 
are men and militias who are not Iraqi, and we don’t exactly know 
where they’re from. Who would then stand by her side if there exists 
no system or safety? 
 
The interviewees were not only concerned about direct violence, but also 
structural violence caused as a result of Iraq’s failing state institutions. For 
example, Sameera highlighted the gendered impacts of a failing healthcare 
system: 
 
A big issue facing Iraqi women is a lack of medical support. 
Pregnant women are left to take care of themselves. They require 
money to give birth. Preventing them from having intercourse with 
their husband is not a solution. 
 
As with the issue of community security, women’s perceptions of personal 
insecurity are shaping how they perceive the past. Asra refers to the ousting 
of Saddam Hussein as ‘catastrophic’ for Iraqis:  
 
If Saddam Hussein decided to drop a nuclear bomb in Iraq and 
killed us all it would have been better. To us it was a total 
destruction to see Americans in our country […] I wasn’t happy 
about them ousting Saddam. I did not feel that they would bring a 
better person than him. Saddam was not detrimental to us. Saddam 
only tortured the ones who misbehaved. Saddam Hussein was a fair 
man. So if you committed a mistake he would harm you but if you 
walked on a straight path, he wouldn’t touch you […] If you didn’t 
take the right path you would get what you deserve of course.  
 
Sameera, explained, ‘Once you lose a sense of security, your whole life can 
turn upside down. Of course I will favour Saddam because he offered me 
security’. As a consequence of Iraq being ‘upside down’, Samira left Iraq to 
reside in Jordan. She declared, ‘bil rooh, bil dam, afedak ya malik’, a 
patriotic Arabic expression loosely translated as ‘I sacrifice my soul and 
blood (for the King of Jordan)’. There was a time when Sameera felt this 
kind of pride in being Iraqi, but this feeling has all but disappeared out of 
despair at the country’s deterioration and insecurity. This points to how 




Women were concerned about personal security, which they viewed as 
deteriorating since 2003 as a result of the US occupation, the rise of armed 
militias, the rise of Islamist parties, the rise of Daesh, and the break down in 
law and order. Their narratives highlight not only the gender-specific 
violence perpetrated against women in conflict but also the gender-specific 
ways in which general insecurity impacts upon women. In particular, as 
markers of the collective, whether the Iraqi nation or a religious sub-state 
group, women have been targeted by different political groups and subject 
to specific kinds of violence, such as forced veiling and forced marriage. In 
response, some women have sought not to oppose patriarchal structures but 
rather to comply with them as a means of securing protection. Meanwhile, 
others expressed nostalgia for life under Saddam Hussein. In addition, all 
the women whom I interviewed, who were residing in Amman at the time of 
our interview, had responded to insecurity by fleeing their homes and their 




Whilst several women raised the issue of personal security, they were 
generally more concerned about community security. Experiences and 
perceptions of community insecurity were narrated in relation to the US 
invasion and its aftermath, including the rise of sectarianism, persecution of 
minorities, and the rise of Daesh, as well as erosion of cultural and religious 
values. These narratives were informed by the intersections of national, 
religious, ethnic and gender identities. 
 
Sectarianism 
Many of the interviewees discussed sectarianism in relation to security. 
Some interviewees maintain they have always been aware of sectarianism 
within Iraq, but others regard it as a solely post-invasion phenomenon. They 
all, however, recognised an increase in sectarian tensions since the US 
invasion and a corresponding insecurity as a result of this. The nature and 
extent of the insecurity these women expressed depended largely on their 
individual ethno-religious background, thereby challenging the notion of a 
collective Iraqi women’s experience.  
 
Some women were vocal in blaming the US invasion for creating 
sectarianism. Aisha told me: ‘the only difficulties women faced [after 2003] 
were disunity created by Americans. Americans precipitated sectarian 
tensions between Sunnis and Shias and this triggered terrorism’. Similarly, 
Shayma blames the US invasion for creating sectarianism:  
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I’m Sunni, I have a friend who’s Shia. Iraqis do not discriminate 
against different sects. Sectarianism always existed but was 
suppressed because Iraq had control over its borders and had a 
strong army. Once Saddam was gone everything fell apart. We Iraqi 
nationals believe that the basis of a country is its leader. The current 
members of parliaments don’t have any sense of nationalism. 
 
Perhaps because Shayma is a Sunni Muslim, she was less exposed to the 
trauma of sectarianism under Saddam Hussein and, therefore, she is also 
more likely to positively identify with an Iraqi national identity, as opposed 
to a sub-state identity based on sect or ethnicity. Similarly, Sameera, a Sunni 
Muslim, also remembers Iraq before the US invasion as a harmonious 
society, telling me: ‘growing up, we were conditioned from an early age to 
accept Saddam Hussein as our father. His picture hung in every single 
classroom. A national anthem was played daily’. Sameera still refers to 
Saddam Hussein as ‘Baba Saddam’ (father Saddam). Her nostalgia for 
Iraq’s past and the vanquished regime inevitably affects her perspective on 
present day Iraq. For Sameera, the US invasion and the toppling of the old 
regime brought chaos and insecurity.  
 
Iman also blamed the US invasion for creating sectarianism, comparing the 
present to the period before 2003:  
 
In the past, Sunnis and Shias were united, they used to be 
neighbours and eat together […] You asked me if I am Sunni or 
Shia, I said I am a Muslim because I don’t differentiate, and I was 
raised to think we are all Muslim. The colonisation brought 
differences between Sunni and Shia by either Americans or Iraqis. 
[…] Colonisation could include cultural aims or aims of creating 
sectarian tensions. Iraq is made of more than one persuasion; there 
are the Kurds, Turkmen, Sunni, Shia…This issue affected me. We 
were raised to think that we are Iraqis which means you are Arab 
and Muslim [...] and not Iraqi from Mosul or Iraqi from Baghdad. 
 
Shatha believed that the only way to resolve sectarian tensions is to have a 
powerful figure like Saddam Hussein. Her privilege, emanating from a 
Sunni sect, made her unaware of Saddam’s mistreatment of marginalized 
groups. According to her: 
 
although Saddam was tenacious, he governed Iraq and the Iraqi 
people […] He controlled. Iraqi society has several different sects. 
All these sects have their own ideas and loyalties. […] Saddam 




By contrast, she considers that the current Iraqi government as well as the 
media are to blame for allowing sectarianism to flourish: 
 
The Iraqi government created sectarianism […] The Arabic media 
are playing mind games. The news would report that X side of Iraq 
has bombed X side of Iraq. These kinds of reports fill people’s 
thoughts with sectarianism. 
 
Interestingly, it is not only my Sunni respondents who viewed the era of 
Saddam Hussein in a more positive light compared with the present. Ruby, a 
Christian, told me, ‘The only thing we liked about Saddam is that he made 
us live in safety during his time. He did not harm Christians; once Saddam 
was gone, Christians all left [Iraq]’. Indeed, at the time of our interview 
Ruby was residing in Amman, waiting to emigrate to Australia to join her 
husband. Bushra, a Shia woman, who spoke of oppression under Saddam 
Hussein, also expressed her view that insecurity has magnified rather than 
reduced since the US invasion:  
 
We used to have one enemy [Saddam] and we knew that he caused 
havoc. I left Iraq for this very reason. I used to think that once 
Saddam is eliminated I can return to Iraq. Now Saddam has gone, I 
still cannot return.  
 
Bushra expressed nostalgia for her home city, Baghdad, prior to the US 
invasion:  
 
Despite the wars we fought and despite Saddam’s control over us, 
Baghdad still existed as a vibrant city […] I visited Baghdad after 
Saddam’s downfall, not Baghdad’s downfall. I do not like to say it 
because in my opinion the regime might fall but Baghdad will never 
fall. As soon as I arrived near the Iraqi borders I started crying all 
the way home […] it was disturbing. My children would ask me why 
are you taking us here? I would reply this is our country and home 
[…] I wanted to describe them the Iraq I once knew. 
 
Meanwhile, Iraqi women from ethno-religious minorities were less likely to 
strongly identify with Iraq, past or present, due to longstanding religious 
intolerance, including under Saddam Hussein. For example, Kawther, who 
is a Sabaean woman, told me, ‘we were exposed to sectarian tensions. They 
[other Iraqis] would tell us ‘you are infidels and don’t have a religion’’. She 
and her husband left their homes and jobs to escape persecution. Similarly, 
Khadeeja, also a Sabaean, also spoke about the religious intolerance that she 
faced growing up before 2003. When Khadeeja performed an ablution for 
prayer by a river, people would throw stones, ‘they would call us infidels, 
people without a prophet and a book, [that] we needed to convert’. She feels 
terrorised by her fellow Iraqis: 
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Even during our school days they tormented us. We weren’t allowed 
to drink water. We weren’t allowed to sit on chairs. I had to sit on 
the floor outside the classroom. In Islamic studies class they would 
kick us out. They would say “you’re Sabaeans, don’t sit amongst 
us”. They tried to force us to convert by making us read the Shahada 
[the Muslim profession of faith]. They would tell us to become 
Muslim and become part of us.  
 
Khadeeja says simply that, as a persecuted minority, ‘life before and after 
the 2003 Iraq War remains unchanged’: 
 
We did not come across good-natured Iraqis. Americans can’t speak 
our language, so we never had any conversations with them to know 
whether they have good or bad intentions. The terror mostly comes 
from Iraqis and not Americans. 
 
Kawther, by contrast, does differentiate between the period before and after 
2003, asserting that, while ‘Saddam’s reign, on the one hand used weapons 
in wars which were hazardous to one’s health [...] on the other hand, 
Saddam offered us security and order which prevented sectarian tensions 
from arising. Everything fell apart after the 2003 war’.  
 
Several of the interviewees resisted sectarianism without necessarily 
expressing nostalgia for Saddam Hussein but through narrating their 
solidarity with women of other sects. Tala, for instance, expressed sympathy 
for fellow Christian-Iraqis who have been targeted by Daesh: 
 
Yes, it had an impact on me. They have raped women. They would 
enter their homes and kill them. They are not merciful; you don’t feel 
that they carry mercy in their hearts. They would enter their homes 
and rape women, especially Christians, these poor people. Just 
because they are Christian? They are human too. God created them 
and created us. 
 
Similarly, Shayma told me: 
 
Daesh was formed through exploiting sectarian and ethnic tensions 
between Sunnis and Shias, Kurds, Yazidi, Christians, Arabs and so 
forth. Yes, I live in a safe area but I have friends in Mosul and family 
in Tikrit, the whole of Iraq is one big family. The whole world has 
become a small village but I consider Iraq our home. I suffer when I 
see a fellow Iraqi suffer or an Iraqi woman being sold off in markets. 
How can that not affect me as a woman and as an Iraqi? Even if 
she’s a Yazidi, she’s to me my sister, if she’s a Christian, she’s to me 
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my sister. I grew up and spent my childhood living amongst 
Christians in a church despite being a Muslim. 
 
Even whilst complaining about the rise in sectarianism, some women 
expressed sectarian attitudes themselves, which appear to have emerged as a 
response to the US invasion. For example, Hanady said: 
 
Saddam had good and bad qualities just like any other leader. He 
served the interest of Ba’athists. Anyone who spoke against the 
government or Saddam, would have been killed – him and his family 
[…] He prevented us from traveling and made us enter battles. 
There was no mobiles or satellites. People were isolated from the 
rest of the world. Regardless of all this, he used to cherish Arabs and 
Iraqis. When he left, Iranians governed us. They dishonoured us. 
They are loyal to Iran […] Americans brought them. 
 
Hanady, a Sunni Muslim, clearly identifies with Arabs and Iraqis and seems 
to allude to the idea that the Iraqi Shia, who have dominated the government 
since the parliamentary elections of 2005, are not real Iraqis. This point 
relates to Maria Stern’s (2006) argument about the paradox of security. That 
is, the manners in which desiring security for oneself can produce a negative 
outcome for others, and how this is often relates to the desire to fix the 
boundaries of ‘who we are’:  
 
when people attempt to protect themselves and to create a sense of 
security, they also produce danger, fear and harm. Furthermore, 
people seek security in direct relation to who they are – sometimes 
with devastating consequences. Attempts to secure a notion of ‘who 
we are’ invite violence when these notions are not shared by 
members of the community in question, when ‘who we are’ must be 
forcibly instilled through disciplinary tactics, when ‘who we are’ 
also depends on belligerently defining and even killing ‘who we are 
not’ (Stern, 2006 p. 189). 
 
Sameera, who is also Sunni, expressed feelings of victimization by the Shia 
by narrating an example of a Sunni woman who was not granted support 
from a governmental organisation:  
 
They are favouring Shias when Shia make up the majority of the 
country […] There’s a Sunni woman whose husband was killed 
because he was an educated Sunni. The woman has his death 
certificate and proof that her son was killed as well. Yet the UNHCR 
[United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] has dismissed 
her story.  
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Several women identified the gender-specific ways that they were impacted 
by sectarianism. As ‘markers’ of the collective, women have been singled 
out in particularly gendered ways. This includes Ruby who as a Christian 
minority felt increasingly under pressure to comply with a strict Islamic 
dress code:  
 
I applied to study radiology. I live in Qaraqosh but I had to travel to 
Mosul to attended classes. This happened around 2007, 2008. I was 
forced to wear the hijab in order to travel to Mosul. I was on the bus 
and there were people that got on it and gave us a warning. Any 
Christian refusing to wear the hijab will be killed. I would wear the 
veil if I had to go to Mosul and discard it when I am back in my 
area. Long skirts and shirts are compulsory. 
 
Similarly, Khadeeja, a Sabaean woman, was also forced to wear the hijab, 
but this was prior to 2003. She described this as ‘suffocating’. By contrast, 
Aisha, who wore the ‘niqab’ (full face veil) long before the 2003 invasion, 
told me that she now prefers to travel to Iraq without the niqab as she fears 
becoming a target: ‘Sunni women wear a niqab differently from Shias, 
making me easily identifiable’. This points to how one person’s insecurity 
can be another person’s security. For instance, one woman felt imprisoned 
by the veil, while the other felt denied the right to don it, confirming the 
necessity of understanding context and one’s identity. 
 
Most of the interviewees recognized that sectarianism had increased since 
2003, although they did not necessarily agree on the reasons for this. The 
increase in sectarianism has led to feelings of insecurity. For the most part, 
this insecurity is not narrated as a direct physical threat but rather as a threat 
to the Iraqi nation and Iraqi national identity. In some cases, women 
narrated the gender-specific ways in which they were targeted by 
sectarianism, particularly those women of religious minorities. Most women 
lamented the disintegration of a strong Iraqi identity at the expense of a rise 
in sectarian and ethnic identities. In other words, many of the interviewees 
narrated security and insecurity in relation to their identification with Iraq 
and a united Iraqi identity. In several cases, they preferred what they 
perceived as a strong and stable Iraq under a brutal dictator to a fragmented 
and insecure Iraq under a freely elected government. For women belonging 
to religious minorities, the sense of identification with Iraq was not strong as 
they did not feel that they ever were truly safe in Iraq, whether before or 
after 2003. In addition, some of my Sunni interviewees experienced the US-
led invasion and its aftermath as an attack on the Sunni community and, in 
response, expressed sectarian attitudes themselves towards other Iraqis. This 
suggests the ways in which security and identity are mutually constitutive. 
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The Threat of Daesh 
There was a general consensus amongst the interviewees that the rise of 
Daesh was very negative for Iraq and Iraqis. Some women presented this 
threat as particularly aimed at their own religious sect. For example, 
Kawther, a Sabaean, perceived that non-Muslims are particularly targeted:  
 
The reason why Daesh exists is to create a united Islamic country, I 
presume […] the spread of Daesh affected me because according to 
them I’m an infidel […] some schools don’t allow my daughters to 
sit next to other students simply for being Sabaeans. 
 
By contrast, Hanady, a Sunni—the same sect as Daesh—regards their 
principal target as being fellow Sunnis: ‘It’s a game they are playing in 
order to end Sunnis in Iraq. All the areas they are taking over are Sunni: 
Mosul, Al-Hawija, Tikrit’. Similarly, Heba believes that Sunnis have been 
particularly affected by Daesh: 
 
Islamic State first made us feel they were here to protect Sunnis […] 
but they killed us [Sunnis] and made us homeless, took our 
belongings […] They turned others against us. The Shia would say 
you are siding with them [Daesh] so we’re going to kill you [...] 
Saudi Arabia did not take up any good position. 
 
Her reference to Saudi Arabia suggests that, as a majority-Sunni country, it 
should have protected Sunnis from Daesh. 
 
Samantha believed that Christians are more exposed than others: ‘They 
[Daesh] just appeared in our areas and as Christians we were given three 
conditions to fulfil. One, to convert to Islam and two, to pay Jizya [a form of 
tax imposed on non-Muslims]’. Samantha did not mention the third 
condition. Nevertheless, she does not see the threat from Daesh as merely to 
Christians: ‘even Muslim areas were subjected to Daesh’s cruelty. Daesh’s 
presence forced us into exile. It’s the worst war we experienced’. She thus 
viewed Daesh as, in some manner, a unifying experiential part of being Iraqi 
that overrides sectarianism. Similarly, Ruby, a Christian, began by speaking 
of her own ordeal with Daesh: 
 
Daesh directly threatened me while I was at work in my clinic. […] 
It used to be safe because it was protected by the Kurds. I examined 
a woman wearing a niqab who was pregnant. When I was done 
examining her, she told me: I know there’s nothing wrong with me. I 
am sent by the Islamic State to convey a message. My heart was 
pounding […] We are not allowed to refer to them as Daesh. They 
are called the Islamic State. [She said] I was sent by the Islamic 
state to demand that you convert. I know your husband is not here 
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and he travelled to the land of the Kuffar [infidels] and you too are 
Kaffra [female infidel], if you do not convert, we will take you and 
your daughters away. And this was not the first time I received this 
kind of threat [but it was indirect before then]. She was Iraqi and 
her husband was outside the clinic holding a weapon. I had to say 
‘Inshallah’ [if Allah wills] to her. I was not allowed to say ‘okay’. I 
really just wanted her to leave. 
 
Ruby experienced Daesh’s brutal approach first-hand after the Kurds could 
no longer protect her—notably, the Daesh member threatened to take her 
daughters away but not her sons or any male family member. She also spoke 
of the impact of Daesh on Iraqis other than Christians: 
 
My Muslim friend [whom] I told you about. We did not discriminate 
against each other. She lives in Mosul and told me that she lived in a 
dire condition. She said, ‘they not only forced us to wear the niqab 
but we always need to be chaperoned. We weren’t allowed to go out 
alone’. She told me about the possibility that as a doctor she would 
have to perform female genital mutilation. I told her God help you. 
 
Thus, Daesh is viewed as a threat to community security—however, 
different women defined that community in different ways. Some 
emphasized the threat to their own religious sect, whilst a few believed that 
Daesh was a threat to all Iraqis, irrespective of religious sect. Again, this 
suggests how insecurity and identity are mutually constitutive. ‘Securing 
something requires its identification’ (Wibben, 2011, p. 105), but, 




In their narratives, many interviewees expressed a sense of insecurity 
because of a perception that Iraqi values and traditions, which were often 
equated with women’s roles and behaviours, were being eroded. The 
reference to women’s behaviour is reflective of the almost universal 
phenomenon that women are considered the symbolic markers of the nation 
and its cultural and biological reproducers (Yuval-Davis, 2004, p. 170). 
Many women expressed an opinion—in tension with liberal feminism—that 
women should uphold ‘traditional’ Arab or Iraqi values, which were in 
danger of being lost, in order to preserve Iraq’s cultural heritage and 
identity. In this light, ‘traditional’ gender norms were constructed as a 
solution to the fragmentation of and conflict within Iraq.  
 
Iraqi women’s security was widely represented as compromised by the 
transgression of traditional Iraqi values as a result of the post-invasion 
influx of foreign organisations and personnel, with ‘Western attitudes’ 
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imposed artificially. Asra expressed insecurity as a result of what she felt 
was a cultural invasion by the US: 
 
We became foreign. It was an American occupation. I was foreign in 
my own country. And we are not use to foreigners in our country. 
It’s like I am not in my country. Their faces are different. That was 
difficult for us. 
 
Iman feels that the ‘openness’, or ‘Al-infitah’ as she refers to it, emanating 
from the invasion has caused social problems such as pervasive drug use: 
 
The openness muddled the Iraqi woman. They [US] created a gap 
between their lives before […] Overnight their lives have changed. 
[…] Before, the openness, Iraq is the only country in the world that 
had no drugs and drug use was not pervasive. Currently, I can’t say 
how widespread it is but the openness made it [drug use] more 
prevalent. 
 
Similarly, Aisha said: 
 
Freedom is out of control in Iraq. Americans brought technology 
without education. Girls are on Facebook and WhatsApp and it’s 
seen as a negative influence […] A girl adds one hundred men and 
wouldn’t know whether it is right or wrong to talk to these random 
men. She might have good intentions while the man doesn’t. 
 
Some women expressed the view that women have a unique role as 
upholders of traditional values and preservers of Iraq’s cultural heritage, in 
resistance to cultural erosion. For example, Kawther declared that a 
woman’s rights and privileges ‘need to all fall within the boundaries of 
moral values which Arabs are known for doing’. Some Iraqi women 
constructed ‘traditions’ with reference to religion. For example, Asra 
believed that women’s role must not exceed the boundaries of Islamic 
practice and tradition, ‘Personally, freedom for me and my daughters […] I 
don’t restrict them but it needs to be within the boundaries of Islamic 
practice and traditions’. In this way, Iraqi women narrate community 
insecurity in relation to changing gender relations and thereby view the 
solution as a need for women to ‘return’ to ‘traditional’ values, by limiting 
their freedom. This highlights the paradoxical relationship between 
victimhood and agency, when viewed within a liberal feminist framework. 
However, not all women endorsed ‘traditional’ gender norms. Dalal 
believed that ‘freedom is limitless’, implicitly unbound by any traditions, 
desiring ‘freedom of expression, in order for women to express their inner 
thoughts and feelings. Domestic freedom and work. Everything really’.  
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Not all Iraqi women narrated cultural erosion in terms of gender roles but as 
a general deterioration in the human capital of Iraq. For example, some 
women emphasized the declining educational standards. Shayma argued that 
prior to the 2003 invasion, ‘we had laws in place which ensured that 
children attended school. If a child were truant from school then his/her 
parents would be held accountable. This is not the case anymore’. Kawther 
similarly explained that ‘the level of education has dropped and children do 
not attend school’. Meanwhile, according to Abeer: 
  
Iraqi men and women are in a state of limbo. It [the war] brought 
life to a halt. There’s no country or women for us to feel that we are 
advancing. Our universities are not able to compete on a world 
stage. Everyone is suffering except for politicians. 
 
On the other hand, Sameera complained that the US is taking over their food 
heritage: ‘we can’t even go to restaurants as you’ll find them [Americans] 
there. They [Americans] took everything from us, even our food’. 
Sameera’s comment on food reveals how she feels about the occupation. 
American presence in restaurants is a symbol of the American occupation 
itself as being ubiquitous. In contrast, most reports on the situation in Iraq 
after 2003 have focused on highlighting that the cost of food has increased, 
with an implication towards security. Sameera did not narrate food in 
relation to hunger or poverty, but rather discussed it in relation to 
community security and how Iraqi restaurants should be protected from 
Americans taking over Iraqi cultural life. 
 
On a slightly different note, Hanady was concerned with the destruction of 
Iraq’s physical heritage: ‘There is nothing left, even cultural sites were 
destroyed by Daesh. Museums are ransacked. Anything symbolic to Iraq is 
taken down. They [Daesh] want us to restart everything without a history or 
origin’. The loss of Iraq’s cultural sites, despite the fact that these sites are 
thousands of years old and were not built by the modern Iraqi state, 
nonetheless points to the significance of the appropriation of ancient history 
in nation building in terms of creating a unifying identity that bridges 
different sects. Eric Davis (2005, p. 111) highlights how the Ba’ath party 
attempted to rewrite Iraq’s history to create a single Iraqi identity which 
suppressed all other Iraqi identities: 
 
Through an emphasis on Iraq’s pre-Arab and pre-Islamic heritage-
which was symbolized by the choice of the Akkadian sun for the 
revolution’s flag and the use of ancient Mesopotamian designs for 
its symbol – the July 1958 Revolution eschewed the symbols of Pan-
Arabism such as the red, green, and black tricolour with its eagle 
insignia. The twin motifs of folklore and ancient Mesopotamian 
heritage served as counterweights to Pan-Arabists designs by 
underlining Iraq’s position as the ‘cradle of civilization: which 
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obviously preceded Arab sematic civilization. Further, folklore 
served to bridge the ethnic gap between Sunni and Shi’i Arabs and 
Kurds because it emphasized their cultural commonalities, such as 
food, rituals, sports and other leisure activities, rather than 
differences. 
 
Perceptions of communal insecurity were expressed in relation to the failure 
of the Iraqi state to provide security and the growth of non-state armed 
actors, principal amongst them being Daesh; the disintegration of a unified 
Iraqi identity; the primacy of ethno-religious identities; and the dilution of 
traditional values and culture. For the most part, women have responded to 
these communal insecurities by identifying with their sub-state identity, 
usually defined by religious sect, or through nostalgia for Saddam Hussein. 
It appears that there is no longer a unified Iraqi identity that may overcome 
sectarian cleavages, although several women expressed compassion for and 
empathy with other Iraqis who have been particularly targeted by Daesh. In 
addition, and in contrast to much of the feminist literature, several women 
viewed increasing freedoms for women as contributing to communal 
insecurity; they called for more limits on women’s freedoms as necessary 
not only for women’s personal security but for protecting national traditions 
and religious values. 
 
Economic security 
Many of the interviewees perceived that women in Iraq are economically 
insecure. Some women even prioritized the need for economic security. For 
example, Shayma asserted that ‘to be free, first and foremost, is to be safe, 
financially stable and to work’. Similarly, Dalal considers economic security 
in tandem with security more broadly:  
 
At this moment the Iraqi woman’s situation is deteriorating. In terms 
of security, I give it a rating of zero. There’s a sense of fear and 
terror. There’s no work, no freedom, no nothing.  
 
However, they viewed the implications of economic insecurity in different 
ways. In general, there was a different perception towards the economic 
insecurity of other women from low-income backgrounds versus the self-
experiences of economic insecurity amongst middle-class interviewees. In 
other words, class differences prevented the narrating of a unified Iraqi 
women’s experience with regards to economic security. 
 
A symbol of economic insecurity in Iraq and its particular gendered effects 
is the ‘Iraqi widow’: that is, Iraqi women whose husbands were killed 
during the US-led invasion and its aftermath. It is estimated there are over 
one million of these war widows (Al-Ali, 2010, p. 72). In her book on the 
Iraq War, Cynthia Enloe (2010, p. 63) described the hardship widows go 
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through, arguing, ‘Wartime widows simultaneously must navigate their 
country’s sexist inheritance laws, the bureaucratic red tape, and the not-
always-altruistic relatives’. While none of the interviewees were widows 
themselves, several expressed concern for widows and accused the 
government and international organisations of failing to protect these 
women. Shayma discussed the issue of widows extensively in order to 
demonstrate how their situation is deteriorating. She believes they are 
subject to greater suffering and insecurity than other women: 
 
There are 20,000 widows and divorcees out of work in my district 
alone. Widows receive 50,000 ID [Iraqi Dinar] [42.75 US Dollars at 
the time of the interview in April 2015] in monthly allowance and 
each child receives 40,000 ID [34.20 US Dollars at the time of the 
interview in April 2015] from the government. This adds up to 
approximately $200 for women with three children [sic!].  
 
The situations of Iraqi widows as well as other women from low-income 
backgrounds were discussed not only out of empathy for their plight but also 
as symbols of the plight of Iraq itself. For example, Sameera told me, ‘There 
are so many widows and orphans and the numbers are on the rise. UNHCR 
are cutting down Iraqis’ allowances and are transferring it over to Syrians’. 
Meanwhile, Shayma was concerned about how, out of poverty, such women 
were forced to send their children out to work and also to marry off their 
young daughters: ‘our country has more child marriages than Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen’. The negative comparison with Saudi Arabia and Yemen, 
considered more socially conservative countries, functions to highlight how 
Iraq is regressing. 
 
Similarly, Iman discussed increasing economic vulnerability for poor 
women since 2003 in order to highlight how bad things have become in Iraq 
in general: 
 
Before the invasion, there was safety. There are things that were 
available to [women]. Yes, they [women] had no income but you 
could find Iraqi products. You would not find poverty. Anyone who 
was very poor would receive food staples: rice, sugar and flour, all 
the basic food items. […] Now you can’t find food banks, it’s not 
available everywhere.  
 
Some women discussed the ways in which gender discrimination was 
preventing women from getting good jobs. For example, Shayma told me: 
‘please focus on this point Ms. Bidrea, a female civil engineer is refused 
employment because she’s female’. She also stated that, what employment 
was available is predominantly in the defence and security sectors, which 
preferred to hire men: ‘There aren’t any projects which would help foster 
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women’s development’. Ebtihal also perceived that women are 
discriminated against:  
 
The challenge women face is with employment. [Employers] don’t 
employ them and a lot of graduates are staying at home. If there are 
any vacancies you have to pay for them $700, $800 to get hired. Not 
every family can afford to pay it. 
 
She also highlights the intersection of gender and class and the extent to 
which class inequality in Iraq increases a woman’s economic insecurities. 
Hanady also stressed the economic situation affected women differently 
depending on their class background: 
 
My sister and her daughters are still in Iraq and they are able to go 
to work and university and their social life has not changed. But 
there are ones who were affected financially; they are the ones who 
are regressing. They do not have money to study or put their 
children in school.  
 
However, whilst the economic situation of women from poorer backgrounds 
was discussed predominantly in relation to their ability to carry out their 
social reproduction roles, middle-class women interviewees discussed their 
own economic situation predominantly in relation to their class status. Tala 
told me: 
 
My life changed [after the 2003 war] in terms of finances. It 
exhausted us psychologically and caused an impact on my children. 
Anything they desire I can’t provide. I wish I could work but my 
husband won’t allow me. The jobs that have been offered to me don’t 
match my level. A thing like being a hostess in funerals is a job 
similar to that of maids. He would not allow it. He says this is not 
your level. If I were offered an office job, he would allow it. I desire 
to work. If I had money I would create a business. 
 
In attempting to maintain their middle-class status, Tala’s husband prevents 
her from taking what is perceived to be an inferior job. Although Tala 
wishes to work, she does not criticize her husband, suggesting that she, too, 
values the maintenance of class status. Similarly, Ruby, who was a 
radiologist from a wealthy background, connects the loss of her job with a 
loss of status:  
 
I was an employed doctor and I used to receive an income […] I had 
two houses, one of which I worked on for 10 years. It was a villa. A 




Whilst, historically, education has been a route to upward social mobility, 
since 2003, this is no longer the case, as Ebtihal’s remarks demonstrate:  
 
I completed a doctorate to improve my children’s life conditions but 
after 2003 […] I studied for 35 years and I did not benefit from my 
qualifications. I have a son who’s an engineer who can’t find 
employment and another son who’s a police officer who is also 
without a job. My daughter migrated to Sweden and my son to 
America. My family is disunited. 
 
Moreover, Ebtihal was also forced to flee the wealthy neighbourhood in 
which she lived because of the sectarian violence that erupted after 2006: 
 
The biggest difficulty I faced was to move from my area, Al-
Adhamiyah, which was a pleasant and predominantly Sunni area, to 
a wholly Shia area, because my sons have Shia names, Omar, Ali 
and Mohammed, and it was safer for them to stay in a Shia area. 
 
It is understood here that the predominantly Shia neighbourhood was not as 
pleasant because it was poorer.  
 
Hanady also expressed a loss of status in relation to the war and violence in 
Iraq since 2003. She believes this has had a levelling effect in that Iraqis of 
all social classes were forced to flee, and she is rather contemptuous of this 
blurring of class hierarchies: 
 
The crisis caused Iraqis from different backgrounds to flee, the 
educated and the uneducated. Iraqis who have sought refuge in 
America, we call them Arab but they are not on our level, so of 
course we have a negative view of them. There are different divisions 
in societies. The ones who are like me are very different to the ones 
who go to America. The more sophisticated people prefer Jordan, 
England or Canada. But Americans are taking in the common 
people. I am not sure if they are deliberately doing this.  
 
However, other Iraqi women that I interviewed were more sympathetic 
towards less fortunate Iraqis. Several women who I interviewed who were 
from wealthier backgrounds were actively involved in charitable activities, 
such as raising money, to support Iraqi refugees in Jordan—many of whom 
find themselves in extremely precarious situations as discussed in previous 
chapters.  
 
The interviewees highlighted the significance of class in differentiating 
women’s perceptions of and experiences of economic insecurity. Feminist 
Security Studies literature often emphasizes the particularly gendered ways 
in which women are impacted by violence and conflict, particularly the 
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increased burden on their social reproductive roles. Women perceived 
economic insecurity as a threat to the social reproductive roles of poorer, 
less fortunate women, but not necessarily themselves. With regards to their 
own experiences of economic insecurity, this was mostly expressed in terms 
of a loss of status. Women responded to this loss of status in different ways. 
We can understand comments that are contemptuous towards Iraqis from 
poorer backgrounds as one way of maintaining class privilege. A contrasting 
way of maintaining class privilege is through involvement in charity work to 




The advantages of a feminist standpoint approach to understanding 
women’s concept of security 
The concept of human security often universalizes the meaning of security. 
A feminist standpoint epistemology together with a narrative approach has 
helped guard against this essentialization by empowering the individual to 
conceptualize their own meaning of security. Whilst all the interviewees 
desired security, each individual woman professed a different understanding 
of what constituted security.  
 
These findings highlight how prioritizing women’s voices by adopting a 
feminist standpoint theory approach can create new meaning which counters 
hegemonic knowledge about Iraqi women in order to contribute to the 
project’s main question: how have Iraqi women disrupted US dominant 
knowledge of Muslim women since 9/11? It is perhaps unsurprising that in 
inviting Iraqi women to narrate their own identities and experiences I found 
that security was a predominant, unifying concern. In a country rife with 
war, these women all portrayed a desire for stability and security. There is a 
common feeling among Iraqi women that the country’s instability has 
eradicated class hierarchies, led to a recurrence of restrictive gender roles, 
and diluted any nationalist collective agenda. Consequently, many 
individual women related their own personal identity to these broader 
issues, although each Iraqi woman has been affected by factors of 
nationality, class and gender differently, which makes their individual 
experiences unique.  
 
I have addressed the subsidiary question: How do narratives of Iraqi women 
reveal the relationship between security and identity? I approached the 
question by adopting a narrative approach, thus I was able to highlight Iraqi 
women’s self-identities and how these diverged from US assumptions that 
the fostering of women’s agency through initiatives for democracy is 
synonymous with security. Iraqi women instead seek security by identifying 
with collective, often sectarian, identities which may in turn perpetuate 
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rather than diminish the insecurities confronting Iraqi women. This does not 
indicate a lack of agency however; Iraqi women express agency through 
more nuanced and complicated positions than US narratives and indeed 
many scholars have allowed.  
 
This chapter deployed intersectionality in order to take into account their 
multivalent identities in relation to security and revealed that Iraqi women’s 
self-identities are constitutive of and constituted in relations to their 
perceptions of security. A standpoint approach helps us to pay attention to 
how women position themselves not only in terms of gender, but also in 
terms of class, religion, and ethnic background. Focusing on a single social 
marker—be it race, ethnicity or gender—leads to an impoverished 
understanding of security. This is because Iraqi women’s narratives suggest 
not only the importance of security at an individual and collective level, but 
also the ways in which gender intersects with other vectors of identity to 
produce different insecurities. This challenge any prioritization of gender in 
understanding women’s insecurity as well as any direct causal relationship 
between particular elements of identity and security.  
 
Thus, studying women’s perceptions of security using a narrative approach 
and intersectionality illuminated the different ways that women construct 
their identities in relation to different types of insecurity. For example, 
studying women’s economic insecurity also illuminated how the gap 
between the needs of women from middle class backgrounds and working-
class backgrounds is vast. Middle class women were concerned with 
establishing a high standard of living for themselves personally; this was 
often as important as the struggle to survive. The divide between low 
income and middle-class women points to the importance of 
contextualization. 
 
The relationship between agency, identity and security  
My findings extend the work of Maria Stern (2004) Annick Wibben (2011) 
on the link between agency and security. The interviewees constructed 
particular types of identities in relation to security threats. Many Iraqi 
women narrated shared Arab or Islamic values in order to counter foreign 
influences and instabilities. My findings highlight that identity and 
insecurity are mutually constitutive. I argue that communal security is 
indivisible from personal security. For example, ethno-religious minorities 
were less likely to feel nationalistic pride due to longstanding intolerance. 
Christians generally maintained a positive view of Saddam Hussein for 
providing security, because the Christian community felt safe under Saddam 
Hussein. With that Christian community now under threat and increasingly 
emigrating, their loyalty to Iraq has diminished. Iraqi Christians are instead 
often seeking solidarity with their co-religionists abroad. For Sabaeans, 
sectarian tensions are the norm in Iraq rather than a new phenomenon, and 
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feelings of alienation continue to exist. Therefore, they see no viable option 
but to emigrate. The aftermath of the invasion has especially heightened 
differences between Sunnis and Shias. Some Sunnis felt under threat from 
Shias and implicitly blamed foreign forces such as Daesh and Iran for 
supporting Shias to plot against wiping out Sunnis in Iraq. Shias, however, 
felt ostracised and are more likely to root their identity in an area other than 
Iraq, signalling their sense of marginalization.  
 
My study also reveals how some Iraqi women were shaped by their 
nostalgia. Romanticising the past has in some cases been a natural response 
to the insecurity and instability of the present. Sunni women were more 
likely to feel nostalgic nationalism because Saddam Hussein traditionally 
favoured them; they associate the emancipation of Iraqi women with the 
bygone regime. Minority groups who are often impoverished, however, are 
less likely to feel nostalgic. Generally speaking, most Iraqi women—even 
the ones who have acknowledged Saddam Hussein’s atrocities—look back 
at his rule with positivity, because they measure stability and peace by the 
level of security he provided. The predominant trend to nostalgia is an 
implicit condemnation of all that followed. 
 
The sense of divergent collectives with different understandings of 
nationalism and its insecurities is reflected in different proposed solutions. 
Some Sunnis maintain that to resolve sectarian tensions a powerful leader 
like Saddam Hussein, an autocrat who will not allow sectarian tensions to 
surface, is required. These sectarian tensions and opposing collectives have 
in some senses fragmented Iraqis into insulate sub-groups which self-
support rather than rely on, or trust, the state. A suspicion of the nationalist 
project was strikingly pervasive across the interviewees.  
 
My findings also challenged the feminist idea that all women desire freedom 
from patriarchy. For many of the interviewees, the freedoms they sought 
were negotiated within the securities of patriarchy. At points, some Iraqi 
women narrated instances of opposing gender norms in pursuit of freedom, 
but at other points they desired to protect the very traditions that restrict 
women’s freedoms. As women, they believed they had an obligation to 
preserve Iraqi tradition and pass down their values onto the next generation. 
As a result, they found it necessary to give up some of their freedoms in 
order to maintain social order. The Iraqi women I interviewed were in the 
main fully cognisant of such principles; within their situation however, 
agency was expressed by creating security for oneself rather than adhering 
to abstract principles or defying normative behaviour.  
 
My findings also highlight the need to consider studying class in relation to 
security. Iraqi women have expressed their class identity by narrating issues 
of economic insecurity. Middle class women have expressed insecurities 
about losing their social status due to the conflict. Awareness of class 
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division has helped mobilize middle class women in aiding less fortunate 
Iraqi women through charitable means.  This often comes as a way of 
expressing their class status and feeling empowered. These findings suggest 
that the gap between working class women’s and middle-class women’s 
insecurities has prevented them from narrating a shared experience.   
Recently, there has been little research in Feminist Security Studies which 
has explored how class differences shape women’s experiences of post 
conflict differently. 
 
I have closely studied the link between security and agency, and in my 
thesis’s conclusion, I will compare the agencies of Iraqi women in both 
these substantive chapters and where we need to go from there. 
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Conclusion: Reflections and Recommendations 
 
My ambitions are not to speak for […] women or to generalize from 
the discourses of in/security-identity, but to pose questions around 
in/security identity from reading their narratives as valid texts of 
global politics (Stern, 2005, p. 56). 
 
The thesis has heeded Stern’s advice by adopting standpoint theory as its 
epistemological underpinning to highlight Iraqi women’s experiences as 
knowledge of International Politics. The present work included carrying out 
in-depth empirical research with Iraqi women in order to generate an 
original dataset of interviews. The aim of these interviews was to capture 
women’s positionalities in relation to US foreign policy narratives and their 
experiences of insecurity after the US-led invasion of Iraq. To that end, I 
deployed the method of narrative analysis and a feminist and postcolonial 
theoretical framework to produce alternative knowledge.  
 
The core argument advanced by my thesis is that a feminist standpoint 
theory approach enables us to understand women’s narratives as a source of 
alternative knowledge production, which, in turn, can challenge the binary 
and essentializing assumptions underpinning dominant knowledge about 
marginalized women, in this project’s case, Iraqi women. This core 
argument challenges the frameworks of postcolonial feminist theorists 
working on the representation of Muslim women since 9/11 who have 
tended to focus more on studying hegemonic knowledge. It also extends the 
work of Feminist Security Studies scholars researching women in conflict or 
marginalized women by highlighting the importance of an intersectionality.  
 
Existing studies of US representations of Muslim women since 9/11 have 
almost entirely excluded the positionalities and responses of the women in 
question; those studies that do include these responses virtually never do so 
in any meaningfully systematic fashion, or they reduce their positionalities 
to an entirely oppositional stance. The diverse experiences of these women 
have thus gone unacknowledged in the literature, leaving Iraqi women’s 
narratives unheard, their agencies misunderstood, and continuing the 
propagation of essentializing binaries. This has led in some cases to a 
serious limitation of knowledge about their experiences and agency. 
 
Moreover, existing studies that examine Iraqi women’s situation in Iraq lack 
theorization of their security situation. Feminist Security Studies scholars 
who are concerned with questions of security have mostly focused on 
gendered violence and thus lack nuance on the many types of violence that 
could be manifested in a woman’s experience of (post-) conflict. In all 
cases, studies dealing with Iraqi women in conflict situations have rarely 
considered women’s agency in relation to their experiences of conflict; this 
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leaves us with an impoverished understanding of Iraqi women’s lived 
experiences. 
 
The present project has extended postcolonial feminist studies of women’s 
agency in representation studies by emphasizing the importance of 
highlighting women’s positionalities in relation to hegemonic knowledge 
about them, in order to highlight their agency and destabilise Orientalist 
binary oppositions. I have also extended Feminist Security Studies by taking 
a more intersectional approach to security, in order to correct the tendency 
of merely focusing on gendered analysis of violence and discounting 
cultural context. Understanding women’s agency through examining Iraqi 
women’s intersectional identity in relation to their insecurities has facilitated 
this project’s aims to develop the concept of security. 
 
The following section will discuss my research findings in relation to my 
research questions. I first discuss the findings of Chapter Three, examining 
the positionalities of Iraqi women towards US narratives about women in 
Iraq and the Middle East since 9/11, particularly highlighting the concept of 
agency and power relations. I then discuss my findings of Iraqi women’s 
experiences of (post-) conflict. I will also discuss the wider implication of 
these findings to the fields of Feminist IR, IR, Security Studies and Feminist 
Security Studies. Lastly, I offer concluding remarks for possible directions 
that future studies can take. With respect to this, I focus on issues of 
identity, agency and security of women in (post-) conflict situations. 
 
Re-conceptualizing agency in relation to positionality 
This thesis has demonstrated that in order to fully understand 
representations of Muslim women, we must incorporate the voices of the 
women in question and engage more with the act of listening to their voices, 
as advocated by Spivak (1988). This is a core postcolonial feminist tenant, 
yet it has been largely ignored in the postcolonial feminist literature dealing 
with the representation of Muslim women since 9/11. Drawing on a feminist 
standpoint epistemology, this research sought to bridge this gap by 
foregrounding the narratives of Iraqi women and treating these as sources of 
alternative knowledge. These findings have also complicated power 
relations between Iraqi women’s knowledge production and US hegemonic 
knowledge. This thesis has made a number of contributions in relation to 
agency and knowledge production. Notably, my project has moved away 
from binaries and complicated the idea of agency. I have also illustrated 
how the prioritization of alternative knowledge has led to understanding 
power relations in complex ways. More specifically, I have built on the 
works of Gayatri Spivak (1988) regarding listening to subaltern women’s 
voices, Stuart Hall (1973) on encoding/decoding, Patricia Hill-Collins 
(1990) on intersectionality, and Fernando Coronil (1996) on Occidentalism. 
This has allowed me to develop a systematic approach to highlighting 
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alternative knowledge as a way of challenging dominant knowledge—this 
has resulted in generative, unexpected new findings. 
 
This thesis has argued that studying Iraqi women’s positionalities in relation 
to US narratives about them has revealed a complex relationship that 
supports as well as contests elements of their representation. Scholars in the 
mainstream have strongly endorsed Muslim women who oppose US 
narratives, arguing that US narratives have victimized them. I have 
countered this simplistic proposition by re-conceptualizing their agencies. In 
addition, I have drawn out theoretical points based on empirical research, 
rather than from abstraction, and thus have avoided predetermining 
women’s agencies.  
 
The call for complicating the concept of agency in relation to positionality 
may not be wholly welcomed by postcolonial feminist scholars who have 
traditionally considered agency to reside solely in oppositional positions. 
This is because many feminist scholars assume the oppositional is a stronger 
stance than others and the only one worth recognizing, if agency is to be 
effective in challenging Western narratives. My project has shown that 
taking this approach leads to bias and essentialization of women’s 
positionalities and experiences. For example, scholars such as Lila Abu 
Lughod (2002) and others have argued that ‘Muslim women do not need 
saving’, in order to make the claim that Muslim women resist US 
superiority and reject hegemonic representations of themselves. This is an 
inherently sweeping generalization based on assumptions that all Muslim 
women hold an oppositional stance. Thus, there is an implicit underlying 
assumption that an oppositional stance is the only authentic voice. This is a 
false premise, and scholars may have determined the authenticity of 
women’s position based on aligning it with their own anti-colonial stance. 
Further, scholars tend to attribute the idea of conforming to hegemonic 
position to soft power, dupes or puppets, not recognizing that such positions 
may be based on complex experiences. This can be regarded as an act of 
homogenization. For example, Spivak (1990, p. 56, my emphasis) once said: 
‘This is a white position [or this is a Muslim woman position], again you are 
homogenizing. I think there is safety in specificity rather than in those 
labels’. The problem with homogenizing Muslim women’s voices is that an 
‘us versus them’ binary perpetuates stereotypes and precludes individuals 
from exercising agency.  
 
These scholars’ narrow definition of agency suggests a reliance on methods 
that do not make possible a multiplicity of perspectives. It recognizes only 
certain behaviours and has overlooked the core feminist postcolonial tenets 
of ‘listening to’ and ‘speaking to’ women. Instead, if we are open to the idea 
of not creating boundaries around the idea of authenticity, we can begin to 
become more inclusive to diverse ideas of agency. While Sneja Gunew 
(1990, p. 56) gives the example of how hegemonic voices construct an 
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authentic voice of the migrant experience, this point also holds true for 
scholars who approach the representation of marginalized women by 
amplifying a single voice or an authentic voice:  
 
the whole notion of authenticity, of the authentic migrant experience, 
is one that comes to us constructed by hegemonic voices; and so, 
what one has to tease out is what is not there. One way of doing this 
(if one has knowledge from a particular culture), is to say: But look, 
this is what is left out, this is what is covered over; this kind of 
construction is taking place, this kind of reading is being privileged 
or, these series of readings are being privileged; and then to ask, 
What readings are not privileged, what is not there, what questions 
can’t be asked? 
 
In order to ask these kinds of questions, one must revise one’s 
methodological approach in a way that allows for pluralistic meanings to 
surface. Thus, if one is to effectively challenge binaries such as ‘us and 
them’, one must adopt a methodological approach that helps prioritize 
socially situated knowledge in order to capture a range of voices.  
 
Thus, my findings have demonstrated that reality is far more complicated 
than a simple narrative that most Muslim women resist US narratives and 
foreign policy. My findings have shown that individual women negotiated 
multiple positions depending on the issue. What does this mean? Women’s 
decoded positionalities demonstrate a wide spectrum of agency in relation to 
dominant power relations. Understanding their pluralistic positionalities has 
ultimately debunked the idea of a unifying singular ‘Iraqi women’ 
collective. Collectively, these interviews are illustrative of the degree to 
which highlighting individual narratives and the particularities of each 
women’s situation has undermined a collective Iraqi identity, let alone an 
Iraqi ‘sisterhood’. I thus argue that there is a need to recognize personal 
circumstances and to resist categorizing women. Such a homogenization 
diminishes their pluralistic agency and perpetuates the myth of solidarity. 
The idea that the concept of solidarity or sisterhood is a myth might surprise 
and even be rejected by some scholars who assume that marginalized 
women would unanimously resist hegemonic knowledge about themselves. 




Furthermore, my findings have demonstrated that it is essential to highlight 
Iraqi women’s negotiated positions for a multiplicity of reasons. 
Highlighting these negotiated positions has allowed me to identify the 
discrepancies between, and ambiguities within, Iraqi women’s narratives. 
These narratives have helped to destabilize meaning and break down 
binaries, as a negotiated position neither wholly agrees with a particular US 
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narrative nor wholly disagrees with it. Their negotiated positions have 
identified cracks in both hegemonic and oppositional positions and capture 
fluidity in meaning. This has created an in between space which allows for 
new meanings to arise.  
  
Further, highlighting the abstention position has amplified my goal of 
capturing pluralistic accounts of women’s experiences. I have argued that 
abstaining from responding to a question is a position in and of itself—if an 
individual decides not to take a position, this necessarily involves a motive 
for doing so. Abstention in the case of the interviewees may connect to the 
fear of talking about Others, because they felt more comfortable discussing 
their own situation. My findings have shown that women from minority 
backgrounds often adopt this position because they wish to remain apolitical 
with regards to highly politicised topics. In my research, I have also 
demonstrated that the abstention position can be regarded as a form of 
agency. I have argued that my findings extend Lene Hansen’s theory of 
‘security as silence’, as I have shown that an abstention position can be a 
tool for resistance to a perceived threat. 
 
These observations have led us to the crucial question: what does studying 
Iraqi women’s positionalities tell us about the relationship between power 
relations and knowledge production? By adopting Stuart Hall’s 
encoding/decoding theory and deploying Occidentalism as a supplemental 
theory, I have demonstrated that even a hegemonic position is an agential 
position and not a passive acceptance of hegemonic narratives. I have 
argued that treating decoding positionalities as an Occidental response 
challenges Said’s Orientalism, which perceives the relationship between 
East and West in binary terms. 
 
Thus, Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding theory has been employed to help 
demonstrate that US hegemonic knowledge can be interpreted in a number 
of ways. This in turn has shown that US hegemonic power does not 
determine how individuals understand US narratives. Individuals may alter 
these narratives in a way that empowers them and amplifies their own 
stances. This includes adopting a hegemonic stance, which they often 
highlighted to embellish their identity as positive and progressive. In this 
respect, my project has contributed to the dismantling of the binary of 
powerful v powerless. Studying women’s positionalities therefore 
complicates the way in which we view hegemonic knowledge not as a one-
way power relation. 
 
Perhaps the most surprising finding in this work is that women were largely 
unaware of US representations of themselves, nor were they particularly 
concerned about them. Nearly all of the interviewees did not wish to spend 
substantial time discussing representations of themselves. Instead, security 
was what mattered to them. 
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The implications of studying narratives of identity and security 
Following on from the alternative knowledge approach to understanding 
women’s agency, this thesis has also considered Iraqi women’s narratives of 
their experiences of war, conflict, violence and displacement since 2003 in 
relation to their identities.  
 
My study has drawn on theories of human security and Feminist Security 
Studies to demonstrate there is a need for conceptualising the notion of 
security with a more intersectional narrative approach, in order to study the 
relationship between women’s identities and security. By taking an 
intersectional narrative security approach, I have been able to highlight the 
meaning of security for these women and the differences amongst women in 
terms of perceptions of insecurity. I have demonstrated that their narratives 
operated on a very different basis from those of US politicians.  
 
My research has revealed three main security areas which Iraqi women have 
highlighted, these are: personal security, community security and economic 
security. I shall discuss the general trends and the implications for how we 
understand the relationship between identity and security for Feminist 
Security Studies, Security Studies, Feminist IR, and IR in general. 
 
Regarding the interviewees’ personal security, they viewed it as declining 
since 2003 due to the US occupation, as well as the rise of paramilitaries, 
Islamist parties, Daesh, and the break down in law and order. The 
interviewees’ narratives highlighted the different types of gendered-based 
violence such as forced veiling, forced marriage rape, and restriction on 
mobility which had their own cultural particularities.  These could not be 
fully understood if we were to examine this merely by deploying a gendered 
analysis. For example, Sameera, one of my interviewees, discussed how 
Americans desired to have sexual relationships with Iraqi women. Sameera 
explained that she wholeheartedly accepted her husband’s decision to 
exercise his dominance in preventing her from leaving the house, so as to 
avoid contact with Americans. This finding demonstrates that, without 
understanding women’s cultural specificity, we risk wrongly assuming that 
such restrictions on mobility cause her insecurity. The reality is that 
Sameera views this as providing her with security. 
 
Iraqi women I interviewed were generally more concerned about 
community security than personal security. These narratives were informed 
by the intersections of national, religious, ethnic and gender identities. Iraqi 
women were affected by the rise of sectarianism, and most Iraqi women 
narrated community security not as a direct physical threat of sectarianism 
but as loss of identity. For example, some women mourned the loss of 
Saddam Hussein, who they perceived to be an effective community leader 
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that provided them with a sense of community security—this is true for 
Sunni women especially as he protected Sunnis under his reign. With this 
protection gone, Sunnis have expressed some sectarian tensions towards 
other groups. However, the vast majority of minorities I interviewed did not 
share this view. This finding confirmed Maria Stern’s argument about the 
paradox of security, and more specifically about securing identity and how a 
notion of ‘who we are’ invites violence when these notions are not shared 
by members of other communities.  
 
Some women discussed the erosion of cultural sites, or public spaces, as a 
loss of national identity. It is best to understand national identity as: 
 
a relational term whose identity derives from its inherence in a 
system of differences. In the same way that ‘man and woman’ define 
themselves reciprocally (though never symmetrically) national 
identity is determined not on the basis of its own intrinsic properties, 
but as a function of what it (presumably) is not. Implying ‘some 
element of alterity for its definition’ a nation is ineluctably shaped 
by what it opposes (Peterson, 1992, p. 5). 
 
Thus, highlighting nationality and sectarianism in this way is a prompt for 
how we reflect on women’s insecurities. For instance, the interviewees 
frequently narrated a sense of a collective identity informed not by gender, 
but by sect and/or religion; women were united not with all other women, 
but with other women from the same ethnic or religious group. This again 
was underscored by concerns of security. Collective identities that 
encouraged mutual support generated a sense of security, as well as 
empowerment, but these formed along sectarian lines, because insecurities 
tended to reflect and stem from such divisions. Intersectionality thus opened 
up the narratives of Iraqi women to reveal multiple influences and to 
broaden the representations available to them.  
 
My findings have also demonstrated that economic insecurity has affected 
women from middle classes differently to women who come from 
impoverished backgrounds. However, middle class women highlighted 
poorer women’s economic insecurities. One example of a narrative that 
middle class women highlighted is the issue of mothers who were forced to 
send their children to work or marry them young, as they were too poor to 
look after them. 
 
The way in which middle class women perceive their own economic 
insecurities is linked to the insecurity of the loss of class status. Often 
preserving social positioning was an underlying concern for women who 
discussed economic insecurities. Several Iraqi women expressed an 
obligation to support less privileged or more unfortunate women, 
highlighting an awareness of differences in class and status. Middle class 
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women narrated how they have helped women, which they sometimes did as 
a way to maintain their own class identity. This also reiterates a sense of 
independence from US aid—Iraqi women are often mutually supportive. 
There is evidence of favouritism when it comes to providing aid, however. 
Muslims largely support Muslims and Christians only reach out to other 
Christians. Sabaeans, however, do not have that network of support to fall 
back on due to their few numbers. This has prevented Iraqi women from 
identifying a unifying narrative. My study shows that studying economic 
security can be an illuminating way of understanding women’s experiences 
and class backgrounds. The theme of economic security in relation to 
women’s experiences in a (post-) conflict context is underappreciated in 
Feminist Security Studies. 
 
These findings about personal, economic, and communal security confirms 
Maria Stern’s argument that identity and security are mutually constitutive, 
as who women say they are, shapes their insecurities. I also extend Stern’s 
study by considering the relationship between identity and security in a 
different context than her study.  
 
The particular context of women’s experiences of the 2003 US-led invasion 
of Iraq has complicated the idea of identity in relation to security in a 
number of ways. I have demonstrated that many view communal security as 
indivisible from personal security, and middle-class women’s concerns 
differed greatly from working class women in the context of post-conflict 
experiences.  
 
My project shows that more studies need to consider incorporating class 
analysis for a richer understanding of social complexities within the context 
of a post-conflict experience. Moreover, a study which considers questions 
of class without regarding cultural context leads to impoverished 
knowledge. I argue that it is vital to adopt an intersectional approach which 
is mindful of a ‘different kind of differences’, as advocated by Yuval Davis 
(2006) and Harding (1997). I agree with their argument that ignoring 
women’s cultural context when studying social differences will lead to 
partial knowledge and risks homogenizing women’s experiences.  
 
Re-conceptualizing agency in relation to security 
My project has also contributed to the idea of complicating agency in 
relation to security. For example, I have found that Iraqi women felt secure 
in their traditional and very restrictive gender roles. Many Iraqi women 
advocated the importance of maintaining traditional values and upholding 
patriarchal structures, as they evoked or enforced security. They were not 
interested in seeking liberty from patriarchy. This runs contrary to 
mainstream feminist scholarship and is therefore overlooked in much of the 
literature. Feminist scholars’ understanding of agency advocates that it must 
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only seek freedom from patriarchy. Scholars might perceive women who 
allow their husbands to restrict their mobility as a type of domestic violence, 
but such reading is a Western interpretation of another culture. We can 
better interpret women’s narratives in relation to context, if gender is not the 
only prism in which we analyse narratives and other social markers are 
given the same level of commitment in understanding one’s experience. The 
interviewees consistently found patriarchy to be useful in times of conflict. 
They sought protection and accepted chaperoning, and some even found it 
necessary to curtail their mobility for the sake of security and comfort. We 
must recognise that these Iraqi women have willingly accepted, even 
demanded, these impositions in order to pursue security. In the light of this, 
these decisions should be treated as agential and encourage the recognition 
of this agency.  
 
Another finding that my project has highlighted is how Iraqi women chose 
to exercise their agency in relation to nostalgia and memory. Many women 
recalled more secure times, such as under Saddam Hussein, and equated this 
with contentment. They perceived nostalgia as a tool for bringing a sense of 
security and comfort. Memory has served as a powerful tool for reshaping 
their past and future in order to cope with the loss of communal identity. 
This calls for more research into the study of memory and nostalgia as a 
form of security. Thus, I have extended the work of Wibben and Sterns by 
making the ways in which we think about agency more nuanced and by 
arguing for the need to take into account more contextual analysis. This is in 
order to more comprehensively understand the way in which we approach 
agency in relation to security.   
 
Wider implications and future studies on alternative knowledge of 
marginalized women  
Although this thesis has focused specifically on Iraqi women’s alternative 
knowledge in relation to US hegemonic knowledge, it has greater relevance 
to other marginalized women’s contexts. The findings of this study have 
ramifications, both in methodological approach and in the generation of new 
material, for scholars working within the field of IR, especially Feminist IR. 
It is intended to constitute a call for at least a partial revision of how we 
approach the representation of marginalized women, and more specifically, 
how we theorise agency and positionality.  
 
I shall offer insights into how my methodological approaches can benefit 
other studies which examine representations of marginalized women. My 
project has demonstrated that methodology matters, as it can yield very 
different results depending on what sets of approaches one takes. It is much 
less fruitful to prioritize dominant knowledge, if we are concerned about 
highlighting women’s voices, as prioritizing dominant knowledge could 
lead us to regurgitating this dominant knowledge and ‘speaking for women’. 
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For example, scholars attempting to prove that Muslim women are victims 
of US narratives do not necessarily liberate them from any victimization 
produced by US narratives, and so the argument becomes circular and 
reductive. To break this logic, we must operate from a different domain of 
knowledge by producing alternative knowledge.  
 
Prioritizing alternative knowledge can help scholars minimize assumptions 
made about other women by paying attention to context: 
 
Some themes like good wins over evil are common to many 
narratives but the way in which elements are ordered produces the 
aspects of a particular story, provides specific nuances of its 
meaning, and makes it distinguishable from all others. It is at the 
story level also that culturally specific, generalized knowledge 
begins to enter the interpretation, often producing (but at times also 
correcting) representational bias (Wibben, 2016, p. 63). 
 
An important framework to help us encapsulate alternative knowledge is a 
narrative approach, as it helps produce new meaning and enables the 
individual to be the central focus of study rather than peripheral or absent: 
 
narratives can be seen as “meaning-constructing activities,” instead 
of ‘meaning preserving’ ones. When one constructs a (semi)coherent 
story, certain meaning is imposed on the series of events and their 
connections. This meaning emerges through the act of narrating; it 
does not exist as some sort of pre-determined mold into which the 
events are poured. This is not to claim that the events did not mean 
certain things when they were experienced. However, the process of 
making connections, of developing a plot (or many plots) in a 
narrative of one’s life, fashions new meanings to these events—
meanings that make sense within that narrative. The spoken story 
must also be seen as an act of writing—and therewith invention—of 
not only the narrative, but also of the self as: character in narrative 
(textualized subject), and narrator. This story is constructed within 
many different relations of power (Stern-Pettersson, 1998, p. 6). 
 
I have demonstrated that studying alternative knowledge has challenged US 
hegemonic knowledge, as women’s narratives capture pluralistic meanings 
that open up different interpretations into how marginalized women 
perceive their representations, and thereby destabilize hegemonic 
knowledge. 
 
The danger of homogenizing marginalized women must be taken more 
seriously. This is because homogenizing marginalized women perpetuates 
epistemic violence as it violently precludes women from expressing their 
agency. We must recognize that epistemic violence not only operates on the 
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level of discourse but can also progress into other forms of violence. As 
Dana Cloud (2004, p. 300) notes: 
 
[The (mis) representations of Muslims] encouraged consent to 
repressive violence in the domestic arena (the policing of Arabs, 
Muslims, and dissenters under the Patriot Act) as well as abroad in 
acts of outright brutality that resulted in the deaths of many 
thousands of innocents.  
 
My thesis has demonstrated that it is important to address epistemic 
violence by enabling women to express their agency and explore the extent 
to which epistemic violence has impacted their lived experiences. An 
effective way to combat epistemic violence caused by hegemonic 
knowledge is recognize the value of women’s perspectives and experiences: 
 
epistemic practices (how we construct and disseminate knowledge) 
profoundly shape our understandings of events and issues—
therefore our capabilities to address them. It is not enough, however, 
to simply argue that the ‘feminist war’ frame had these effects, but it 
is important to ‘trace the ideological and material consequences of 
such representations’ (Wibben, 2016, p. 71). 
 
Tracing the ideological and material consequences of marginalized women’s 
representations can draw out the links between different types of violence: 
‘epistemic, physical, and structural violence shaping women’s lives’ 
(Wibben, 2016, p. 71). Therefore, the study of epistemic violence should not 
be considered as an isolated instance but as forming part of a ‘continuum of 
violence’. 
 
The case for more studies to consider alternative knowledge becomes 
apparent when considering the current political climate in the US and the 
portrayal of Muslim women under the Presidency of Donald Trump:  
 
President Donald Trump has also drawn upon the image of the 
oppressed Muslim woman to justify further intervention in Iraq and 
Syria. In his 2016 speech entitled “Understanding the Threat: 
Radical Islam and the Age of Terror,” Trump spoke of the 
“oppression of women . . . in many Muslim nations,” highlighting 
the practice of honour killings in Pakistan, but also suggesting that 
the practice has “reached our own shores.” These ideas were likely 
employed to shame President Obama for failing to have a stronger 
military presence in the Middle East and North Africa, which he 
seemed to equate with protecting Muslim women. President Trump 
has suggested policies like reinvading Iraq to keep the oil, indicating 
that his concern for Muslim women seems to be a thin veneer 
beneath which lies the same desire for plunder which has often 
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motivated representations of Muslim woman as helpless. Earlier in 
the campaign, Trump had drawn criticism for insinuating that 
Ghazala Khan, the mother of a slain Muslim-American soldier, was 
forbidden from speaking by her husband when they stood on stage at 
the Democratic National Convention (Markey, 2016, p. 1331). 
 
These homogenizing representations of Muslims are not just empty 
rhetoric—they have been institutionalized. Further, the ways in which 
scholars have discussed representations is reminiscent of studies that 
considered Muslim women’s portrayal in the context of ‘War on Terror’:  
 
In the United States, the two executive orders (EO) Donald Trump 
signed soon after his inauguration in 2017 officially sanctioned and 
legitimized discourse and policy against Muslims. Thinly disguised 
as actions that would give the government time to review and 
strengthen already very stringent policies regarding visas of tourists, 
immigrants, and refugees, the EOs clearly target Muslims, cast them 
as security threats, and attempt to implement Trump’s campaign 
promise for a complete “Muslim ban.” The anti-Muslim discourse 
and actions rely on and reproduce deeply gendered stereotypes 
about Muslims and Islam by depicting all Muslim men as potential 
terrorists, Muslim women as helpless victims of oppression, and 
Islam as inherently tyrannical, violent, and patriarchal (Gökariksel, 
2017, p. 469). 
 
It is not just the US that has portrayed marginalized women and men in 
reductive terms. If we turn our attention to Europe, we notice that refugees 
specifically are being represented in a reductive gendered and racialized 
manner: 
  
the claim that the Syrian refugees are primarily male is often 
repeated on #refugeesnotwelcome through images of men with text 
highlighting the absence of women and children. This emphasis on 
visual displays of male refugees is particularly strong following the 
extreme spread of images of drowned children on European beaches 
in august and September 2015. In contrast to mainstream media 
coverage of the war against Afghanistan and Iraq, in which the war 
was justified in part through an explicit focus on images of 
oppressed women, on #refugeesnotwelcome women are less visible. 
However, this lack of visibility operates in a similar way to highlight 
the desertion of women in the geographic location that the refugees 
are fleeing from, thus reaffirming the notion that Muslim nations are 
places where there are oppressed women to be rescued (Rettberg, 
2016, p. 17). 
Scholars continue to prioritize hegemonic knowledge. While it is important 
to highlight this, doing this alone leads us to make assumptions about 
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women’s agency. Instead, women need to be offered a platform to express 
their own concerns and agencies. Therefore, studying the narratives of 
Syrian refugees as well as other refugees is needed. In particular, studying 
their lived experiences in relation to Western hegemonic knowledge allows 
us to highlight convergences and divergences between the two sets of 
knowledge as a way of breaking down binaries.   
 
My project has also pointed to the need for more studies to look into the 
precarious situation of Iraqi female refugees. It is clear that almost fifteen 
years after the US-led 2003 invasion, there is a lack of peace, and the 
situation of Iraqi refugees in Jordan has not improved (given their lack of 
refugee status). When thinking of ways to develop the work on Iraqi 
women’s situations, Al-Ali and Pratt (2016, pp. 22–34) invite us to consider 
achieving peace and demanding more for women’s rights in a critical way: 
 
Given our findings on Iraq, real peace cannot be achieved without 
an end to the global and local inequalities that are linked to 
imperialism, neoliberalism, authoritarianism, and militarism. A 
legalistic focus on rights or gender quotas, as happened under the 
US occupation of Iraq, allows politicians to give lip service to 
‘women’s rights’, whilst ignoring whether such measures lead to 
tangible improvements for women on the ground. 
 
This demonstrates there is a need for more studies that focus on women’s 
narratives, rather than just statistics about their situation. New studies of 
women’s narratives would help us understand how women perceive 
insecurity and reveal their own agency in addressing insecurity. Future 
studies examining marginalized people should not only focus on victim 
narratives but also highlight their agency as a necessary tool for countering 
hegemonic knowledge about them.  
 
Studies which examine the lives of women in conflict situations continues to 
be marginalized in mainstream IR. As recent as 2016, feminist scholars 
continue to call for more studies that theorize and take seriously the role of 
gender and women in the relation to the war on terror and its aftermath:  
 
There is now a rapidly growing body of literature examining the 
development, motivation, and effects of this US-led aggression […] 
However, what is virtually absent from these accounts is an 
examination of the central role that gender, as it intersects with 
other identities such as race, class, sexuality, nationality and 
religion, plays in the war on terror. In part, this reflects the 
conventional way of thinking about international relations, in 
general, and wars, in particular. That is, states, state leaders, 
militaries, international organizations, global capitalists and, in this 
particular case, transnational terrorist organizations, are assumed 
 171 
to be the most important actors in international conflicts. Women, 
when and if they appear, are typically represented as being acted 
upon rather than as actors themselves. In terms of the war on terror, 
we can see this in portrayals of women as casualties of the 9/11 
attacks, mothers of fallen soldiers, victims of repressive dictators, 
and widows rebuilding their lives in the aftermath of war. (Hunt & 
Rygiel, 2016, p.1) 
 
We need to amplify a range of different voices in order to address power 
imbalances. Hunt & Rygiel’s argument about highlighting women’s 
experiences has implications for how we think about Security Studies and 
International politics. My project has demonstrated how women’s narratives 
of security and agency complicate conventional understanding of security, 
in part because of the difficulties of conceiving security in abstract terms. I 
demonstrated that not all women’s needs were being accurately addressed 
by the home or host governments. Since each woman had a different 
definition of what it meant to feel secure, ideas of security need to embody a 
more personal approach to security.  These findings have relevance for 
scholars researching marginalized women in post-conflict situations, as one 
prominent example. We must continue to challenge the often abstract ideas 
of security and realist paradigms of mainstream IR, which have undervalued 
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Appendix: Biographical accounts 
It was very important for the project to include these biographies regardless 
of length, in order to provide as much background context on the lives of the 
women who have shared their stories about the 2003 US-led conflict of Iraq. 
 
Shayma 
Shayma was born in Maysan, Iraq on the 29th of July 1965 to a writer and a 
housewife. Iraq remains her place of residence. She is married with six 
children and is an avowed Sunni devotee.  
 
Shayma completed a diploma in accounting and currently works as a 
feminist activist (Na’shita Nisawiya). She is head of the first feminist 
organisation—focusing primarily on women’s interests and spreading 
democracy—in her district. Shayma met some US officials during the 
occupation to discuss the writing of the constitution and the mechanisms of 
Iraqi democracy. She is still in touch with US officials who were stationed 
in her place of residence, Al Kut. 
 
Dalal 
Dalal was born in Amarah, Iraq on the 29th of June 1978 to a housewife and 
a water and sewage worker. She left Iraq to seek refuge in Jordan on the 19th 
of March 2015. Dalal does not plan on returning to Iraq, as she fears for her 
life. She is single and describes her religious affiliation as Sabaean. Dalal 
did not go to university and is currently unemployed.  
 
Khadeeja 
Khadeeja was born in Amarah, Iraq on the 7th of January 1989 to a 
housewife and a water and sewage worker. Like her sister Dalal, Khadeeja 
left Iraq on the 19th of March 2015 to seek refuge in Jordan. Khadeeja does 
not plan to return to Iraq as she deems the level of terrorism too high. She 
has also received anonymous death threats. Khadeeja is single and describes 




Sameera was born in Mosul, Iraq on the 18th of August 1970 to a timber 
merchant and a housewife, who Sameera said had managed to complete her 
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primary education. Troubled by the war, Sameera decided to leave Iraq. She 
moved to Syria for 8 months before settling in Jordan where she is currently 
based. She is married with three children. Sameera describes herself as a 
religious Sunni but sees no difference between different sects. Sameera 
herself obtained a degree in mechanical engineering from the University of 
Mosul. She is currently without an official job, as Iraqis are not permitted to 
work in Jordan; instead she works secretly for a charity supporting refugee 
Iraqi families.  
 
Christina 
Christina was born in Kirkush, Iraq in 1945 to a housewife and a farmer. 
Her father passed away when she was aged 3. She left Iraq on the 19th of 
August 2014 to seek a safe haven in Jordan. Christina does not plan to 
return to Iraq. She lost her home and belongings around the time when 
Daesh appeared, and thus has nowhere to return to. She describes herself as 
a religious Christian. Christina is married with seven children. She 
completed a diploma in teaching and is now retired.  
 
Aisha 
Aisha was born in Baghdad, Iraq in 1979 to a housewife and an electrician. 
She currently resides in Jordan. She has not attended university and is 
currently unemployed. She is married with three children. Aisha describes 
herself as a religious Sunni.  
 
Hajjar 
Hajjar was born in Baghdad, Iraq in 1975 to a housewife and accountant. 
Hajjar now resides in Jordan. She is married with five children. Hajjar 
belongs to the Sunni sect of Islam. Hajjar has not completed a university 
degree but undertook training in healthcare and human development. She 
works as a social researcher in health. She also works for a charity 
supporting Iraqi refugee families.  
 
Kawther 
Kawther was born in Al-Qadisiya, Iraq in 1973. Her father is retired, and her 
mother is a housewife. Kawther left Iraq for Syria in 2007, and then on the 
25th of December 2014 settled in Jordan. She has no plans to return to Iraq, 
as the current situation is unstable. Kawther is married with three boys and 
four girls. She describes herself as a Sabaean devotee. Kawther has not 




Zainab was born in Mosul, Iraq in 1965. Her father is deceased, and her 
mother is a housewife. Zainab studied Chemistry at Mosul University. She 
left Iraq in 2007 and lived in Syria for five to six years before settling in 
Jordan. She plans to return to Iraq but is waiting for the situation in Iraq to 
stabilise. She is a housewife and a mother of four boys and two girls.  
 
Samantha 
Samantha was born in Kirkush, Iraq in 1975 to two teachers. She left Iraq on 
the 18th of August 2014 to reside in Jordan. She describes herself as a 
religious Christian. She is unmarried. She studied Biology at the University 
of Mosul. She used to work for the health ministry in Iraq but is currently 
unemployed in Jordan.  
 
Tala 
Tala was born on the 2nd of May 1980 in Baghdad but lived in Nasiriyah, 
Iraq. Her mother is a housewife and her father are a teacher. She has not 
completed a university degree. However, Tala has her own small business 
sewing clothes at home and she also works in a salon. She describes herself 
as a religious Sunni who fulfils her religious obligations such as praying and 
fasting. Tala mentioned that she has been twice married. Her oldest daughter 
(from her previous marriage) is married and still resides in Iraq. Tala has 
three children from her second husband. She does not plan to return to Iraq 
but instead would like to migrate to the US with her family in order to join 
her two brothers who reside there. 
 
Hanady 
Hanady was born in Basra on the 30th of April 1948. She has a son who 
passed away, three daughters and nine grandchildren. She describes herself 
as a religious Sunni. Her dad worked on formalities for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. He worked his way up until he became an ambassador. He 
retired in 1960. Her mother is a housewife. The nature of her father’s work 
meant that Hanady had to move countries every three years and so pursuing 
a higher education was never her focus. She completed her GCSEs but did 
not go to university as she married at 18. Her husband decided to study in 
England during which time she undertook a Secretarial and Administration 
course and managed to find work. 
 
Hanady worked at French company based in Iraq for 14 years. She is 
currently involved in humanitarian work. She set up a charity five years ago 
when she first noticed that the number Iraqi refugees in Jordan had 
increased and were in need for support, such as providing food, livestock or 
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help with paying off their medical operations. Many have been struck by 
cancer resulting from the weapons that have been used in Iraq, and she 
thinks the problem is spreading amongst adults and children. The price of 
treatment in Jordan is exorbitant. Thus, she began launching appeals online. 
She received funds from donors which she then distributes amongst 
deprived individuals. She settled in Jordan in 2004 after having lived in 




Abeer was born in 1970 in Iraq to parents who were both teachers. She 
obtained a degree in Administration from the University of Baghdad. She is 
unemployed in Jordan, but when she lived in Iraq she used to teach at an 
Academy. She describes herself as somewhat religious, emphasizing that 
she is not overly religious. She comes from a mixed religious background: 
her father is Sunni and her mother are Shia. She is married to a university 
professor and has three children, two girls and a boy. She left Iraq in 2009 
and lived in Libya for four years before settling. At present, she has no plans 
to return to Iraq. However, if the situation in Iraq improves, she would be 
willing to move back to Iraq. 
 
Shatha 
Shatha was born in Baghdad in 1992 to a mother who works in 
humanitarian aid and a father who works in the pastry industry. She studied 
genetic engineering at the University of Philadelphia in Jordan and is 
currently unemployed. She describes herself a religious Sunni. She left Iraq 
in 2007. Based on the current situation, she has no plans to return to Iraq 
because of the lack of safety. If the situation improves, she will ‘100% 
return to Iraq’. 
 
Ruby 
Ruby was born in Mosul in 1977. Her mother is a housewife and father are 
retired. She studied medicine at the University of Mosul. She currently does 
not work in Jordan but in Iraq. She worked as a doctor in Al-hamdaniya 
hospital and worked at a clinic in the afternoons. Ruby described herself as a 
deeply devout Christian and even has said ‘a person without religion has no 
worth’. She is married and has four girls and a boy.  
 
 
She left Iraq on the 18th of August 2014 and has never lived in another 
country prior to moving to Jordan. She told me that she definitely does not 
want to return to Iraq. Her goal at the moment is to immigrate to reunite 




Iman was born in Jordan in 1988. Her father is the delegate minister of Arab 
Universities but is now retired. Her mother runs a school. Iman studied 
marketing at Al Zaytoonah University in Jordan, which is a private institute. 
She currently works as a teacher at her mother’s school. She describes 
herself as Muslim and does not affiliate herself with any sect of Islam. 
 
 
Iman never lived in Iraq, but she visited the country once or twice a year. 
She mentioned that she never lived anywhere other than Jordan. Her parents 
moved to Jordan in 1979 as their work was based in Jordan and they decided 
to settle here. However, she would still consider moving to Iraq if the 
situation in Iraq improves.  
 
Bushra 
Bushra was born in Baghdad in 1976. Her father is an engineer who used to 
work for the government and her mother worked for the ministry of 
planning. She never completed her secondary school education and is 
currently unemployed. She describes herself as a moderate Shi’a although 
she does not like announcing it. She is married and is a mother of two boys 
and two girls. She left Iraq in 2001 with her family and has no current plans 
to return to Iraq, although she might in the future. 
 
Asra 
Asra was born in Baghdad in 1973. Her father is a solider in the Iraqi army 
and her mother is an elementary school teacher who teaches religion, 
Islamic studies and maths. Asra completed a diploma in teaching but is 
currently unemployed in Jordan. She describes herself as a religious Sunni. 
Asra is married with three daughters and a son. 
 
 
Asra left Iraq in 2007. She intends to errantly return to Iraq once the 
situation improves. In fact, during the interview, she was very happy to 
mention that she will be visiting Baghdad the day after our interview, giving 
her some hope for a safer Iraq. 
 
Ebithal 
Ebithal was born in Iraq in 1961. She is married with children and holds a 
PhD in Media and Communications. She currently does not work in Jordan, 
but in Iraq she used to be a Public Relations manager. She has experience 
working with Americans at a media station. She has no plans to return to 
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Iraq and is considering migrating to the US, as she has been told that life in 
the US is comfortable and they take care of seniors and ill people.  
 
 
 
